INTEREST OF v. << (2026)

In this delinquency proceeding, minor child A. C. challenges the juvenile court's order upholding the use of secure sanctions, including a seven-day detention. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the juvenile court's order upholding the sanction is a nullity, which must be vacated, and we are thus unable to reach the merits of A. C.’s claims.

Construed in favor of the juvenile court's findings,¹ the record shows that in September 2023, the State filed a delinquency petition against then-13-year-old A. C., alleging that he had interfered with government property. A. C. admitted that he committed criminal trespass, and the matter was held in abeyance for four months in order to complete a social history. In March 2024, the juvenile court adjudicated A. C. delinquent based on his commission of the offense of criminal trespass, a misdemeanor,² and ordered him to a probation management program (PMP). See OCGA § 15-11-605. A PMP is “a special condition of probation that includes graduated sanctions” for violations of the terms of one's probation, and the sanctions range from verbal warnings to community service, electronic monitoring, or home confinement. OCGA § 15-11-471(5) & (11). The court also imposed on A. C. numerous conditions of probation, including requiring him to report to his probation officer as directed, avoid illegal drugs, and follow all school rules.

The juvenile court adjudicated A. C. delinquent twice more in 2024 based on violations of the terms of his probation and ordered him to continue on the PMP, but with “secure sanctions,” which can include confinement in a secure or nonsecure residential facility for seven, fourteen, or thirty days. See OCGA §§ 15-11-471(12); 15-11-605(a)(2). As relevant to this case, A. C.’s most recent adjudication and disposition was entered on November 21, 2024. He filed no appeal from that order.

In the latter part of 2024, in accordance with the PMP, A. C.’s probation officer subjected him to several graduated sanctions due to additional violations. Then, in February 2025, after A. C. again violated the conditions of his probation by being expelled from school, his probation officer sought to sanction him with a seven-day detention. A hearing was held before the chief probation officer, during which A. C. admitted to being in violation of the PMP due to his expulsion. The chief probation officer determined that A. C. had failed to respond to graduated sanctions and was eligible to serve seven days in detention. On February 28, 2025, the juvenile court issued an order authorizing the detention at a regional youth detention center. See generally OCGA § 15-11-605(f) (outlining the procedure by which a juvenile's probation officer may request and the court may order a secure sanction). A. C. was thereafter detained for seven days.

Rather than appeal to this Court from the February 28 detention order, on March 5, 2025, A. C. filed an emergency motion for the juvenile court to review his detention on the basis that he was ineligible for the secure sanction of detention as a matter of law. On the same day, he also filed a demand for administrative review of the chief probation officer's decision in accordance with OCGA § 15-11-605(g)(2). One week later, on March 12, in a decision that is not a part of the record on appeal, the chief probation officer affirmed his earlier decision regarding the seven-day detention. On March 27, 2025, A. C. filed an appeal of the chief probation officer's March 12 decision to the juvenile court and requested a hearing. Following an April 2025 hearing, the juvenile court issued an order on August 5, 2025, denying A. C.’s appeal of the chief probation officer's decision and upholding its imposition of the seven-day detention as a secure sanction. A. C. filed a timely application for discretionary review from the August 5 order, which this Court granted, noting that the order appeared to be subject to direct appeal as a final judgment. See OCGA § 5-6-35(j). This appeal follows.³

In two related claims of error, A. C. contends that the juvenile court imposed a “void disposition” when it ordered him to the PMP with secure sanctions and ordered him detained for seven days. But before we can consider the merits of A. C.’s argument, we must first address the procedural posture of this appeal.

Pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-605(g), juveniles are entitled to certain procedural safeguards when sanctioned while on a PMP. When a hearing officer determines that a child has violated the conditions of probation, the probation officer can impose graduated sanctions, OCGA § 15-11-605(g)(1), or ask the juvenile court to impose secure sanctions, OCGA § 15-11-605(f). Thereafter, the Juvenile Code provides a regimented procedure for challenging a sanction. Specifically, under OCGA § 15-11-605(g)

(2) A hearing officer's decision [imposing a sanction] shall be final unless such child files, within five days of the service of such decision, a written demand with the hearing officer who conducted the administrative hearing for review of such decision. Such demand shall not stay the sanction decision. Such hearing officer shall issue a response to such demand within five days of receiving such demand.

(3) If such hearing officer insists on the sanction, his or her decision shall be final unless the child subject to the sanction files an appeal in the court that originally adjudicated such child. Such appeal shall be filed within ten days of the date of the decision of the hearing officer.

(4) The appeal shall first be reviewed by the court upon the record. At the court's discretion, a de novo hearing may be held on the decision. The filing of the appeal shall not stay the sanction decision.

(5) Where the court does not act on the appeal within 15 days of the date of the filing of the appeal, the sanction decision shall be affirmed by operation of law.

(Emphasis added.)

Under OCGA § 15-11-605(g)(2), A. C. timely filed his request for the chief probation officer, who was acting as a hearing officer, to review his February 28 decision recommending the secure sanction. But even assuming that we could consider the chief probation officer's ensuing March 12 decision affirming his February 28 decision, which is not in the record, A. C. did not file an appeal to the juvenile court until March 27 — fifteen days after the March 12 decision — and therefore his appeal to the juvenile court was not timely under OCGA § 15-11-605(g)(3) (requiring such an appeal to be filed not later than ten days after hearing officer's decision insisting on the sanction). And even if we construed the emergency motion on March 5 to be a premature request for review of the secure sanction to the juvenile court on the basis that the sanction was not permitted by statute, see Razavi v. Emily, 371 Ga. App. 878, 882(3), 903 S.E.2d 153 (2024) (explaining that “appellate courts look to the substance of a pleading, not merely its nomenclature”), the emergency motion ripened upon the chief probation officer's affirmance of the sanction decision on March 12, and the juvenile court was thereafter required to “act on the appeal” within 15 days of the filing or ripening of the appeal — March 27 — or the sanction decision would be affirmed by operation of law. OCGA § 15-11-605(g)(5).

The juvenile court took no action on or before March 27,⁴ and the sanction decision was thereby affirmed by operation of law no later than March 27. As such, the juvenile court's August 5 order was a nullity, as the sanction had already been affirmed by operation of law.⁵ See OCGA § 15-11-605(g)(5). See also Kool Smiles/NCDR, LLC v. Gonzalez, 342 Ga. App. 503, 504(1), 803 S.E.2d 795 (2017) (holding that the trial court's order was a nullity when the court failed to act within statutory time limit); Kennestone Hosp., Inc. v. Cartersville Med. Ctr., Inc., 341 Ga. App. 28, 30–33(1), 798 S.E.2d 381 (2017) (explaining that once a decision is affirmed by operation of law pursuant to a statute, any further trial court orders are a nullity). A trial court order that is a nullity must be vacated. See, e.g., Kelly v. State, 315 Ga. 444, 448(2), 883 S.E.2d 363 (2023); Am. Plumbing Profs., Inc. v. ServeStar, LLC, 367 Ga. App. 233, 233, 885 S.E.2d 255 (2023) (explaining that this Court cannot ignore the nullity of a trial court's decision). Accordingly, we vacate the juvenile court's August 5 order.

Having vacated that August 5 order, we now consider whether we can review the merits of A. C.’s challenge to the validity of the secure sanction specifically or to his disposition generally. Even though a juvenile court retains jurisdiction to consider and correct a void disposition in a juvenile delinquency action, see, e.g., In the Interest of D. B., 341 Ga. App. 559, 565(1), 802 S.E.2d 19 (2017), a vacated order cannot serve as a basis for appeal to this Court and we cannot consider the merits of the appellant's challenge to such an order. See, e.g., Kool Smiles/NCDR, 342 Ga. App. at 504(2), 803 S.E.2d 795; Kennestone Hosp., 341 Ga. App. at 33(2), 798 S.E.2d 381.

Judgment vacated.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See, e.g., In the Interest of H. P., 368 Ga. App. 222, 222, 889 S.E.2d 408 (2023).

2.   See OCGA § 16-7-21(d).

3.   We note that it is not clear from the record whether A. C. has been subject to additional secure sanctions beyond the seven-day detention.

4.   The juvenile court's first possible action was the issuance of a rule nisi on March 28 setting a hearing for April 30.

5.   A. C.’s March 5 emergency motion set forth none of the grounds for modifying or vacating a juvenile court order pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-32, such as fraud, mistake, lack of jurisdiction, newly discovered evidence, or changed circumstances. See OCGA § 15-11-32(a)(1)–(3). Accordingly, the ensuing August 5 order cannot be considered an order denying a motion for modification. See In the Interest of A. C. J., 211 Ga. App. 865, 866, 440 S.E.2d 751 (1994) (holding that a motion that made no reference to factors that would warrant vacating or modifying a juvenile court order cannot be treated as a motion to vacate or modify).

Fuller, Senior Judge.

Doyle, P. J., and Davis, J., concur.