WATERS v. STATE (2025)

After trial, Christopher Waters was convicted of child molestation. Waters appeals, arguing his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to properly communicate or explain a pre-trial plea offer. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Waters does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence at trial,¹ but viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the record shows he was convicted of child molestation for masturbating in front of an 8-year-old child. His sole claim of error is that trial counsel never informed him of a pre-trial plea offer of a sentence less than what he received after trial.²

To prevail on his Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance,³ Waters must show that “counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced [him].”⁴ And as to deficient performance, a claimant must demonstrate that his attorney “performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.”⁵ Significantly, when reviewing counsel's performance, we apply a “strong presumption that counsel's representation was within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional assistance.”⁶ As a result, to show he was prejudiced by counsel's performance, a claimant must “prove a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”⁷ A reasonable probability is one “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”⁸ Finally, the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations are “reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, but this Court will independently apply the legal principles to the facts.”⁹

When considering a claim of ineffective assistance in the context of a plea offer, trial counsel will be found to have rendered less than reasonably professional assistance if he has “not informed his client that such a plea offer has been made and advised the client of the consequences of the choices confronting him.”¹⁰ Indeed, an accused is entitled to rely on counsel to “independently examine the facts, circumstances, pleadings[,] and laws involved in the case and then to offer an informed opinion about what plea should be entered.”¹¹ The plea-bargaining process, then, is “a critical stage of the criminal proceedings, so counsel's involvement is crucial.”¹² With these guiding principles in mind, we turn to Waters's sole claim of error—that counsel failed to inform him about a pre-trial plea offer.

At the motion-for-new-trial hearing, Waters's former trial counsel testified that he met with his client in person four or five times and also communicated with him via correspondence “extensively.” And according to counsel, he kept Waters “very well informed as regards to the issues in this case and kind of what was going on with his case,” including plea offers. Indeed, during their interactions, counsel warned Waters that being a recidivist would impact his sentencing at trial. Counsel also advised Waters “in agonizing detail” about the impact similar-transaction evidence would have on his chances of success at trial. Finally, counsel recommended to Waters in person that he “should take the offer that's on the table.” Waters's response to this advice was—according to counsel—“very belligerent.”

Following the in-person conversation about taking the plea deal, Waters's former trial counsel followed up with a three-page letter reiterating his assessment of the case and his advice to take the State's offer. Counsel and Waters then spoke again after the letter was sent, and they then “talked about it” further. In short, counsel testified that he communicated the offer to Waters and “made it very clear to him in writing and in person” that his advice was to take the plea deal. Even so, post-trial counsel argued that Waters never received the information, didn't understand it, and “couldn't put it in its proper light in relation to the evidence.” Notably, Waters did not testify at the hearing.

After considering the foregoing evidence, the trial court concluded that Waters's former trial counsel did not perform deficiently. We agree. The record supports the court's conclusion that Waters was fully informed of the plea deal, and so he failed to establish the first Strickland prong.¹³ The court did not err, then, in denying Waters's motion for new trial on this ground, and we affirm its judgment.

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Supreme Court of Georgia has discontinued its practice of examining the sufficiency of the evidence sua sponte when the issue is neither briefed nor meaningfully argued on appeal. See Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 396, 846 S.E.2d 83 (2020) (“We cannot now identify a compelling reason to retain our current practice of sua sponte review of the sufficiency of the evidence in cases in which the appellant is not sentenced to death, and there are good reasons to abandon that practice.” (emphasis omitted)). As a result, we do not consider the sufficiency of the evidence here because Waters has not challenged it. See Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872, 874, 452 S.E.2d 756 (1995) (“The attempts to provide sua sponte appellate review of criminal appeals notwithstanding incomplete appellate filings, while laudable, do a disservice to the courts, the criminal defendant, and appellate counsel.”), overruled on other grounds by Cook v. State, 313 Ga. 471, 870 S.E.2d 758 (2022).

2.   Waters's appellate brief fails to comply with the rules of this Court by omitting citations to the record in support of his factual allegations. See GA. CT. APP. R. 25 (c) (ii) (“Each enumerated error shall be supported in the brief by specific reference to the record or transcript. In the absence of a specific reference, the Court will not search for and may not consider that enumeration.”).

3.   See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012) (noting that defendants have a “Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a right that extends to the plea-bargaining process,” and that during plea negotiations, “defendants are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel” (punctuation omitted)).

4.   McAllister v. State, 351 Ga. App. 76, 93, 830 S.E.2d 443 (2019) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).

5.   Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 266, 272, 830 S.E.2d 99 (2019) (punctuation omitted); accord Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339, 344, 745 S.E.2d 637 (2013).

6.   Jackson, 306 Ga. at 272, 830 S.E.2d 99 (punctuation omitted); accord Romer, 293 Ga. at 344, 745 S.E.2d 637.

7.   Jackson, 306 Ga. at 272, 830 S.E.2d 99 (punctuation omitted); accord Arnold v. State, 292 Ga. 268, 269, 737 S.E.2d 98 (2013).

8.   Jackson, 306 Ga. at 272, 830 S.E.2d 99 (punctuation omitted); accord Arnold, 292 Ga. at 269, 737 S.E.2d 98.

9.   Jackson, 306 Ga. at 272, 830 S.E.2d 99 (punctuation omitted); accord Jones v. State, 305 Ga. 750, 755, 827 S.E.2d 879 (2019).

10.   Temple v. State, 320 Ga. App. 721, 722, 740 S.E.2d 669 (2013) (punctuation omitted); accord Brown v. State, 291 Ga. 892, 898, 734 S.E.2d 23 (2012); see Whitehead v. State, 211 Ga. App. 121, 122-23, 438 S.E.2d 128 (1993) (explaining that objective professional standards dictate that, absent extenuating circumstances, a defendant is entitled to be told that an offer to plead guilty has been made and to be advised of the consequences of the choices confronting him because for counsel to do otherwise amounts to less than reasonably professional assistance).

11.   Temple, 320 Ga. App. at 722, 740 S.E.2d 669 (punctuation omitted); accord Brown, 291 Ga. at 898, 734 S.E.2d 23.

12.   Temple, 320 Ga. App. at 722 (1), 740 S.E.2d 669 (punctuation omitted); accord Brown, 291 Ga. at 898, 734 S.E.2d 23.

13.   See Temple, 320 Ga. App. at 724 (1), 740 S.E.2d 669 (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance of counsel when the record “showed that [appellant] was informed about the consequences of the choices confronting him”); Pickard v. State, 257 Ga. App. 642, 643, 572 S.E.2d 660 (2002) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance of counsel when the record “makes it clear that [appellant's] counsel advised him against rejecting the plea agreement and informed him that he could be given a life sentence if convicted”).

Dillard, Presiding Judge.

Mercier, J., and Senior Judge C. Andrew Fuller, concur.