YOUNGBLOOD v. STATE (2022)

Appellant challenges his conviction and life sentence for sexual battery of a child under 12 by a person 18 years of age or older. Appellant claims that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of his committing “other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestation.” § 90.404(2)(b)1., Fla. Stat. We disagree and affirm.

Although some of the prior bad acts occurred many years ago, that was but one factor for the trial court to consider in deciding to admit this evidence. See McLean v. State, 934 So. 2d 1248, 1262 (Fla. 2006). Witnesses testified at a pretrial hearing that when they were young girls between the ages of 6 to 8 years old, Appellant abused them much like his sexual battery of the 6-year-old female victim of the charged offense. “[T]he similarity of the prior acts to the act charged regarding the location of where the act occurred, the age and gender of the victims, and the manner in which the acts were committed” are all considerations under McLean. 934 So. 2d at 1262–63. The trial court considered the applicable factors and did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to hear the evidence of Appellant committing prior acts of sexual abuse. See Newman v. State, 300 So. 3d 360 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020); Whisby v. State, 262 So. 3d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).

Finally, the evidence of Appellant committing prior bad acts of child molestation did not become a central feature of the trial. See McLean, 934 So. 2d at 1262. “The determination is fact-dependent and multifaceted and therefore must be made on a case-by-case basis.” Pitts v. State, 263 So. 3d 834, 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). The prior bad act witnesses’ testimony was short. The prior acts were only briefly mentioned by the State in opening and closing statements to the jury, and the jury was repeatedly instructed as to the proper use of the collateral crimes evidence. See id., 263 So. 3d at 841 (rejecting argument that collateral crimes evidence became a central feature of the trial where the charged offense and collateral crimes evidence shared many similarities, the testimony about the charged offense was substantially longer than that of the collateral crimes, the substantial focus of the State's arguments to the jury were directed to the charged offense, and the jury was instructed as to the proper use of collateral crimes evidence); Whisby, 262 So. 3d at 232–33 (same).

Affirmed.

Per Curiam.

Lewis, Makar, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.