HAMILTON v. MOORE (2026)

Defendants David Hamilton and Deborah Davis (“the Defendants”) appeal from an order denying their motion for summary judgment against plaintiff William Moore on his claim for negligent misrepresentation. The Defendants argue that the trial court erred because the alleged representations at issue — that Hamilton and/or Davis had authority to enter into a lease with Moore on behalf of their employer, the City of Albany (“the City”) — were matters of law of which Moore is deemed to have knowledge and therefore not actionable negligent misrepresentations. We agree and reverse.

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Matjoulis v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 226 Ga. App. 459(1), 486 S.E.2d 684 (1997).

So viewed, the record shows that in 2018, the City and Moore executed a one-year lease agreement (“the Lease”) allowing Moore to farm hay at the Southwest Georgia Regional Airport, which is on City-owned property. The lease designated the City as the lessor, and it bore the signatures of Moore as lessee, Hamilton as the City's Transportation Director, and Davis with a handwritten date and no title. This was the third lease Moore had entered into to farm hay on the airport property.¹

Albany City Code § 12-36(c) provides that “[t]he aviation commission shall make no sales or conveyances of [airport] property, or agreements for the lease, rental or sale of any property, until such transactions have been approved by the board of city commissioners.” It is undisputed that the board of city commissioners had not formally approved the Lease. But according to Moore, he understood Hamilton to have authority to enter into the lease because Hamilton told him, “You can have the lease as long as you want it ․ There's no problem ․ You're doing a good job, sir ․ I got no problem signing off on it.” Hamilton's signature was applied with a stamp by Davis, who was an Administrative Manager.

A few months after the Lease was executed, Hurricane Michael made landfall in Georgia, causing widespread damage. In the aftermath, Dougherty County officials contacted the City to inquire about using airport property to temporarily stage storm debris. The City agreed and authorized the County to use airport property for “temporary staging, storage, and reduction of Hurricane Michael storm debris.” These activities were carried out on land Moore had been using to farm hay, preventing Moore from continuing his farming operation at the airport.

Moore objected, and a dispute arose over the enforceability of the Lease, resulting in Moore being banned from the property. Ultimately, Moore sued the City as well as Hamilton and Davis in their official and individual capacities. Moore alleged a claim for breach of contract against the City, as well as claims against all three defendants for ordinary negligence, negligent misrepresentation, punitive damages, and attorney fees under OCGA § 13-6-11. Discovery began, and the trial court eventually granted certain defensive motions resolving all claims except the individual capacity claims against the Defendants for negligent misrepresentation and ordinary negligence.²

After discovery was complete, the Defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims. In January 2025, following a hearing, the trial court entered an order merging the ordinary negligence claims with the negligent misrepresentation claims because they were based on the same conduct. It also entered summary judgment in favor of Hamilton and Davis with respect to the punitive damages and attorney fee claims. But it denied their motion for summary judgment as to the negligent misrepresentation claims against them in their individual capacities. In part, the court ruled that Moore could not be held responsible for failing to discover that the City commission needed to, but did not, officially approve the lease. The Defendants now appeal from that order.

The Defendants argue that Moore's negligent misrepresentation claim fails as a matter of law because the Defendants’ alleged misrepresentation — that they had authority to execute the Lease — was a matter of law of which Moore is deemed to have knowledge in this context. We agree.³

“The elements of a claim for negligent misrepresentation are: (1) the defendant's negligent supply of false information to foreseeable persons, known or unknown; (2) such persons’ reasonable reliance upon that false information; and (3) economic injury proximately resulting from such reliance.” Tuscany Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. C. P., 376 Ga. App. 238, 251(2)(d), 918 S.E.2d 435 (2025) (punctuation omitted). The problem here is Moore's reasonable reliance.

As a basic premise, “[a] municipality's method of contracting, once prescribed by law or charter, is absolute and exclusive.” H. G. Brown Family L.P. v. City of Villa Rica, 278 Ga. 819, 820(1), 607 S.E.2d 883 (2005). Moore's claim against the Defendants is based on certain alleged oral representations that Hamilton had authority to approve and execute the Lease (with Davis stamping his signature).⁴ But this does not change the City's exclusive contracting authority prescribed by Albany City Code § 12-36(c): “The aviation commission shall make no sales or conveyances of [airport] property, or agreements for the lease, rental or sale of any property, until such transactions have been approved by the board of city commissioners.” In light of this, only the “board duly authorized [can] act on behalf of the municipality, otherwise a valid contract cannot be created.” H. G. Brown Family L.P., 278 Ga. at 821(1), 607 S.E.2d 883. Because the Lease was not approved by the board of city commissioners as required by City code, “[i]t follows that the City entered [the Lease] in derogation of its limited grant of authority; in other words, the City acted beyond the power or competence of the local government. Therefore, ․ the contract is ultra vires, null and void.” Id. (citation modified).⁵ Nevertheless, Moore argues that even if his breach of contract claim against the City is barred for this reason, he should still be able to maintain his claims against the Defendants in their individual capacities for negligent misrepresentation. But Georgia law is clear that

[a]ll persons dealing with a public officer must at their peril ascertain the extent of his authority. It is the duty of any person dealing with a municipality in a contractual relation to see that there has been a compliance with the mandatory provisions of the law limiting and prescribing its powers, a duty which includes determining that the public officer who executed a contract has the requisite authority. In this regard, parties are presumed to know the law, which includes not only statutes ․ but also the provisions of municipal ordinances.

City of Atlanta v. Black, 265 Ga. 425, 426, 457 S.E.2d 551 (1995) (citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted) (holding that a city attorney's apparent authority was controlled by the limitations on his authority in a municipal ordinance, despite those limitations not being communicated by the attorney).

Thus, the trial court erred when it opined that “[i]t is unreasonable to assume that an ordinary prudent person would know of the requirement of the Board's approval, as such approval is not acknowledged explicitly in the lease.”

Persons dealing with a public officer must take notice of the extent of the officer's powers. Even assuming the [alleged representations were made], [Moore] was not entitled to rely on such [representations] as they were beyond the powers conferred upon [the Defendants as prescribed by the City code]. Moreover, the [statements of authority] would have been based on misrepresentations of law, i.e., promises to perform tasks appellee was not legally authorized to perform, which are not relievable.

Jones v. Ward, 201 Ga. App. 757, 760(2), 412 S.E.2d 576 (1991) (citations and punctuation omitted) (addressing a negligent misrepresentation claim against a government employee in her personal capacity). Because Moore had a duty to ascertain the validity of the Lease, and because he is presumed to know the law, the trial court erred by denying the Defendants’ summary judgment motion as to Moore's claims against them in their individual capacities. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of summary judgment to the Defendants in their individual capacities.

Judgment reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Each prior lease was signed by an official on behalf of the Albany-Dougherty County Aviation Commission, the lessor listed in each previous lease.

2.   The trial court deferred ruling on the claims for punitive damages and attorney fees.

3.   There is no issue of official or qualified immunity presented in this appeal.

4.   There was deposition testimony to the effect that Hamilton approved the lease and that Davis represented that this could be made effective with a stamp of his signature. At the summary judgment stage, we construe the evidence in Moore's favor. See Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Koch, 303 Ga. 336, 344(3), 812 S.E.2d 256 (2018) (“[T]he party opposing the [summary judgment] motion ․ is entitled to have the evidence in the record viewed in the light most favorable to [him] and to have all reasonable inferences from the evidence drawn in [his] favor.” (punctuation omitted)).

5.   Because of the ultra vires nature of the Lease, “the City's substantial performance under the contract will not be treated as a ratification thereof.” H. G. Brown Family L.P., 278 Ga. at 822(2), 607 S.E.2d 883.

Doyle, Presiding Judge.

Markle and Padgett, JJ., concur.