STREETER v. STATE (2015)

Sylathum Streeter appeals his two mandatory life sentences for first-degree murder, as well as the 280–year aggregate sentence for three counts of attempted first-degree murder, seven counts of attempted felony murder, three counts of shooting or throwing a missile into a dwelling, vehicle, building, or aircraft, and two counts of burglary with assault or battery.¹ Because Streeter received two mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole for first-degree murders that he committed when he was a juvenile, we reverse those sentences and remand for further proceedings consistent with Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), and Toye v. State, 133 So.3d 540 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).² See also Taylor v. State, 151 So.3d 1273 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014); Snipes v. State, 150 So.3d 1211 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014); Burton v. State, 148 So.3d 541 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).

As we did in Burton, we certify conflict with Geter v. State, 115 So.3d 375 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012); Gonzalez v. State, 101 So.3d 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); and Falcon v. State, 111 So.3d 973 (Fla. 1st DCA), review granted, 137 So.3d 1019 (Fla.2013).³ See Burton, 148 So.3d at 542.

Streeter also challenges his 280–year aggregate sentence for the nonhomicide offenses. He acknowledges that this and other courts hold that aggregate term-of-years sentences do not violate the prohibition of a life sentence for a juvenile offender for a singular, nonhomicide offense as set forth in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). See, e.g., Walle v. State, 99 So.3d 967, 970 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Peters v. State, 128 So.3d 832, 855–56 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Rosario v. State, 122 So.3d 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Henry v. State, 82 So.3d 1084 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). However, he contends that due to the length of his aggregate sentence, he has no “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. Consequently, he argues that his aggregate sentence is a “de facto life sentence” that violates the dictate of Graham. As support, he cites cases from the First District Court of Appeal that hold that a Graham violation occurs where a court imposes a term-of-years sentence that does not provide a meaningful opportunity to obtain release. See Adams v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D1865 (Fla. 1st DCA Aug. 8, 2012) (involving 60–year aggregate sentence which would exceed appellant's lifetime); Floyd v. State, 87 So.3d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (involving 80–year aggregate sentence which would exceed appellant's lifetime).

We affirm based on Walle, but we certify conflict with Adams and Floyd, and as the court did in Rosario, we certify the following questions to the Florida Supreme Court as questions of great public importance:

1. DOES GRAHAM V. FLORIDA, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), APPLY TO LENGTHY TERM–OF–YEARS SENTENCES THAT AMOUNT TO A DE FACTO LIFE SENTENCE?

2. IF SO, AT WHAT POINT DOES A TERM–OF–YEARS SENTENCE BECOME A DE FACTO LIFE SENTENCE?

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; conflict and questions certified.

FOOTNOTES

1.  The sentences arose from two different circuit court cases, CF98–002950 and CF98–02951A.

2.  We note that the State has asserted that upon resentencing, the trial court could use the doctrine of statutory revival to sentence Streeter to life sentences with the possibility of parole. See Rodriguez–Giudicelli v. State, 143 So.3d 947 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). However, we offer no opinion as to whether that doctrine should be applied to this case.

3.  The supreme court heard oral argument in the Falcon case on November 6, 2014. Although the State asks this court to hold this case in abeyance until Falcon is decided, we decline to do so and instead apply Toye as we have done in other cases.

MORRIS, Judge.

CASANUEVA and BLACK, JJ., Concur.