STATE v. GRAMMIG (2019)

The State appeals the trial court's order granting the defendant's motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

In May of 1986, the State filed an information charging the defendant with sexual battery, aiding and abetting sexual battery, and kidnapping. An arrest capias was issued, but the State did not serve it on the defendant until March of 2012 when he turned himself in to Minnesota law enforcement. He subsequently filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the statute of limitations had expired. After a lengthy evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted his motion and this appeal timely followed.

We consider whether prosecution of the defendant commenced after the expiration of the statute of limitations due to an unreasonable delay by the State in serving the capias. See § 775.15(5), Fla. Stat. (1985).¹ Based upon the totality of the circumstances, we disagree with the trial court's finding that the delay by the State was unreasonable.

Although, arguably, law enforcement could have conducted a more thorough investigation, there was testimony that they made several diligent attempts to locate the defendant. Further, there was uncontradicted evidence that the defendant fled from the state and attempted to avoid prosecution with the use of multiple aliases. Therefore, in considering both the efforts exercised by the State and the defendant's attempts to avoid prosecution, we find that the State met its burden to prove that it served the defendant without unreasonable delay. See Goings v. State, 76 So.3d 975 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes (1985), provides, in part:A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay. In determining what is reasonable, inability to locate the defendant after diligent search or the defendant's absence from the state shall be considered.

PER CURIAM.

BERGER, EISNAUGLE, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.