GRILLO v. STATE (2022)

Anthony Joseph Grillo seeks appellate review of the order summarily denying what the postconviction court properly deemed to be a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. He argues, and we agree, that his sentence is illegal because it imposes an adult sanction but maintains his youthful offender status.¹ Accordingly, we reverse the order insofar as it denies relief on Ground One and remand to the postconviction court to strike the youthful offender designation from Grillo's sentence. We affirm the order in all other respects.

Shortly before his twenty-first birthday, Grillo entered a plea of guilty to (1) attempted second-degree murder with enhancement; (2) attempted robbery with a firearm; and (3) shooting into a vehicle. Grillo was sentenced as a youthful offender pursuant to section 958.04, Florida Statutes (2012), to three years in the Florida Department of Corrections, followed by one year of community control, followed by two years of probation. After serving the incarcerative portion of his sentence, Grillo was released to community control, which he violated by committing new drug-related offenses. The court sentenced Grillo to a composite sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Corrections with a twenty-five-year minimum mandatory. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court on appeal. Grillo v. State, 202 So. 3d 429 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016).

Grillo, through postconviction counsel, filed a “Motion for Postconviction Relief Pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850,” arguing in Ground One that Grillo's “sentencing is improper and inconsistent with the law and practices of the court.” In the corresponding memorandum of law filed in support of the motion, postconviction counsel elaborated on Grillo's claim, asserting that Grillo's composite twenty-five-year prison sentence for his violation of community control was illegal because the court sentenced Grillo to an adult sanction but also maintained Grillo's youthful offender status. The postconviction court correctly determined that Grillo was actually seeking rule 3.800(a) relief, not the rule 3.850 relief Grillo identified. However, because it misconstrued Grillo's claim as a challenge to adult sentencing and the accompanying twenty-five-year firearm minimum mandatory provision, it incorrectly denied relief based on Cooper v. State, 267 So. 3d 558 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (holding that, upon revocation of youthful offender's probation or community control for a substantive offense, sentencing court may either impose a sentence under the youthful offender designation or impose an adult sanction, in which case any minimum mandatory provision associated with the offense would have to be imposed).

Contrary to the court's construction of Grillo's argument, Grillo was not alleging that he could not be sentenced to an adult sanction or that he could not receive the accompanying twenty-five-year minimum mandatory after the substantive violation of his community control. Grillo was also not asserting that he was entitled to maintain his youthful offender status along with the adult sanctions imposed for his substantive violation of community control. Rather, Grillo was arguing that his composite twenty-five-year prison sentence for the violation of community control is illegal because, when imposing the adult sanctions, the sentencing court also pronounced that Grillo would maintain his youthful offender status.

The records in the prior appeal ² before this Court reflect that, at the conclusion of Grillo's violation of community control hearing, the court found that Grillo had committed a substantive violation of his community control by committing new law violations. The court then revoked and terminated Grillo's community control and sentenced him to adult sanctions. However, after pronouncing Grillo's prison terms, the court also stated:

You forfeited your right to the youthful offender sentence by committing the condition five violations as you did.

However, you will maintain your youthful offender status within the Department of Corrections. The appellate courts say you're entitled to do that. They [sic] may have something to do with your placement while you're in the prison system.

This was error.

“[W]hen a youthful offender commits a substantive violation of probation and the trial court elects to impose a sentence in excess of the six-year cap, the sentence necessarily becomes an adult CPC sentence such that the defendant does not retain his or her ‘youthful offender status.’ ” Alexis v. State, 284 So. 3d 1125, 1126 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (quoting Eustache v. State, 248 So. 3d 1097, 1102 (Fla. 2018)). Therefore, Grillo's sentences are illegal, and the postconviction court should have granted relief as to Ground One. Accordingly, we reverse. Because the transcript of the violation of community control hearing makes it clear that the court intended to impose adult sanctions for Grillo's substantive violations of his supervision and that the court only ordered that Grillo would maintain his youthful offender status because it was under the mistaken impression that it was required to do so, we remand for the postconviction court to strike the erroneous youthful offender designation.

REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   His remaining arguments are either without merit or time-barred and accordingly are not addressed.

2.   “This court can take judicial notice of its own records.” Scheffer v. State, 893 So. 2d 698, 699 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).

WOZNIAK, J.

LAMBERT, C.J. and EVANDER, J., concur.