PORTER v. STATE (2022)

Don J. Porter appeals an order denying his postconviction motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Finding no error by the trial court, we affirm.

We write to warn Porter against filing any further frivolous postconviction appeals. Following a 2008 jury trial, Porter was convicted of lewd and lascivious battery, sexual activity with a person aged sixteen or seventeen, and child abuse by impregnation. His judgment and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See Porter v. State, 13 So. 3d 471 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).

In the thirteen years following his convictions, Porter has filed seven postconviction appeals in this Court and has obtained no relief. See Porter v. State, 88 So. 3d 155 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (affirming order denying rule 3.850 motion); Porter v. State, Case No. 1D11-6195 (Fla. 1st DCA Aug. 8, 2012) (dismissing appeal of order denying petition for writ of habeas corpus); Porter v. State, 95 So. 3d 219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (affirming order denying rule 3.800(a) motion); Porter v. State, 137 So. 3d 379 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (affirming order denying rule 3.800(a) motion); Porter v. State, 228 So. 3d 558 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (affirming order denying rule 3.850 motion); Porter v. State, 326 So. 3d 1211 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (affirming order denying rule 3.800(a) motion and warning Porter against future frivolous filings).

Two months ago, this Court warned Porter against filing frivolous appeals. See id. Because Porter filed the instant appeal before that warning issued, we will not order him to show cause why he should not be barred from future pro se filings in this Court. Even so, we warn Porter that if he again seeks to challenge his judgment or sentence, we will likely issue an order under State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999), requiring him to show cause why he should not be barred from further pro se filings and for consideration of disciplinary action under section 944.279(1), Florida Statutes (2021). Frivolous postconviction appeals burden judicial resources and “serve[ ] no purpose other than to delay resolution of meritorious claims brought by others.” See Hall v. State, 94 So. 3d 655, 656 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Ferris v. State, 100 So. 3d 142, 143 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (Wetherell, J., concurring) (“[C]ourts do not exist simply to give prisoners something to do while they serve their sentences, and there comes a point in every criminal case that the defendant needs to accept the finality of his judgment and sentence and just do his time.”).

Affirmed.

Since Porter qualified as a prison release reoffender (PRR), I agree that his thirty-year prison sentence was not an illegal sentence. As a PRR convicted of a first-degree felony, Porter's thirty-year sentence was mandatory. See § 775.082(9)(a)3.b., Fla. Stat. (2007). I also agree that we are correct to warn Porter against further frivolous filings.

Per Curiam.

Rowe, C.J., and Jay, J., concur; Bilbrey, J., concurring in result with opinion.