TRUST REAL ESTATE VENTURES LLC v. DESNICK (2019)

Appellants contend the lower tribunal improvidently granted final summary judgment in favor of appellee, in light of pending discovery depositions. “The granting or denying of a motion for continuance is within the discretion of the trial judge and a gross or flagrant abuse of this discretion must be demonstrated by the complaining party before this court will substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge.” Stern v. Four Freedoms Nat'l Med. Servs., Co., 417 So. 2d 1085, 1086 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (citation omitted). Having carefully reviewed the record before us, it is clear that appellants “had an adequate opportunity to engage in discovery and ․ any further discovery was not likely to present any material facts relevant to the trial court's disposition of the issues.” Barco Holdings, LLC v. Terminal Inv. Corp., 967 So. 2d 281, 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). Thus, appellants have failed to demonstrate that the denial of the continuance was “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable ․ [or that] no reasonable man [or woman] would take the view adopted by the trial court,” and we conclude that summary judgment was not premature. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980) (citation omitted); see Vancelette v. Boulan S. Beach Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 229 So. 3d 398, 400 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“Absent a non-moving party's demonstration of diligence, good faith, and the materiality of the discovery sought to be completed, a trial court cannot be faulted for denying a motion to continue a long-scheduled hearing on the motions for summary judgment.”) (citations omitted); Crespo v. Fla. Entm't Direct Support Org., Inc., 674 So. 2d 154, 155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (“A trial court has the discretion to deny a continuance of a summary judgment hearing where the outstanding discovery items are immaterial to the dispositive issues in the case.”) (citations omitted); see also Carbonell v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 675 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (“A party seeking a continuance bears the burden of showing, by affidavit, the existence and availability of other evidence, its relevance, the efforts taken to produce it, and that any failure to do so is not the result of the movant's inexcusable delay.”) (citing DeMesme v. Stephenson, 498 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(f)). Accordingly, we affirm the final judgment under review.

Affirmed.

MILLER, J.