PONOMARENKO v. ESENOVA (2020)

Former husband appeals two orders of the trial court, one which denied his motion for relief from a final judgment of dissolution which incorporated a marital settlement agreement and the other which denied his petition to modify child support. He also filed a petition for writ of prohibition to disqualify the trial judge. We have consolidated that petition with this appeal for disposition.

We dismiss the appeal from the order denying relief from judgment, as the notice of appeal was filed over four months after its issuance, thus making it untimely. We affirm the final order denying the petition for modification, as the issues raised in the initial brief attack the original entry of the marital settlement agreement and not the modification proceedings.

Finally, we deny the petition for writ of prohibition as to the motions to disqualify the trial judge. Not only were they technically insufficient, we deem them legally insufficient as well.

Appellant's main source of contention with respect to disqualification is the limited amount of time the trial court gave him during the hearing to prepare a written motion of disqualification. He contends that In re Aleman, 995 So. 2d 395, 400 (Fla. 2008), is on point. Aleman, however, involved whether a judge violated the code of judicial conduct by allowing counsel only fifteen or twenty-two minutes to prepare a motion for disqualification in the middle of a first-degree murder trial in which the death penalty was sought. Then the judge threatened the lawyer with contempt. The type of proceeding and its extreme consequence was clearly a substantial factor in finding that the judge violated the code of conduct. Aleman does not stand for a rule of per se reversal any time a judge allows a limited time to prepare a motion for disqualification during trial. In this case, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the time for preparing the motion for disqualification.

The other issues noticed in the appeal, but not argued, are deemed waived.

Affirmed as to the final order denying the petition for modification; dismissed as to the order denying relief from judgment; and denied as to the petition for writ of prohibition.

Per Curiam.

Warner, Gross and Gerber, JJ., concur.