URREA v. KOPLOW (2026)

Affirmed. See Fla. R. App. P. 1.540(b)(5) (providing relief from judgment where “the judgment, decree, or order has been satisfied, released, or discharged” and requiring such motion for relief be filed “within a reasonable time” after the judgment was entered); Brooks v. Brooks, 340 So. 3d 543, 545 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (“[R]ule 1.540(b)[(5)] requires such a motion to be brought ‘within a reasonable time’ therefore, once the litigant knows the final judgment is no longer equitable, the litigant must move within a reasonable amount of time to vacate final judgment.” (quoting Castro v. Sun ‘N Lake of Sebring Improvement Dist., 334 So. 3d 663, 666–67 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021))); Brooks, 340 So. 3d at 547 (affirming denial of rule 1.540 relief where the motion was filed sixteen years after the challenged order and “[t]he former husband knew of the alleged mistake in 2004”); see also Travelers Com. Ins. Co. v. Harrington, 187 So. 3d 879, 888 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (“[T]he exhaustion of appellate remedies has never been a prerequisite to the entitlement of relief under rule 1.540(b)(5), or an impediment to the jurisdiction of a trial court to consider whether to grant relief from a ‘final judgment’ under that subsection of the rule.”); see also Sanchez v. Sanchez, 285 So. 3d 969, 975 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (reviewing denial of rule 1.540 motion for an abuse of discretion); Cunha v. Cunha, 92 So. 3d 918, 919 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“Because a trial court is accorded broad discretion in determining rule 1.540(b) motions, the standard of review of an order on a rule 1.540(b) motion for relief from judgment is whether there has been an abuse of the trial court's discretion.”) (quotation omitted).

PER CURIAM.