CHAVEZ v. STATE (2020)

Appellant, Neil D. Chavez, appeals an Order Denying Defendant's Petition for Removal of the Requirement to Register as a Sexual Offender. Appellant was adjudicated guilty and sentenced for the offenses of traveling to meet a minor in violation of section 847.0135(4)(b), Florida Statutes, and the unlawful use of a computer service in violation of section 847.0135(3)(b), Florida Statutes. The trial court properly denied Appellant's petition for the removal of the requirement to register as a sexual offender because neither of Appellant's offenses are included within section 943.04354, Florida Statutes (2018), which provides that as long as certain requirements are satisfied, a court may consider removing the registration requirement for defendants who are convicted of the enumerated crimes of lewd or lascivious offenses committed upon or in the presence of persons less than sixteen years of age, sexual performance of a child, and engaging in certain prohibited computer transmissions. Although Appellant attempts to liken his offenses to those provided for in the statute, we are not at liberty to add words to statutes that were not placed there by the Legislature. See Seagrave v. State, 802 So. 2d 281, 287 (Fla. 2001); see also English v. State, 191 So. 3d 448, 450 (Fla. 2016) (noting that when a statute's language is clear, a court need not look behind the statute's plain language); Courson v. State, 24 So. 3d 1249, 1251 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (noting that courts are without the power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way that would extend, modify, or limit its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications).

Accordingly, the trial court's order is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam.

Lewis, Winokur, and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.