WILLACY v. STATE (2021)

Chadwick Willacy appeals an order denying his successive motion for postconviction relief, which was filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.¹ We affirm the denial of relief.

Willacy filed a successive postconviction motion claiming that he is entitled to relief under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Flowers v. Mississippi, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 204 L.Ed.2d 638 (2019), based on the prosecutor's peremptory strike of juror Payne for allegedly racial reasons. On August 12, 2020, the postconviction court entered an order denying Willacy's successive postconviction motion. Specifically, the postconviction court found that Willacy's motion was procedurally barred, untimely, and without merit.

We agree with the postconviction court and affirm the denial of relief. Prior challenges to the prosecutor's peremptory strike of juror Payne for allegedly racial reasons were litigated during Willacy's direct appeal and successive postconviction proceedings and resolved against Willacy. See Hendrix v. State, 136 So. 3d 1122, 1125 (Fla. 2014) (“Claims raised and rejected in prior postconviction proceedings are procedurally barred from being relitigated in a successive motion.”); Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1067 (Fla. 2000) (“This claim was raised on direct appeal; therefore, it is procedurally barred and was properly summarily denied.”).

Further, Willacy's successive motion is untimely. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1) (“Any motion to vacate judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be filed by the defendant within 1 year after the judgment and sentence become final.”); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2) (providing an exception to the one-year time limit for motions alleging “the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not established within the period provided for in subdivision (d)(1) and has been held to apply retroactively”). Flowers did not establish a new constitutional right that has been held to apply retroactively. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2235, 2251 (“[W]e break no new legal ground. We simply enforce and reinforce Batson [v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)] by applying it to the extraordinary facts of this case.”).

Accordingly, Willacy is not entitled to relief based on Flowers, and we affirm the postconviction court's denial of Willacy's successive postconviction motion.

It is so ordered.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

PER CURIAM.

CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.