MILLS v. RILEY (2020)

Shirley Mills appeals the final judgment of injunction for protection against stalking entered under section 784.0485, Florida Statutes (2019), in favor of her neighbor, Lawana Riley. Ms. Mills contends the evidence was insufficient to support the injunction because the record lacks any evidence that any of the alleged incidents of harassment caused Ms. Riley substantial emotional distress. We agree. “Without evidence of this necessary element, the injunction should not have been entered.” Shannon v. Smith, 278 So. 3d 173, 176 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019); see also Klemple v. Gagliano, 197 So. 3d 1283, 1286 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (finding that there was insufficient evidence to constitute stalking under the “harassment” prong of the statute where the petitioner did not testify as to any emotional distress caused by the respondent's actions and reasoning that the stalking statute does not allow trial courts to enter injunctions simply to keep the peace between parties who are unable to get along). We reject, without discussion, the other arguments raised by Ms. Mills in this appeal.

Reversed.

Ongoing neighborhood fracases resulted in an anti-stalking injunction against Shirley Mills, who engaged in a course of harassing conduct directed at Lawana Riley and her family members that served no legitimate purpose. The trial judge found Riley credible and discounted what Mills had to say (he labeled her as “passive-aggressive” and concluded that “it must be a terror living anywhere nearby you because this is harassment ․ to the extreme.”).^*

The only question remaining is whether the record evidence shows that harassment by Mills caused “substantial emotional distress” as required by statute and interpreted by caselaw. § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2020) (“ ‘Harass’ means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.”); see, e.g., Paulson v. Rankart, 251 So. 3d 986, 990 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (characterizing the evidentiary standard as “exacting” to justify injunctive relief). The legal determination of whether harassment causes “substantial emotional distress” is judged by a “reasonable person” standard rather than what the target of harassment subjectively experienced. Paulson, 251 So. 3d at 989. The reason a more “exacting” standard applies, id., is to weed out and separate the run-of-the-mill incivilities, discourtesies, and loutishness in some sectors of public life from the more serious forms of harassment for which judicial intervention (versus peace officer or mediator intervention) is legislatively reserved.

On this basis, I concur in the conclusion that although the trial record shows subjectively severe emotional distress was caused, the harassment statute and our caselaw do not deem what occurred to be an objective basis by which a reasonable person would experience “substantial emotional distress.” That said, the harassment that occurred in this case flirts with the hazy line that separates objective from subjective emotional distress.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.   These are harsh words, but the trial court observed the witnesses’ demeanors and attitudes and apparently perceived a basis for these observations, a responsibility he shouldered and one we do not re-weigh on appeal as a general matter. Khan v. Deutschman, 282 So. 3d 965, 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019).

Per Curiam.

Ray, C.J., and M.K. Thomas, J., concur; Makar, J., concurs with opinion.