BURKHALTER v. STATE (2026)

Josie Burkhalter appeals from the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. Burkhalter contends that the trial court erred in finding that the arresting officer had the legal authority to initiate the traffic stop. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court's order.

In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court must construe the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's factual findings and judgment, and all relevant evidence of record, including evidence introduced at trial, as well as evidence introduced at the motion to suppress hearing, may be considered. The trial judge sits as the trier of fact and its findings based upon conflicting evidence are analogous to the verdict of a jury and should not be disturbed by a reviewing court if there is any evidence to support them. A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will be upheld if it is right for any reason.

Chambers v. State, 351 Ga. App. 389, 391(1), 831 S.E.2d 11 (2019) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Burkhalter was arrested on August 2, 2024, and charged with driving under the influence. She filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained from the traffic stop that led to her arrest, asserting that the traffic stop was illegal. At the hearing, deputy sheriff Cory Hulett testified that he was in a particular area in Tift County responding to a 911 call about an erratic driver. The 911 caller stated that he was driving behind a white Volvo SUV being driven erratically; the caller had observed the vehicle failing to maintain its lane and driving into the oncoming lane of traffic.¹ Hulett observed a vehicle matching the 911 caller's description being driven by a woman later identified as Burkhalter. Hulett followed her vehicle for some time.

Deputy Hulett observed that as soon as he turned his car around to follow the vehicle, it pulled off onto a side road and pulled over. Hulett passed the vehicle, which then pulled back out into the road. The vehicle then pulled into a gas station parking lot. Hulett got behind Burkhalter's vehicle again after it pulled out of the parking lot, and it was as the vehicle was trying to turn into a different parking lot that Hulett conducted the traffic stop.

Deputy Hulett testified that he initiated a traffic stop because he saw the vehicle “getting on to the white line, failing to maintain her lane.” He stated that the vehicle's tires were “on the line,” but when asked directly, he could not recall if they crossed over the line. While following Burkhalter, Hulett reported via radio ² to a coworker that “she's on the white line,” and he similarly told Burkhalter during the traffic stop “that her tires were on the white line, and that's failure to maintain lane.” When asked during the hearing whether he understood that driving on a white line does not constitute failure to maintain lane, Hulett testified, “I haven't seen anything that defines if it's on the line or over the line.” He added, “[W]henever I read the failure to maintain code section, it says failure to drive within a single lane.”

Hulett stated that he alternatively could have initiated a traffic stop based on the report of reckless driving in the 911 call and his articulable reasonable suspicion that the driver was under the influence. He noted in his report that he found her behavior to be evasive, as she pulled off the road multiple times after he began following her in his patrol car. After pulling the car over and identifying Burkhalter as the driver, Hulett and another officer observed indicators of intoxication and Burkhalter was arrested and charged with driving under the influence.

The trial court denied Burkhalter's motion to suppress. The court found that so long as Hulett had a good faith, reasonable belief that Burkhalter was violating the law, his traffic stop was legal. Thus, even if Burkhalter's driving on the white line did not actually constitute a failure to maintain lane, the trial court ruled that Hulett had reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that a traffic offense was being committed, rendering the stop lawful. The court certified its order for immediate review, and we granted Burkhalter's application for interlocutory appeal. Case No. A25I0214 (May 15, 2025).

Burkhalter contends that the trial court erred in concluding that Hulett's mistaken belief that Burkhalter was violating a traffic law was reasonable. Specifically, she argues that the law regarding failure to maintain lane is unambiguous and not subject to any required legal interpretation by an officer. As such, she asserts that Hulett's mistaken belief that driving on the white line constitutes failure to maintain lane was unreasonable and hence could not support a lawful traffic stop. Although we agree that Hulett was mistaken regarding whether Burkhalter was failing to maintain her lane, we nonetheless affirm the trial court's order for the reasons that follow.

“[O]n a motion to suppress, the State has the burden of proving that a search was lawful.” State v. Hammond, 313 Ga. App. 882, 883-84, 723 S.E.2d 89 (2012). Thus, in a case involving a traffic stop, the burden is on the State to prove the lawfulness of the stop. See OCGA § 17-5-30(b); State v. Parke, 304 Ga. App. 124, 126, 695 S.E.2d 413 (2010). “To initiate a traffic stop, an officer must have specific, articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. It is well established that a stop is authorized if the officer observes a traffic violation.” Chapman v. State, 368 Ga. App. 682, 684(1), 890 S.E.2d 313 (2023) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Further,

[w]here an officer reasonably but mistakenly believes that certain conduct violates the law, the observation of that conduct can serve as reasonable suspicion if the officer's mistake of law was objectively reasonable. To determine whether an officer's mistake of law was reasonable, courts must engage in a straightforward question of statutory construction. If the law in question is genuinely ambiguous, such that overturning the officer's judgment requires hard interpretive work, then the officer has made a reasonable mistake.

Id. at 685(1) (citations omitted, citation modified).

Under OCGA § 40-6-48(I), “[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.” Here, Hulett testified that he believed he observed Burkhalter committing the traffic violation of failing to maintain her lane because she drove on (but not over) the white line. However, we have held that “a motorist does not violate OCGA § 40-6-48(1) when [s]he drives on, but does not cross over, a fog line.”³ Chapman, 368 Ga. App. at 685 (1), 890 S.E.2d 313. Thus the law is not ambiguous on this issue, and Hulett's mistake of law could not serve as the legal basis for the traffic stop. See Harris v. State, 344 Ga. App. 572, 575, 810 S.E.2d 660 (2018) (where the law is not ambiguous, but rather is capable of only one interpretation, officer's mistaken belief that the defendant's actions constituted a violation of the law does not support a traffic stop); Abercrombie v. State, 343 Ga. App. 774, 783 (2)(a), 790 (2)(b), 808 SE2d 245 (2017) (there is no good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in cases where an officer made an unreasonable mistake of law; “it is no defense that an officer was unaware of or untrained in the law or that the officer relied upon improper training or departmental direction”).

That said, in this case, the officer's mistaken belief that he observed a traffic violation was not the only evidence in the record relating to the decision to initiate a traffic stop. An officer may initiate a traffic stop if he has “a specific, articulable suspicion which is determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances—objective observations, information from police reports, the modes or patterns of certain kinds of lawbreakers, and the inferences drawn and deductions made by a trained law enforcement officer.” State v. Armstrong, 223 Ga. App. 350, 351 (2), 477 S.E.2d 635 (1996) (quotation marks omitted). Here, even assuming Hulett did not directly observe a specific traffic violation, the totality of the circumstances supported Hulett's articulable suspicion—he received notice of a civilian emergency report that Burkhalter's vehicle was driving erratically and dangerously, and Hulett was able to confirm information from the 911 call when he observed a white truck with a cattle trailer follwing a white Volvo SUV (matching the caller's descriptions) in the area. Hulett then observed evasive behavior from Burkhalter when she repeatedly left the roadway after his patrol car pulled up behind her. Thus, Hulett “nonetheless had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop [Burkhalter] ․ whether or not [s]he was [failing to maintain her lane].” Id. at 351 (2), 477 S.E.2d 635. See also Blanks v. State, 334 Ga. App. 626, 630-31 (1)(b), 778 S.E.2d 261 (2015) (officer had articulable suspicion to stop driver based on 911 call where caller was observing the defendant drive in a manner consistent with driving under the influence).

Given our duty to construe the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment, and uphold it if it is right for any reason, we affirm. Chambers, 351 Ga. App. at 391 (1), 831 S.E.2d 11.

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The 911 caller identified himself as driving a white truck hauling a cattle trailer. He informed dispatch that he was driving behind the erratic white Volvo and Hulett testified that he saw both of these vehicles—the truck following the SUV—when he arrived at the area.

2.   The record on appeal does not include the dash cam or body cam video recordings that were played for the trial court, but neither party disputes that the recordings affirm Hulett's testimony.

3.   In Chapman, we recognized that Georgia law previously had been “genuinely ambiguous as to whether driving on a fog line amounts to a failure to maintain one's lane.” Id. at 686 (1), 890 S.E.2d 313. But Chapman, which clarified the law, was issued in 2023, prior to Burkhalter's arrest in August 2024.

Gobeil, Judge.

Rickman, P. J., and Davis, J., concur.