E.L., a Juvenile, Appellant, v. State of Florida, Appellee. (2026)

Appellant, E.L., a juvenile, appeals from an order withholding an adjudication of delinquency for carrying a concealed firearm and possession of a firearm by a minor. On appeal, he contends the evidence was insufficient to establish concealment and therefore he was entitled to a judgment of dismissal on the first offense. For the reasons below, we affirm.

I

Deputy Alberto Rafael III was in his marked patrol car at the Martin Luther King, Jr. Day parade in Liberty City when he was approached by an unidentified woman who wished to remain anonymous. The two engaged in a brief conversation, the contents of which are not evident on the record before us. But the woman was ostensibly “desperate” and pointed out E.L.

E.L. noticed Deputy Rafael and first began walking, then running in the opposite direction. Deputy Rafael caught up with E.L. and ordered him to stop and raise his hands. E.L. turned and faced the officer, and when he raised his hands, his shirt lifted, exposing a firearm in his waistband directly below his navel. He then told the officer to “take [the gun], take it, take it.” Deputy Rafael retrieved the firearm, handcuffed E.L., and effectuated a formal arrest.

The State filed a delinquency petition charging E.L. with carrying a concealed firearm and possession of a firearm by a minor, in violation of sections 790.01(3) and 790.22(3), Florida Statutes (2025). The case proceeded to an adjudicatory hearing.

At the hearing, Deputy Rafael testified to the above facts, and the State entered his body camera footage into evidence. The prosecution rested, and E.L. unsuccessfully moved for dismissal. The court later denied E.L.’s second motion for dismissal and found E.L. delinquent of both offenses. E.L. received a withhold of adjudication and a probationary term. This appeal ensued.

II

A

We review the denial of a judgment of dismissal de novo. See N.C. v. State, 300 So. 3d 310, 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). “While the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the State, if the State fails to present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of the crime charged, then a judgment of dismissal is proper.” Id. (quoting C.T. v. State, 238 So. 3d 857, 859 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (citation omitted)).

B

To prove the offense of carrying a concealed firearm, the State must establish that the accused carried a firearm “on or about [his] person in such a manner as to conceal [it] from the ordinary sight of another person.” See § 790.001(3), Fla. Stat. “The term ‘ordinary sight of another person’ means the casual and ordinary observation of another in the normal associations of life.” Ensor v. State, 403 So. 2d 349, 354 (Fla. 1981); see also State v. Riocabo, 372 So. 2d 126, 126 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (holding “a concealed firearm may be accidentally, partially exposed so that an arresting officer may see a portion of the firearm” but that the firearm may still be concealed under the statute); State v. Joseph, 506 So. 2d 493, 494 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (“The fact that [the weapon] is revealed to the arresting officer when the person turns and his coat swings away sufficiently for the officer to identify it as a pistol does not keep it from being a ‘concealed weapon’ under the law.”).

E.L. correctly posits that just because a portion of the weapon cannot be seen upon casual observation does not automatically create a triable issue of fact. The Florida Supreme Court has instead focused on the “manner” in which the weapon is carried. Dorelus v. State, 747 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla. 1999) (citing § 790.001(2)-(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995)). As the court has recognized, “a statement by the observing officer that he or she was able to ‘immediately recognize’ the questioned object as a weapon may conclusively demonstrate that the weapon was not concealed as a matter of law because it was not hidden from ordinary observation.” Id. at 372 (citing State v. Hardy, 610 So. 2d 38, 38 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Cope v. State, 523 So. 2d 1270, 1270 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)).

But in this case, the converse was true. Deputy Rafael testified on direct examination that the firearm was “concealed out of ordinary sight” until E.L. raised his shirt and requested to be disarmed. That testimony was sufficient to sustain the trial court's denial of both dismissal motions and the finding of delinquency. Accordingly, we impute no error to the decision below.

Affirmed.

MILLER, J.