TAYLOR v. STATE (2026)

Akeem Taylor seeks review of his convictions for child trafficking, pimping, and sexual exploitation of children following a jury trial in Houston County. Taylor argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm Taylor's convictions. But, because Taylor's conviction on Count 3, sexual exploitation of children (OCGA § 16-12-100), requires the imposition of a split sentence, we vacate Taylor's sentence on Count 3 and remand for resentencing.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts,¹ the evidence at trial showed the following. In August 2016, the Houston County Sheriff's Office was investigating the case of a 16-year-old runaway, S. O. On August 4, 2016, S. O.’s mother and stepfather informed law enforcement that S. O. was being advertised online as a prostitute. Law enforcement later made contact with S. O. at a local hotel. S. O.’s stepfather provided officers with a cell phone he purchased and allowed S. O. to use. Following an interview with S. O., officers secured warrants for Taylor's arrest. In executing the warrants for Taylor's arrest, officers seized a cell phone belonging to Taylor. A forensic examination was conducted on both cell phones and excerpts from those forensic reports were admitted into evidence at trial. The forensic examination of Taylor's cell phone revealed emails from backpage.com indicating the creation of an account with backpage.com, the placement of an advertisement on backpage.com, a video of S. O. unclothed and touching her vagina, and text messages between Taylor's phone and S. O.’s phone discussing clients and money. Screen shots of the advertisement on backpage.com showing photographs and the video of S. O. were admitted into evidence.

At trial, S. O. testified that around August 2, 2016, Taylor contacted her about “escorting” – which she understood to mean prostitution. Taylor picked S. O. up from a friend's house and took her to a hotel where he paid for a room for her to engage in prostitution. S. O. testified that they advertised on a website with photographs of her and a video of her masturbating. S. O. testified that Taylor took the video on his phone and uploaded it to the website. Clients contacted S. O., and she had sex with some of them. Taylor told S. O. how to handle the money, came to the hotel frequently to get the money, and he gave S. O. a portion of the proceeds.

A grand jury indicted Taylor on one count each of trafficking of persons for sexual servitude (OCGA § 16-5-46), pimping for a person under 18 (OCGA § 16-6-11)² , and sexual exploitation of children (OCGA § 16-12-100), possession of firearm during the commission of a felony (OCGA § 16-11-106), and possession of firearm by a convicted felon (OCGA § 16-11-131).³ At trial, the jury found Taylor guilty of trafficking persons for sexual servitude, pimping for persons under 18, and sexual exploitation of children. Taylor was sentenced as follows: Count 1 - twenty years to serve; Count 2 - ten years probation, consecutive to Counts 1 and 3; Count 3 - twenty years to serve, concurrent with Count 1. Taylor's trial counsel filed a motion for new trial on May 15, 2017. A motion for new trial hearing was held on September 9, 2024, where the trial court assigned new counsel to represent Taylor after Taylor alleged he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. New appellate counsel was appointed, and a second hearing on Taylor's motion for new trial was heard on March 25, 2025; the trial court orally denied the motion on that date. Taylor filed a premature notice of appeal on April 22, 2025. A written order denying Taylor's motion for new trial was filed on June 17, 2025.⁴ This appeal followed.

1. In his first enumeration of error, Taylor argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel both at trial and during post-conviction proceedings. We disagree.

In evaluating Taylor's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), which requires a defendant show that his trial counsel's performance was deficient and that but for counsel's errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Id. at 687(III), 104 S.Ct. 2052. Further, “should a defendant fail to meet his burden on one prong of the two prong test, we need not review the other prong.” Lawson v. State, 365 Ga. App. 87, 95(3), 877 S.E.2d 616 (2022) (quotation marks omitted). Moreover, unless clearly erroneous, “this Court will uphold a trial court's factual determinations with respect to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel; however, a trial court's legal conclusions in this regard are reviewed de novo.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

(a) Taylor first argues his trial counsel failed to consult with, advise, and prepare him for trial. At the hearing on Taylor's motion for new trial, both Taylor and his trial counsel testified. Taylor testified that trial counsel visited him in jail three times prior to trial and that trial counsel provided Taylor with an investigative report, but they never discussed the evidence or any potential witness testimony. However, trial counsel testified that in preparing for Taylor's trial, he prepared a trial notebook, filed pretrial motions on Taylor's behalf, spoke with law enforcement about the case, discussed Taylor's statement with him, and explained to Taylor “what [he] thought was the substance of the case.” “There exists no magic amount of time which counsel must spend in actual conference with his client.” Williams v. State, 285 Ga.App. 190, 193(3)(a), 645 S.E.2d 676 (2007) (quotation marks omitted). Taylor has also not shown how additional communications with his lawyer would have changed the outcome of his trial. See Id. at 194, 645 S.E.2d 676. “Bare allegations that trial counsel should have acted differently will not support a claim of ineffective assistance.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Thus, Taylor's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with him in preparation for trial must fail.

Taylor also asserts that he gave trial counsel the names of three witnesses he wanted trial counsel to interview and present at trial. Although Taylor testified at the motion for new trial hearing that the testimony of these three witnesses would have exonerated him, no evidence was offered as to what these witnesses would have testified had they been called at trial. Because Taylor neither called these witnesses to testify at the motion for new trial hearing, nor presented a legally acceptable substitute for their testimony so as to substantiate his claim that their testimony would have been relevant and favorable to his defense, it was impossible to show there is a reasonable probability the results of the proceedings would have been different. Dickens v. State, 280 Ga. 320, 323(2), 627 S.E.2d 587 (2006). Thus, Taylor cannot meet the prejudice prong regarding trial counsel's alleged failure to call these witnesses.

Taylor also asserts trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to interview S. O. prior to trial. S. O.’s statements to officers were memorialized in the investigative report. Trial counsel testified that in preparation for trial, he reviewed the incident reports and the statements made by Taylor and S. O. Taylor asserts that trial counsel's failure to interview S. O. prior to trial was “meaningful and significant to the extent that there is a reasonable probability that the result of this trial would have been different.” But, he makes no allegations as to what trial counsel would have learned from S. O. in a pretrial interview or how any information gleaned would have resulted in a different outcome at Taylor's trial. Taylor cannot meet his burden to show that trial counsel performed deficiently nor can he show that he was harmed by trial counsel's failure to interview S. O. prior to trial. See Sanders v. State, 253 Ga. App. 380, 381, 559 S.E.2d 122 (2002) (trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance where he did not interview investigating officers or the victim but did review pretrial statements of all witnesses).

(b) Taylor further argues his counsel was ineffective for failing to work on Taylor's case after filing the initial motion for new trial. The seven-year delay in resolving the motion for new trial in this case is troublesome. After trial, counsel did not withdraw from representation but remained counsel of record despite his belief that alternate counsel would be hired or appointed and his apparent intention to discontinue working on the case (when questioned about what he did on the case after filing the initial motion for new trial, counsel responded, “Honestly, I don't think I did do anything.”). Counsel's decision to continue as counsel of record without continuing to work on Taylor's case undoubtedly contributed to the seven-year delay in Taylor's motion for new trial being heard and ruled upon.

Appellate courts repeatedly have admonished trial courts that such delays are unacceptable and reiterated that it is the duty of all those involved in the criminal justice system, including trial courts and prosecutors as well as defense counsel and defendants, to ensure that the appropriate post-conviction motions are filed, litigated, and decided without unnecessary delay.

Williams v. State, 359 Ga.App. 408, 410, 858 S.E.2d 80 (2021) (quotation marks omitted).

Substantial delays in the appellate process generally implicate due process rights, and appellate due process claims are reviewed under the four-factor test used for speedy trial claims set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). Williams, 359 Ga.App. at 410, 858 S.E.2d 80. These factors are (1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) assertion of the defendant's right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Id. “To establish prejudice, the defendant must show that the post-conviction direct appeal delay prejudiced the ability of the defendant to assert his arguments on appeal, leading to a reasonable probability that, but for the delay, the result of the appeal would have been different.” Id. at 411, 858 S.E.2d 80 (quotation marks omitted). “Failure to make this showing of prejudice in an appellate delay claim is fatal to the claim, even when the other three factors weigh in the appellant's favor.” Terrell v. State, 313 Ga. 120, 123(1), 868 S.E.2d 764 (2022). Here, although Taylor argues at length about trial counsel's lack of effort in timely pursuing his appeal, he does not put forth any argument as to how he was prejudiced by the delay or how the delay hindered his ability to assert his arguments on appeal. Although this Court is concerned with the substantial length of the delay from Taylor's conviction to the hearing on his motion for new trial, ultimately, Taylor has not shown that he was prejudiced by this delay. As such, we conclude that Taylor did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel in his post-conviction proceedings.

2. In his second enumeration of error, Taylor argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Again, we disagree.

“In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility but only determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Grant v. State, 370 Ga. App. 882, 884(1), 899 S.E.2d 469 (2024) (quotation marks omitted).

(a) Trafficking Persons for Sexual Servitude

In Count 1, Taylor was charged with trafficking persons for sexual servitude (OCGA § 16-5-46). Under OCGA § 16-5-46(c) (2016),⁵ “a person commits the offense of trafficking a person for sexual servitude when that person knowingly subjects another person to or maintains another person in sexual servitude or knowingly recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means another person for the purpose of sexual servitude.” The State alleged that Taylor committed the offense in that he “did knowingly recruit, entice, harbor, and transport [S. O.] for the purpose of sexual servitude.” As recounted above, the evidence showed that Taylor transported S. O. to a hotel where he purchased a room and advertised that S. O. would perform sexual acts in exchange for money. When S. O. received money for performing sexual acts, Taylor took a portion of that money. In addition to S. O.’s testimony about these events, the forensic report showing messages from Taylor's cell phone to S. O.’s cell phone, which corroborated S. O.’s statements, was also admitted into evidence. Despite Taylor's testimony that he did not purchase a hotel room for the purpose of prostitution and that he did not discuss or suggest that S. O. engage in prostitution, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find Taylor guilty of trafficking persons for sexual servitude (OCGA § 16-5-46). “It is for the jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence and questions of witness credibility, not this Court.” Hayes v. State, 2292 Ga. 506, 509, 739 S.E.2d 313 (2013).

(b) Pimping for a Person Under 18

In Count 2, Taylor was charged with pimping for a person under 18 (OCGA § 16-6-11). OCGA § 16-6-11(2) provides that “a person commits the offense of pimping when he or she ․ offers or agrees to arrange a meeting of persons for the purpose of prostitution.” The indictment alleged that Taylor committed the offense in that he “did unlawfully offer to arrange a meeting of persons under 18 years of age, for the purpose of prostitution[.]”⁶ As described above, S. O.’s testimony and the forensic report from Taylor's cell phone showed that Taylor “arrange[d] a meeting of persons for the purpose of prostitution” when he posted the advertisement on backpage.com for S. O. to perform sexual acts in exchange for money. The text messages between S. O. and Taylor further showed that Taylor arranged for S. O. to meet with men for the purpose of prostitution. And the evidence showed that S. O. was under the age of 18 at the time of the prostitution. Because the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Taylor committed the offense of pimping a person under the age of 18 (OCGA § 16-6-11; OCGA § 16-6-13(b)(1) (2011)), we affirm Taylor's conviction on Count 2.

(c) Sexual Exploitation of Children

In Count 3, Taylor was charged with sexual exploitation of children (OCGA § 16-12-100(b)(1)). At the time of the offense, OCGA § 16-12-100(b)(1) (2015) provided in part that “it is unlawful for any person knowingly to employ, use, persuade, induce, entice, or coerce any minor to engage in ․ any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual medium depicting such conduct.” S. O. testified that when she was 16 years old, Taylor used his phone to take a video of her masturbating. The video itself, which was found during the forensic examination of Taylor's phone, was also admitted into evidence. Because this evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Taylor guilty of sexual exploitation of a child (OCGA § 16-12-100(b)(1)), we affirm Taylor's conviction for that offense.

3. Finally, although neither party raised the issue,⁷ Taylor's sentence on Count 3 does not comply with OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (2013). That statute provides that any person convicted of a sexual offense ⁸ , “shall be sentenced to a split sentence which shall include the minimum term of imprisonment specified in the Code section applicable to the offense ․ [and] an additional probated sentence of at least one year.” Here, although Taylor's total sentence included a period of probation for his pimping conviction (Count 2), on his sexual exploitation of children conviction (Count 3), the trial court only imposed a prison sentence. The split sentence requirement applies to each sexual offense count, not the overall sentence. State v. Riggs, 301 Ga. 63, 64 (1), 799 S.E.2d 770 (2017). Because the trial court did not impose a split sentence as required for Taylor's sexual exploitation of children conviction (Count 3), we vacate that sentence and remand to the trial court for resentencing that complies with OCGA § 17-10-6.2.

In summary, we conclude that Taylor did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions, so we therefore affirm Taylor's convictions. But because the trial court erred in failing to impose a split sentence on Count 3, sexual exploitation of children (OCGA § 16-12-100), we vacate Taylor's sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with OCGA § 17-10-6.2.

Judgment affirmed in part, vacated in part, and case remanded for resentencing.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2.   At the time of the crime, a person convicted of pimping (OCGA § 16-6-11) a person under the age of 18 but over the age of 16 was guilty of a felony and was to be punished by imprisonment for a period of not less than five nor more than 20 years. OCGA § 16-6-13(b)(1) (effective July 1, 2011 to June 30, 2017).

3.   Counts 4 and 5 were nolle prossed.

4.   A premature notice is effectively filed upon the entry of the order denying the motion for new trial. Livingston v. State, 221 Ga. App. 563, 564-68, 472 S.E.2d 317 (1996).

5.   “In general, a crime is to be construed and punished according to the provisions of the law existing at the time of its commission.” Torres v. State, 361 Ga.App. 149, 154(3), 863 S.E.2d 399 (2021).

6.   At the time of the crimes, a person convicted of pimping a person under the age of 18 but over the age of 16 would be guilty of a felony and subject to incarceration for 5 to 20 years. OCGA § 16-6-13(b)(1) (2011).

7.   We may consider this issue sua sponte because, as a result of the trial court's sentencing error, Taylor's sentence is void, and we are authorized to correct a void sentence on our own motion. See Owens v. State, 353 Ga.App. 848, 854(2)(d), 840 S.E.2d 70 (2020).

8.   Sexual exploitation of children as defined in OCGA § 16-12-100 is a sexual offense under OCGA § 17-10-6.2(a)(10) (2013).

Davis, Judge.

Rickman, P. J., and Gobeil, J., concur.