Cesar Lacayo, Cross-Appellant, v. BANK TRUST (2019)

Affirmed. See Carlisle v. U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 225 So. 3d 893, 896 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“[T]he general rule remains, and best practice requires, that a non-party must seek and be granted leave to intervene before it will have standing to pursue relief [from judgment].”); Jaffer v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 155 So. 3d 1199, 1200-02 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (finding that allegations in complaint that plaintiff was “the holder of the [m]ortgage [n]ote and [m]ortgage” were sufficient to state a cause of action for mortgage foreclosure); see also U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Morelli, 249 So. 3d 717, 721 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“It is now settled law that ․ when a foreclosure complaint alleges a borrower is in default for any payment due within five years of the filing of the complaint, the action is not barred by section 95.11(2)(c) of the Florida Statutes.”); Debish v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 240 So. 3d 16, 17 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (“[T]he requirement of adequate protection is generally satisfied ‘through a written indemnification agreement in the final judgment.’ ”) (quoting Blitch v. Freedom Mortg. Corp., 185 So. 3d 645, 646 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)); E. Nat'l Bank v. Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 508 So. 2d 1323, 1324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (“The doctrine of subrogation is generally invoked when one person has satisfied the obligations of another and equity compels that the person discharging the debt stand in the shoes of the person whose claim has been discharged, thereby succeeding to the rights and priorities of the original creditor.”).

PER CURIAM.