WHEELOCK v. ESTATE OF BETZOLD (2019)

In February of 2017, appellant Macy Wheelock appealed a January 20, 2017 order of the trial court. On March 7, 2018, we granted the parties' joint motion to relinquish jurisdiction for ninety days so the trial court could, as the motion requested, “rule on matters which are related to, and which will be dispositive of, one or more significant issues on appeal.” On August 22, 2018 – several months after the ninety-day relinquishment period had ended – Wheelock filed a motion to “prolong” the period of relinquishment of jurisdiction. In her motion, appellant argued that “the issues have been so narrowed that there is an opportunity for the trial court to resolve all remaining issues, thereby mooting this appeal.”

Appellee Stephen Hertz objected to further relinquishment of jurisdiction, arguing, inter alia, that the initial period of relinquishment had expired, and no authority existed for a “second period of relinquishment.” On August 29, 2018, this Court granted appellant's motion, and relinquished jurisdiction until September 20, 2018. On September 11, 2018, this Court also denied Hertz's September 4, 2018 motion seeking rehearing of this Court's second relinquishment order.

On August 31, 2018, the trial court entered an order essentially setting aside its January 20, 2017 order, the one Wheelock had appealed in February 2017. Shortly thereafter, on September 20, 2018, Wheelock filed its notice of voluntary dismissal of this appeal pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.350(b) (2018).¹ Hertz then filed an objection to the dismissal, and also filed a separate petition in this Court seeking certiorari relief (case number 3D18-1978). In both his objection and his separately filed petition, Hertz advanced the same argument he unsuccessfully advanced in opposition to Wheelock's August 22, 2018 relinquishment motion.

On January 14, 2019, in an unelaborated order, a separate panel of this Court denied Hertz's certiorari petition, and we now overrule Hertz's objection to Wheelock's voluntary dismissal of this appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

Upon consideration of appellee Stephen G. Hertz's motion for appellate attorney's fees, it is ordered that said motion is hereby denied.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The 2018 version of rule 9.350(b) provided, in relevant part, as follows: “Voluntary Dismissal. A proceeding of an appellant or petitioner may be dismissed before a decision on the merits by filing a notice of dismissal with the clerk of the court ․”

LOGUE, SCALES and LINDSEY, JJ., concur.