PETERSON v. MCNEIL (2023)

On Sunday, November 21, 2021, around 9:30 p.m., Harrison Peterson was involved in a three-car collision. The State alleges that his vehicle struck the back of one car causing it to strike a third car. In the middle car rode a 34-week pregnant mother and the baby's father. The mother and child died at the scene of the crash, and the father allegedly suffered serious injuries. The State charged Peterson with two counts of DUI-manslaughter and one count of DUI with serious bodily injury. Peterson was released on pre-trial bail with the condition that he abstain from alcohol. To enforce this bail condition, he was assigned a machine that measured his alcohol level at random times during the day.

During one of the random measurements about four months after the fatal crash, the machine revealed that Peterson was positive for alcohol in his system and that he had skipped the next required alcohol test. The trial court held a hearing on the State's motion to revoke Peterson's pre-trial release. Peterson admitted to consuming alcohol and to lying to his pre-trial release officer about it. He admitted that after he tested positive, he left the machine in another room and did not submit to the next required test.

At a later hearing on Peterson's motion to reinstate his conditions of pre-trial release—in which he argued there were alternatives to pre-trial detention sufficient to protect the community—the State asked that the trial court deny that motion and keep him detained, arguing that Peterson's violation showed that no release conditions could adequately protect the community. According to the State, Peterson's inability to abstain from alcohol, even when the abstention was a requirement of his pre-trial release on DUI manslaughter charges, made clear that no other conditions could protect the community: “because clearly temptation is too strong for him to fight it and we cannot risk more people dying because of the choice that's being made to either be around alcohol or drink alcohol. ․ We cannot risk that because he's already shown us what is going to happen.”

The State pleaded with the trial court as follows:

So, I hope, Judge, that this is the third and final time that we have to go through this, that the court makes it clear that bond is denied, that that door that, you know, may appear to have been left open a little bit after the first two times the court denied it, that that door is now being closed, that bond is denied due to the egregious actions and the complete disregard for human life that this Defendant has ․ This Defendant is exactly where he needs to be to ensure that, one, he is not going to be testing positive for alcohol, drinking alcohol, being around alcohol, and to protect the community from him.

․

I would ask this court to find that this Defendant does present a risk to the community, that he will not follow a court order, as he has shown already, and I would ask Your Honor to stick to what you've already decided, which is that bond will be denied due to the two things I just said, which is that he presents a risk to the community and that there's nothing that's going to protect the community from him, including conditions that are put in place.

The trial court denied Peterson's motion. The trial court noted that the crash allegedly involved alcohol and pointed out that Peterson's pre-trial release conditions had been unambiguous. Further, the trial court found that Peterson admitted to violating the condition prohibiting his consumption of alcohol and admitted to initially being untruthful about it. The trial court also noted that the pre-trial services officer recommended that Peterson's release be revoked.

Peterson now seeks habeas relief from this court. The upshot of his petition is that the State did not sufficiently demonstrate the need for detention, and the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact, as required by section 907.041(4)(i), Florida Statutes. This court ordered a response, effectively granting the writ. See § 79.01, Fla. Stat.; see also §§ 79.03, 79.04, Fla. Stat. Now that we have reviewed the sheriff's return and considered the relevant record of the proceedings below, it is the judgment of this court that Peterson is not being detained illegally.

On a writ of habeas corpus, legality of the petitioner's detention “is the sole question to be considered, and the record will be examined with a view to determining that question.” Ex parte Amos, 93 Fla. 5, 112 So. 289, 292 (1927). Habeas “may not be used as a substitute for appeal.” Sneed v. Mayo, 66 So. 2d 865, 869 (Fla. 1953); see also State ex rel. McClure v. Sullivan, 43 So. 2d 438, 439 (Fla. 1949) (“The fact that this proceeding is not a direct appeal from the order denying the motion to quash but is here on petition for writ of habeas corpus is important and should be constantly borne in mind.”). We limit the scope of our consideration “to whether the [trial] court that entered the order was without jurisdiction to do so or whether the order is void or illegal.” Alachua Reg'l Juv. Det. Ctr. v. T.O., 684 So. 2d 814, 816 (Fla. 1996). In turn, we will not discharge a detainee because “the detention order is merely defective, irregular, or insufficient in form or substance.” Id.

Section 907.041(4)(c)7. permits a trial court to order pre-trial detention when the defendant has violated a condition of pre-trial release and “the violation, in the discretion of the court, supports a finding that no conditions of release can reasonably protect the community.” (emphasis supplied). This is what the State argued and was—as the record makes clear—the basis for the court's pre-trial detention order. Peterson, however, points out that the statute also requires the court's detention order to “contain findings of fact.” § 907.041(4)(i), Fla. Stat. The same provision, however, says those findings can be made “in writing or orally on the record.” Id.

It is true that the trial court did not say on the record specifically that “no conditions of release can reasonably protect the community.” At the same time, we have no doubt that the trial court knew what the standard was for detention and clearly was concerned about the danger Peterson posed to the community under all the circumstances. The trial court's decision to keep Peterson detained was firmly grounded in the conclusion that the nature of Peterson's violation pointed toward a danger to the community that no other conditions would protect against. The trial court made the link between the role that alcohol played in the charged offenses and Peterson's demonstrated inability to refrain from drinking when left to his own devices.

By statute, the trial court had the discretion to make this link and conclude that nothing short of detention—under these circumstances—will protect the public from Peterson when he has access to alcohol. The trial court had ample support to do what it did under the circumstances. Again, we do not order discharge of a detainee based on some failure in form or other technical deficiency. Perhaps the trial court could have been more specific as to his findings, but the trial court's exercise of discretion to detain Peterson under these circumstances is supported by the facts and the law. On the record that we have, “the law and the evidence require” remand of Peterson to the sheriff's custody to await trial. § 79.08, Fla. Stat.

Relief Denied; writ Discharged. No costs or charges awarded to either party.

Per Curiam.

Roberts, Tanenbaum, and Long, JJ., concur.