JONES v. STATE (2019)

Quincy Jones appeals the summary denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the records attached to the order do not conclusively refute Jones's claim in Ground Six that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to notify the trial court during the trial of a discovery violation and request a Richardson ¹ hearing on the State's alleged coercion of James Phillips's testimony,² we reverse the order under review and remand for attachment of portions of the record conclusively refuting Jones's claim, or in the absence of such records, for an evidentiary hearing. See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 2000) (“[A] defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction relief motion unless (1) the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, or (2) the motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient.” (citing Maharaj v. State, 684 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1996))). We affirm in all other respects.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771, 774–75 (Fla. 1971).

2.   In Ground Six, Jones alleged, among other things, that he informed trial counsel of the purported discovery violation on the morning of the second day of trial. Trial counsel's statement at the sentencing hearing, which the trial court ruled showed that trial counsel learned of the alleged discovery violation after the trial concluded, is too ambiguous to conclusively refute Jones's allegation on this point.

PER CURIAM.

ORFINGER and HARRIS, JJ., and JACOBUS, B.W., Senior Judge, concur.