CHAPPELL v. STATE (2019)

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

We grant Isaac Chappell Jr.'s (“Defendant”) motion for rehearing, withdraw our previously issued opinion, and substitute the following in its place.

The Defendant appeals the trial court's order summarily denying his motion for postconviction relief for lack of jurisdiction. We reverse.

Here, the Defendant timely filed his motion for postconviction relief. We agree that the two-year limit for filing a motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 does not begin to run until direct review proceedings have concluded. Gland v. State, 239 So. 3d 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018); Breland v. State, 58 So. 3d 326 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Pierce v. State, 875 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Snipes v. State, 843 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Skeens v. State, 853 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); McGee v. State, 684 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

The Defendant's convictions and sentences became final for the purposes of rule 3.850 when the thirty-day deadline expired for filing a direct appeal of his resentencing in this case.¹ Pursuant to the mailbox rule, Defendant filed his rule 3.850 motion on December 11, 2018. The two-year deadline was December 14, 2018.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to consider the merits of the Defendant's motion for postconviction relief.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Finality is not extended when resentencing occurs pursuant to the granting of a postconviction motion claim. See Joseph v. State, 835 So. 2d 1221, 1222 n.3 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (noting that two-year limitation period under rule 3.850 is not tolled by other collateral proceedings filed in the trial court, even if a corrected sentence is entered).

PER CURIAM.

COHEN, EDWARDS and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.