BRYAN CAVE LEIGHTON PAISNER LLP v. GEBO LAW LLC (2025)

Gebo Law, LLC obtained a judgment against a former client for unpaid legal fees. These appeals concern Gebo Law's attempt to garnish funds allegedly belonging to the former client from the trust account of the former client's new law firm, Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner, LLP.

We granted Bryan Cave's application for discretionary appeal of the state court's order directing it to pay $125,265 into the court registry. Bryan Cave filed a notice of appeal, and Gebo Law filed a notice of cross-appeal. We must dismiss Bryan Cave's appeal. As detailed below, since the case remains pending in the state court, Bryan Cave was required to file an application for interlocutory appeal. And because we lack jurisdiction over Bryan Cave's appeal, we must also dismiss Gebo Law's cross-appeal.

Gebo Law filed this garnishment action naming its former client as a defendant and naming multiple garnishees, including Bryan Cave. After Gebo Law served Bryan Cave with a summons of garnishment, Bryan Cave answered, denying that it held any funds of Gebo Law's former client. Gebo Law traversed Bryan Cave's answer.

The state court entered an order directing Bryan Cave to pay money into the court registry. The court did not order the funds to be disbursed to any party. Bryan Cave filed an application for discretionary appeal of this order. We granted the application, and these appeals followed.

Although no party has questioned our jurisdiction in this appeal, it is our duty to inquire into our jurisdiction in any case in which there may be a doubt about the existence of such jurisdiction. State of Ga. v. Federal Defender Program, 315 Ga. 319, 324 (2), 882 S.E.2d 257 (2022). Upon further review of the applicable law, we conclude that the application for discretionary appeal was improvidently granted.

Because the order that Bryan Cave appeals ordered Bryan Cave to pay funds into the court registry but did not direct the disbursement of those funds from the court registry, the order is not a final judgment. See Turner v. Wood, 159 Ga. App. 850, 285 S.E.2d 589 (1981) (“Although the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff with regard to defendant's traverse, there is no order of the trial court disbursing the funds answered into court by the garnishee. No final order has been entered in the main case. The appeal is accordingly premature.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Knox v. Knox, 151 Ga. App. 144, 259 S.E.2d 150 (1979) (dismissing appeal from order denying motion to dismiss garnishment, because there was not a final judgment and the case was “still pending following payment into the court by the garnishee”); Marbut Co. v. Capital City Bank, 148 Ga. App. 664, 665 (1), 252 S.E.2d 85 (1979) (“the matter remains in the hands of the trial judge until such time as an order is entered directing the disbursement of the funds [paid into the court]”). See also Godfrey v. Kirk, 161 Ga. App. 474, 476 (2), 288 S.E.2d 301 (1982) (physical precedent only). Compare id. at 478, 288 S.E.2d 301 (Banke, J., concurring specially).

Although appeals in garnishment cases are typically brought by discretionary application, see OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (4), where both discretionary and interlocutory application procedures apply, the applicant must follow the interlocutory appeal procedure and obtain a timely certificate of immediate review before filing an application. See Scruggs v. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources, 261 Ga. 587, 588-589 (1), 408 S.E.2d 103 (1991).

We observe that the appeal may be premature for another reason. Gebo Law filed summonses of garnishment naming garnishees other than Bryan Cave. So Gebo Law's claims against other garnishees may have been outstanding in the garnishment proceeding at the time Bryan Cave filed its application for discretionary appeal. Cf. Ameriprise Holdings v. McCampbell, 371 Ga. App. 323, 325-326 (1), 899 S.E.2d 509 (2024). In a case involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a decision adjudicating fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties is not a final judgment. Johnson v. Hosp. Corp. of America, 192 Ga. App. 628, 629, 385 S.E.2d 731 (1989). Such a ruling may be appealed only if the trial court makes an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and an express direction for the entry of judgment under OCGA § 9-11-54 (b), or the party seeking to appeal complies with the interlocutory appeal requirements of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). See Johnson, supra.

Because Bryan Cave failed to follow the interlocutory appeal procedure and the state court's order did not include the express determinations of OCGA § 9-11-54 (b), Bryan Cave's application for discretionary appeal was improvidently granted, and we dismiss its appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Because we lack jurisdiction over Bryan Cave's appeal, and “there is no independent jurisdictional basis for [Gebo Law's] cross-appeal,” Forest City Gun Club v. Chatham County, 280 Ga. App. 219, 222, 633 S.E.2d 623 (2006), we also dismiss the cross-appeal. Id.

Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed.

McFadden, Presiding Judge.

Mercier, C. J., and Rickman, P. J., concur.