SQUIRES v. VINCENT (2026)

This case arises out a March 2023 motor vehicle collision involving Weston Vincent and State Farm Automobile Insurance Company's insured, Carl Squires. Vincent's alleged injuries exceed policy limits. Consequently State Farm could have been liable to Squires if it had failed in bad faith “to settle a claim within the policy limits based on a time-limited settlement offer by [Vincent's] attorney.” S. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 416 S.E.2d 274 (1992).

The question before us is whether Vincent's claim against Squires has been settled. The answer to that question is controlled by OCGA § 9-11-67.1, which regulates offers to settle such claims. That statute was enacted in 2013 and amended in 2021 and 2024. Because the communications at issue took place prior to the effective date of the 2024 amendment, the 2021 version controls.

These related appeals challenge the trial court's finding that there was not an enforceable settlement agreement under OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (2021). We must reverse that finding under our recent decision in Gomez v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., ––– Ga. App. ––––, ––– S.E.2d –––– (Case No. A25A2187, decided Feb. 13, 2026), 2026 WL 409522, 2026 Ga. App. LEXIS 88.

In Gomez we held, under circumstances similar to those here, that there was an enforceable settlement agreement under OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (2021). So we likewise hold that there was an enforceable settlement agreement here and reverse the trial court's rulings premised on that erroneous finding — denials of a motion to enforce the settlement agreement and a motion for summary judgment on a breach of contract claim.

1. Facts and procedural posture

“In reviewing the trial court's order on both a motion to enforce a settlement agreement and a motion for summary judgment, we apply a de novo standard of review and, thus, view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Barnes v. Martin-Price, 353 Ga. App. 621, 623 (1), 838 S.E.2d 916 (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). So viewed, the record shows that in February 2024, Vincent sent State Farm a six-page offer of settlement. The letter stated that the offer was “not made pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-67.1,” but was “made pursuant to and governed by common law.” The letter included all of the statutory material terms set out in OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (a) (2021),¹ as well as various non-statutory terms.

State Farm timely responded, providing, in pertinent part:

As an initial matter, State Farm's position is that your offer is controlled by OCGA § 9-11-67.1, and pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (b) (1), State Farm does not agree to any terms of your offer beyond the material terms required by OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (a) (1) and permitted by OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (a) (3).

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (b) (2), State Farm accepts the terms of your offer in their entirety, to the extent that they consist of the material terms outlined in OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (a).

Vincent replied to State Farm's response by claiming it was a rejection of the offer. State Farm sent Vincent a follow-up letter, explaining that it “considers this matter to have been settled” and including an affidavit of insurance, a settlement check, and a limited release. Vincent returned the check, claiming that State Farm's response to his offer did not amount to an acceptance.

In March 2024, Vincent filed suit against Squires, seeking damages for injuries allegedly sustained in the motor vehicle collision. Squires filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, asserting that State Farm and Vincent had entered into a binding agreement under OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (2021). Vincent opposed the motion, arguing that common law principles, not OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (2021), applied to his offer. The trial court agreed with Vincent and denied the motion to enforce; it ruled that under common law principles, no agreement had been reached because State Farm's response was not an acceptance of Vincent's offer.

State Farm filed a separate complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that there was an enforceable settlement agreement under OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (b) (2) (2021) or, alternatively, a declaration that Vincent's offer was invalid under OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (b) (1). State Farm amended its complaint to add a breach of contract claim based on Vincent's rejection of the settlement agreement and a claim for attorney fees under OCGA § 13-6-11.

State Farm moved for summary judgment on all its claims, and Vincent moved to dismiss the complaint. The trial court granted Vincent's motion to dismiss the two counts seeking declaratory judgment; it found that those counts failed to state appropriate claims for declaratory relief. In the same order, the court also denied State Farm's motion for summary judgment as to the breach of contract and attorney fees claims, finding that no settlement agreement had been formed.

In Case No. A25A2137, Squires appeals from the denial of his motion to enforce the settlement agreement. He argues that the trial court erred by determining that the parties did not have an enforceable agreement under OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (2021).

In Case No. A25A2138, State Farm appeals from the trial court's order denying its motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim and granting Vincent's motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment claims. State Farm also argues that the trial court erred in finding that the parties did not have an enforceable settlement agreement.² Because the appeals arise from the same underlying transaction and involve the same dispositive issue, we consider them together.

2. Applicability of OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (2021)

As we held in Gomez, “OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (2021) applied to ‘any offer to settle a tort claim for personal injury, bodily injury, or death arising from the use of a motor vehicle and prepared by or with the assistance of an attorney on behalf of a claimant or claimants’ made ‘prior to the filing of an answer.’ ” Gomez, supra at 7 (1), ––– Ga. App. at ––––, ––– S.E.2d –––– (footnotes, punctuation, and emphasis omitted). Here the offer was extended before an answer was filed. So OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (2021) applies.

3. Enforceable settlement agreement under OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (2021)

Squires and State Farm assert, contrary to the trial court, that the parties did have an enforceable settlement agreement under OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (2021) and so that Squires’ motion to enforce and State Farm's motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim were due to be granted. We agree because, as explained by Gomez, an enforceable settlement agreement was reached by the parties under OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (2021).

In Gomez, as in the instant cases, the plaintiff made a settlement offer to an insurance company; claimed that it was not governed by the 2021 version of OCGA § 9-11-67.1 and was instead governed by common law; and included not only the material terms for such an offer as provided by OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (a) (2021), but also other terms not provided by that code section. Gomez, supra at 3-4, ––– Ga. App. at ––––, ––– S.E.2d ––––. The insurance company maintained that the offer was governed by OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (2021), accepted only the material terms of the offer in accordance with that code section, and did not agree to any terms other than those material terms provided under OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (a) (2021). Gomez, supra at 4-5, ––– Ga. App. at ––––, ––– S.E.2d ––––.

Under those circumstances, this court held that the settlement offer was governed by OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (2021), not common law principles, and that a binding settlement agreement was reached upon the insurance company's written acceptance of the material terms provided by that statute. As this court explained:

[The insurance company] agreed in writing only to the statutory material terms of [the plaintiff's] offer and rejected any non-statutory terms. And as we recently explained, a recipient can accept an offer under the statutory terms or it can agree to be bound by more terms. If the offeror and recipient both agree in writing to operate under additional terms, common-law principles still apply (as discussed in Redfearn [v. Moore, 371 Ga. App. 655, 902 S.E.2d 233 (2024)]). But in the absence of such a mutual agreement, extraneous terms are irrelevant to the formation of a binding contract under OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (2021). As a result, a binding settlement agreement was formed under the plain language of OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (b) (1) and (b) (2) (2021) when [the insurance company] accepted the material statutory terms of the offer in writing. The trial court did not err, then, in concluding that an agreement was reached as to those terms and those terms alone.

Gomez, supra at 13-14 (2), ––– Ga. App. at ––––, ––– S.E.2d –––– (citations, punctuation, and footnotes omitted).

Likewise, in the instant cases, Vincent's offer of settlement to State Farm was governed by OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (2021); State Farm agreed to only the statutory material terms set forth in the offer and rejected any non-statutory terms; and therefore a binding settlement agreement was formed under OCGA § 9-11-67.1 when State Farm “accepted the material statutory terms of the offer in writing.” Gomez, supra at 14 (2), ––– Ga. App. at ––––, ––– S.E.2d ––––. So the trial court erred in concluding that a binding settlement agreement was not reached as to those material terms and erred in denying Squires’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement and in denying State Farm's motion for summary judgment on its claim for breach of that agreement. See Square v. Woods, 375 Ga. App. 319, 322, 915 S.E.2d 915 (2025) (whether there is an enforceable settlement agreement is a question of law for the court); The West Firm v. Cent. United Methodist Church of Atl., 373 Ga. App. 148, 149 (2), 907 S.E.2d 233 (2023) (summary judgment appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law).

4. Motion to dismiss

State Farm also sought two declaratory judgements, one seeking a determination that there was an enforceable settlement agreement and the other seeking — explicitly in the alternative — a determination that the offer was invalid. Squires did not seek to have the offer invalidated. On appeal State Farm challenges the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss the counts seeking those declaratory judgments. But given our holding above that there was an enforceable settlement agreement between the parties under OCGA § 9-11-67.1 and given that State Farm is entitled to summary judgment on its breach of contract claim, those declaratory judgment claims are now moot. We do not consider the rulings thereon because their resolution would not “have any practical effect on the underlying controversy[.]” Barrow v. Raffensperger, 308 Ga. 660, 667 (2) (b), 842 S.E.2d 884 (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).

The dissent contends that although Squires did not make the invalidity argument and State Farm made it only in the alternative, that argument must be considered first and should end our analysis. We disagree.

State Farm made that argument in the alternative and Squires made it not at all. Simply invalidating the offer prolongs this litigation. Analysis of the interplay between the statute's remedy provisions demonstrates that the remedy the General Assembly provided is formation of a binding settlement agreement.

Those remedy provisions compose OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (b) (2021):

(b) (1) Unless otherwise agreed by both the offeror and the recipients in writing, the terms outlined in subsection (a) of this Code section shall be the only terms which can be included in an offer to settle made under this Code section.

(b) (2) The recipients of an offer to settle made under this Code section may accept the same by providing written acceptance of the material terms outlined in subsection (a) of this Code section in their entirety.

(Emphasis added).

Both subsections are a single sentence. In subsection (1), the subject is “terms”; and the predicate is “shall be.” Subsection (1) sets out a rule, but does not expressly specify consequences.

Subsection (2) specifies consequences. Its subject is “recipients,”and its predicate is “may accept.” It expressly grants a power. The majority would effectively remove that power.

Subsections (b) (1) and (2) operate in tandem. The power set out in subsection (2) is activated if and only if the rule set out in subsection (1) is violated. Under the dissent's analysis subsection (2) would be effectively meaningless. Under Gomez both subsections are operative.

It may be fair to read into subsection (b) (1) an implication of the possibility of an offer being deemed void — for example an offer that omitted one or more of the material terms specified in subsection (a). But that is not the case before us. The case before us is controlled by subsection (b) (2)’s express grant to “[t]he recipients of an offer” of the power to “accept the same by providing written acceptance of the material terms outlined in subsection (a) of this Code section in their entirety.”

And contrary to the claims of the dissent, there are no material differences between these cases and Gomez. The dissent mentions the procedural postures, but Gomez involved a motion to enforce a settlement agreement and, regardless of procedural posture, addressed the same substantive issue under the same material facts as the instant cases — whether a settlement offer that included terms in addition to all of the required material terms under OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (b) (1) (2021) and an acceptance of only those material terms under OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (b) (2) (2021) formed an enforceable settlement agreement. After quoting those code subsections, Gomez went on to expressly hold: “As a result, a binding settlement agreement was formed under the plain language of OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (b) (1) and (b) (2) (2021) when [the insurance company] accepted the material statutory terms of the offer in writing. The trial court did not err, then, in concluding that an agreement was reached as to those terms and those terms alone.” Gomez, supra at 13-14 (2), ––– Ga. App. at ––––, ––– S.E.2d –––– (emphasis added). So contrary to the claim of the dissent, Gomez did find that there was a valid offer under (b) (1) and acceptance thereof under (b) (2), and we are bound by that decision.³ See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Par. III.

Judgments reversed in Case No. A25A2137 and Case No. A25A2138.

Because I do not believe that our decision in Gomez v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., A25A2187 (Ga. App. Feb. 13, 2026), ––– Ga. App. ––––, ––– S.E.2d ––––, 2026 WL 409522 answers the specific question before this Court on appeal, I must dissent.

This case presents two distinct questions: first, whether Vincent made a valid offer to settle under OCGA § 9-11-67.1(b)(1) (2021); and, second, if the offer was valid, whether State Farm/Squires could accept some but not all of the terms of that offer under OCGA § 9-11-67.1(b)(2) (2021) in order to create a binding settlement agreement. The majority opinion skips the first question to answer the second. However, I am of the mind that we must first consider whether Vincent made a valid offer under the statute in the first instance. And because I would conclude that Vincent did not make a valid offer to settle as required by subsection (b)(1), I would not reach the second question in this case.¹ Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the trial court in Case No. A25A2137 as right for any reason, and I would vacate the judgment of the trial court in Case No. A25A2138 and remand for the trial court to enter a judgment consistent with this writing.

Importantly, this case presents a different set of procedural facts than our decision in Gomez. As noted by the majority opinion, State Farm filed a declaratory action wherein it argued, among other things, that Vincent failed to make a valid offer to settle under OCGA § 9-11-67.1(b)(1) (2021). Maj. Op. at ––––. This issue was not presented to the Court in Gomez, nor does the opinion address the same. Instead, the Gomez decision focused exclusively on the issue of “whether the trial court erred by misreading OCGA § 9-11-67.1(2021) to override foundational contract principles and conclude that a settlement agreement existed when there was a lack of mutual assent as to its terms.” Gomez, slip op. at 14, ––– Ga. App. at ––––, ––– S.E.2d ––––. While the Gomez decision thoroughly discusses the development of Georgia case law on the differing versions of the relevant statute – and makes a passing reference to OCGA § 9-11-67.1(b)(1) (2021) – that decision does not expressly consider what the plain language of the statute says about a valid offer to settle. Therefore, the Gomez decision is not instructive as to the first question before this Court on appeal.²

Turning to the issue at hand, State Farm argues that the trial court's rulings on summary judgment and on its motion to dismiss were error because Vincent failed to make a valid offer under OCGA § 9-11-67.1(b)(1) (2021). I agree.

Under OCGA § 9-11-67.1(a), a plaintiff's pre-suit offer to settle must be made in writing and include certain material terms. Subsection (b)(1) of the statute provides that “[u]nless otherwise agreed by both the offeror and the recipients in writing, the terms outlined in subsection (a) of this Code section shall be the only terms which can be included in an offer to settle made under this Code section.” (Emphasis supplied).

Here, the parties did not agree to operate outside the confines of OCGA § 9-11-67.1. Indeed, State Farm, in writing, specifically rejected Vincent's request to operate under common law contract principles and, instead, made clear that it would only proceed under OCGA § 9-11-67.1. Consequently, in light of the mandatory language of “shall” and “only” in subsection (b)(1), State Farm's written refusal to operate outside the confines of OCGA § 9-11-67.1 required Vincent to send a pre-suit offer of settlement that included only the material terms of OCGA § 9-11-67.1(a)(1) if he wanted to make a valid offer to settle under the statute.³

Because Vincent's offer did not satisfy the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-67.1(a) and (b)(1), I would conclude that it was not a valid offer capable of being accepted, and, consequently, would affirm the trial court's judgment in Case No. A25A2137 as right for any reason. Cf. Lester v. Hampton, 377 Ga. App. 353, 356, 922 S.E.2d 595 (2025) (“Because Lester's offer was governed by OCGA § 9-11-67.1 but did not satisfy the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-67.1(a)(1), it was not a valid offer capable of being accepted. Consequently, there is no enforceable settlement agreement between the parties[.]”). For this same reason, I would vacate the trial court's judgment in Case No. A25A2138 and remand for the trial court to enter a new order.

Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1.   OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (a) (1) (2021) provided that an offer to settle “[s]hall contain the following material terms: (A) The time period within which such offer must be accepted, which shall be not less than 30 days from receipt of the offer; (B) Amount of monetary payment; (C) The party or parties the claimant or claimants will release if such offer is accepted; (D) For any type of release, whether the release is full or limited and an itemization of what the claimant or claimants will provide to each releasee; and (E) The claims to be released[.]”

2.   State Farm has raised no claim of error as to the trial court's denial of summary judgment on the claim for attorney fees.

3.   We acknowledge the concern expressed in the dissent's footnotes. Abridging freedom of contract is strong medicine. It is beyond our power to administer. See Hansen v. Doan, 320 Ga. App. 609, 619, 740 S.E.2d 338 (2013) (McFadden, J., dissenting). But although Vincent has asserted that OCGA § 9-11-67.1 is an overreach, he has cited no authority demonstrating that it is beyond the power of the General Assembly.

1.   Certainly, if I had to reach the second question in this case, then I would be bound by this Court's decision in Gomez, whether I agreed with it or not.

2.   Vincent has asked this Court to consider overruling Gomez, a question I need not delve into since I do not believe that Gomez controls here. That said, I question whether Gomez is correctly decided. First, the decision fails to analyze the interplay of subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2); that failure risks rendering OCGA § 9-11-67.1(b)(1) meaningless, which runs counter to our well-established duty when interpreting a statute. See SecureAlert, Inc. v. Boggs, 345 Ga. App. 812, 814, 815 S.E.2d 156 (2018). Further, the Gomez decision does not discuss the inclusion of the phrase “in its entirety” by the legislature in subsection (b)(2), and whether that phrase might impact what terms the recipient of an offer to settle may accept. In my mind, reading (b)(1) and (b)(2) together, as we must, the statute allows parties to, in effect, agree to agree on non-statutory settlement terms, or, in the absence of such an agreement, requires an offer that includes nothing but the statutory terms and requires an acceptance that mirrors that offer. Nothing more, nothing less, much like the common law “mirror image” rule. Finally, I question whether Gomez’s interpretation of the statute has triggered Due Process issues by, in effect, allowing a party to unilaterally revise an opposing party's offer and then bind that party in contract; this issue, which has been raised by Vincent on appeal, remains unaddressed.

3.   Of course, neither Vincent nor any plaintiff is required to make a pre-suit offer to settle. They may choose to make a settlement offer at a different time during the civil process. However, if a plaintiff wishes to proceed with a pre-suit offer to settle under this statute in hopes of pursuing a bad faith claim later down the line, then they must abide by the statute's requirements.

McFadden, Presiding Judge.

Hodges, J., concurs. Pipkin, J., dissents.