CHOI v. CHOI (2026)

In this declaratory judgment action, Kang Hee Choi (the “Daughter”) appeals the trial court's final judgment: (1) declaring that a quitclaim deed executed by Kwan Bok Choi (the “Father”) validly transferred certain real property to Abraham Jang Kyong Choi (the “Son”); and (2) cancelling a separate quitclaim deed transferring the property from the Father to the Daughter. We affirm.

In the appellate review of a bench trial, we will not set aside the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and this Court properly gives due deference to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. But when a question of law is at issue, we review the trial court's decision de novo.

Stonewall v. Stonewall, 368 Ga. App. 292, 293, 890 S.E.2d 59 (2023) (punctuation omitted).

So viewed, on June 25, 2016, the Father executed a quitclaim deed conveying his interest in the real property located at 1885 Watercrest Circle, Lawrenceville, Gwinnett County, Georgia 30043 (the “Property”) to the Son (the “First Quitclaim Deed”) for “the sum of one dollar ․ and other good and valuable consideration.” The Father's execution of the First Quitclaim Deed was witnessed by a notary public and the Son as an unofficial witness. Two days later, on June 27, 2016, the Father executed a second quitclaim deed, again purporting to convey his interest in the Property to the Daughter (the “Second Quitclaim Deed”) for “the sum of TEN ․ Dollars and other good and valuable considerations in hand[.]” The Father's execution of the Second Quitclaim Deed was witnessed by a notary public and an employee of the law firm that assisted in the execution of that deed. The First Quitclaim Deed was recorded on July 18, 2016, and the Second Quitclaim Deed was recorded on August 12, 2016.

On July 22, 2016, the Father executed his last will and testament, in which he devised the Property to the Daughter. The Father died in October 2016.

In July 2022, the Son filed a petition for declaratory judgment, seeking a ruling that he was the sole owner of the Property. The Daughter counterclaimed for tortious interference with inheritance and tortious interference with gift expectancy and sought a declaratory judgment that the Second Quitclaim Deed was valid and that the First Quitclaim Deed was invalid. Both parties moved for summary judgment. After a hearing, the trial court denied both motions. The trial court then held a bench trial. The trial court heard testimony from witnesses, including the attorney who prepared the Father's will, the attorney whose law firm prepared the Second Quitclaim Deed, the Son, and the Son's wife.¹

The trial court then entered its final judgment, declaring that: (1) the Son was the sole legal owner of the Property by virtue of the First Quitclaim Deed; (2) the Second Quitclaim Deed was void; and (3) the Father's will purporting to devise or bequeath the Property was ineffective and did not alter the legal effect of the First Quitclaim Deed. The final judgment also dismissed the Daughter's counterclaims. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the Daughter argues that the trial court erred in enforcing the First Quitclaim Deed against her because it was invalidly executed.² We disagree. “[B]efore any deed to realty ․ or other recordable instrument executed in this state may be recorded, it shall be an original instrument and shall be attested or acknowledged as provided by law.” OCGA § 44-2-14(a). To that end, OCGA § 44-5-30 states that

a deed to lands shall be an original document, in writing, signed by the maker, attested by an officer as provided in Code Section 44-2-15, and attested by one other witness. It shall be delivered to the purchaser or his or her representative and be made on a good or valuable consideration. The consideration of a deed may always be inquired into when the principles of justice require it.

Here, the Daughter argues that “[t]he sole issue presented is whether the first deed takes priority over the second deed where the first was invalidly attested by the grantee as the only ‘unofficial witness.’ ” The Daughter, however, does not argue that the Father otherwise validly executed the First Quitclaim Deed. In fact, the Daughter concedes on appeal that the Father executed both the First Quitclaim Deed and the Second Quitclaim Deed.

Despite the statutory requirement that the signature of the maker of a deed must be attested by an officer as provided in Code Section 44-2-15 and one other witness, the requirement relates only to the recordability of the instrument. See Hooten v. Goldome Credit Corp., 224 Ga. App. 581, 583(2), 481 S.E.2d 550 (1997) (interpreting former version of OCGA § 44-5-30). And while “[a] deed not executed in precisely the manner prescribed in OCGA § 44-5-30 is not properly recordable and therefore does not give constructive notice to all the world. ․ As between the parties themselves, however, the deed is valid and binding, absent fraud and certain other conditions.” Duncan v. Ball, 172 Ga. App. 750, 752(2), 324 S.E.2d 477 (1984) (citation omitted); Z & Y Corp. v. Indore C. Stores, Inc., 282 Ga. App. 163, 173(2)(b)(i), 638 S.E.2d 760 (2006) (a written deed signed by the grantor is valid and binding on the parties, even if the deed is not properly attested or recorded); Allgood v. Allgood, 230 Ga. 312, 313(3), 196 S.E.2d 888 (1973) (“Attestation of a deed only affects its recordability.”). And the allegation that the deed was improperly witnessed is insufficient to void a deed, since a deed without attestation conveys the title as against the grantor and his heirs. Budget Charge Accounts v. Peters, 213 Ga. 17, 19(4), 96 S.E.2d 887 (1957).

In addition, we recognize that, as a general rule, “a bona fide purchaser for value is protected against outstanding interests in land of which the purchaser has no notice.” Brock v. Yale Mtg. Corp., 287 Ga. 849, 852(2), 700 S.E.2d 583 (2010) (punctuation omitted). But the Daughter does not contend on appeal that she was a bona fide purchaser for value. And, in fact, there was evidence that the conveyance in the Second Quitclaim Deed was not for valuable consideration: the family relationship between the parties; the Daughter swore in an affidavit that the “[F]ather ․ had gifted his house to me in the summer of 2016”; the consideration was trivial; and the Daughter did not show that she paid any other consideration for the property. See Price v. Price, 286 Ga. 753, 755, 692 S.E.2d 601 (2010) (holding that the trial court erred in concluding that the appellee was a bona fide purchaser for value where the evidence, including that the parties were married and the trivial amount of the consideration, showed that the conveyance was not for valuable consideration). Thus, because the Daughter was not a bona fide purchaser for value, she was not protected against the Son's interest in the land by way of the First Quitclaim Deed – even if the First Quitclaim Deed was not recordable, because it was valid against the grantor (the Father) and his heirs (the Daughter). See Duncan, 172 Ga. App. at 752(2), 324 S.E.2d 477; Budget Charge Accounts, 213 Ga. at 19(4), 96 S.E.2d 887.

Accordingly, the Daughter has not shown that the trial court erred in ruling that the Son was the sole legal owner of the Property by virtue of the First Quitclaim Deed.³

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   According to the trial court's final judgment, the trial court conducted a five-day bench trial where the Father's five children and other non-party witnesses testified. For reasons that are not clear, the trial court only transmitted a copy of the transcript of the final day of the bench trial, which included testimony of the Son and the other witnesses described above. While it ultimately does not affect the outcome of this appeal, we remind litigants before this Court that it is the burden of the appellant to ensure that a complete record is transmitted to this Court on appeal. See Shelton v. State, 350 Ga. App. 774, 780(2) n.17, 830 S.E.2d 335 (2019).

2.   In her appellate brief, the Daughter does not challenge the trial court's dismissal of her counterclaims for tortious interference with inheritance or tortious interference with gift expectancy, and she therefore has abandoned any claim she may have had in that regard. See Massey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 363 Ga. App. 588, 592, 871 S.E.2d 685 (2022).

3.   Because the First Quitclaim Deed was valid between the Father and the Son, we do not address the Daughter's argument that the First Quitclaim Deed did not meet the requirements for recordability due to its improper execution.

Padgett, Judge.

McFadden, P. J., and Watkins, J., concur.