G.K., the father, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES (2026)

This is an appeal from a final judgment terminating the father, G.K.’s, parental rights to his children, K.K. and R.K. The father argues that: (1) the circuit court failed to certify that his surrender of parental rights was knowing and voluntary; (2) termination was not the least restrictive means of protecting the children; and (3) termination was not in the children's manifest best interests. We affirm the circuit court's ruling for the reasons discussed below.

Background

The Department of Children and Families (“the Department”) sheltered the two children in the underlying dependency proceeding—then thirteen-year-old K.K. and eleven-year-old R.K.—based on allegations that the father physically abused the children and that their mother, R.B., was unavailable as a caregiver. The father was subsequently arrested for child abuse, and the circuit court entered a no-contact order prohibiting him from contacting the children.

The Department filed an expedited petition to terminate the father's parental rights. The father was present on the first day of the adjudicatory hearing on the petition. At the outset of the proceeding, the children's attorney ad litem informed the court that the father had expressed an intention to voluntarily surrender his parental rights if the children confirmed that was what they wanted. The parties agreed that the father would participate in a supervised virtual meeting with the children the following morning before returning to court to continue the hearing.

Before recessing, the circuit court advised the father that he was required to return for the second day of the hearing and that his parental rights could be terminated if he failed to appear. The father indicated that he understood.

The father did not appear on the second day of the hearing. Instead, his counsel filed the father's Affidavit and Acknowledgment of Surrender, Consent, and Waiver of Notice, through which the father voluntarily surrendered his parental rights and consented to the Department's placement of the children for adoption. The circuit court reviewed the affidavit on the record, found that it appeared to be in proper form, confirmed that it had been executed with the required witnesses, and accepted and filed the affidavit.

After accepting the father's surrender, the circuit court scheduled a manifest best interests hearing. At the hearing's start, the father's counsel stipulated to two of the statutory manifest best interests factors, including the father's ability and capacity to provide for the children.

The circuit court then heard testimony from the Department's dependency case manager. The case manager testified that the children had been placed in licensed care and did not have special needs. She explained that the Department had been unable to locate an approved relative placement, but that the children's mother was actively working on a reunification case plan. The case manager further testified that the children were straight-A students, were capable of forming bonds with a parental substitute, and had expressed during her most recent home visit that they did not wish to have further contact with the father.

The Department advised the circuit court that case management supported termination of the father's parental rights. The Guardian ad Litem Office and the children's attorney ad litem likewise supported termination.

Following the hearing, the circuit court entered a final judgment terminating the father's parental rights pursuant to section 39.806(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2025), based, in part, on the father's sworn surrender affidavit. The circuit court also made written findings addressing each of the eleven manifest best interests factors under section 39.810, Florida Statutes (2025), concluding that termination was in the children's manifest best interests and constituted the least restrictive means of protecting them from further harm.

The father did not move for rehearing before filing this appeal.

Discussion

A circuit court may terminate parental rights only upon clear and convincing evidence. M.D. v. State, Dep't of Child. & Fams., 187 So. 3d 1275, 1277 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting J.G. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 22 So. 3d 774, 775 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)). On appeal, however, we review whether competent, substantial evidence supports the circuit court's judgment. Id. Proof of one statutory ground for termination is sufficient. Id.

As a threshold matter, the father did not preserve the arguments which he raises on appeal. When an alleged error first appears on the face of a final order, the party must raise the issue in a motion for rehearing or other appropriate motion to preserve it for appellate review. B.A. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 311 So. 3d 34, 38 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). Because the father did not move for rehearing, our review is limited to fundamental error analysis.

Fundamental error is error that goes to the foundation of the case or the merits of the cause of action. Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562, 575 (Fla. 2008). “The doctrine of fundamental error should be applied only in rare cases where a jurisdictional error appears or where the interests of justice present a compelling demand for its application.” Smith v. State, 521 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1988); see also B.T. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 300 So. 3d 1273, 1280-81 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). We therefore evaluate the father's arguments under this standard.

The father first argues that the circuit court's failure to conduct a colloquy before he surrendered his parental rights—at a hearing that the father voluntarily did not attend—constitutes fundamental error. Not so.

Section 39.806(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2025), authorizes termination when a parent voluntarily executes a written surrender of the child and consents to the Department's custody for adoption purposes. The surrender document must be executed before two witnesses and a notary or other authorized official. § 39.806(1)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2025). Once accepted, the surrender may be withdrawn only upon a judicial finding that it was obtained by fraud or duress. § 39.806(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2025).

The statute imposes no requirement that the circuit court conduct a colloquy before accepting a voluntary surrender.

Here, the father does not contend that his surrender was involuntary, procured by fraud or duress, or otherwise deficient under section 39.806(1)(a). Instead, he argues only that the circuit court was required to conduct a colloquy or make additional findings not mandated by statute or rule at a hearing which he elected not to attend after receiving notice.¹ Under these circumstances, the circuit court did not commit fundamental error.

The father next argues that termination was not the least restrictive means of protecting the children.

To terminate parental rights, the Department must establish three elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) a statutory ground for termination under section 39.806 exists; (2) termination is in the child's manifest best interests under section 39.810; and (3) termination is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious harm. § 39.802(4), Fla. Stat. (2025); B.K. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 166 So. 3d 866, 873 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).

The least restrictive means prong is a due process safeguard designed to protect the fundamental liberty interest which parents have in the care, custody, and companionship of their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1991). Because termination “irretrievably destroys” the parent-child relationship, the State generally must demonstrate that it employed measures short of termination, or that such measures would be futile, before seeking to sever parental rights. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54, 102 S.Ct. 1388; Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571. In most cases, this requirement is satisfied through a case plan and reunification services designed to address the conditions leading to dependency. See Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571.

“In all cases, ․ to pass constitutional muster, the termination of parental rights to the current child must be the least restrictive means of protecting that child from harm.” Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fams. v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 608 (Fla. 2004). The least restrictive means requirement does not mandate reunification efforts where such efforts would place the child at substantial risk. Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fams. v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 608-09 (Fla. 2004); see also Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fams. v. B.B., 824 So. 2d 1000, 1009 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).

As a threshold matter, the father's argument overlooks the effect of his voluntary surrender. A voluntary surrender of parental rights under section 39.806(1)(a) provides an independent statutory basis for termination and waives challenges relating to reunification efforts. See § 39.806(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2025); see also D.M. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 315 So. 3d 90, 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020).

In addition to the surrender, the record reflects extraordinary circumstances such that termination without a case plan constituted the least restrictive means. See In re T.M., 641 So. 2d 410, 413 (Fla. 1994). Here, the expedited petition alleged egregious conduct and abuse—grounds that independently excuse reunification efforts under section 39.806(2). A no-contact order remained in place throughout the proceedings, and the circuit court found that reunification would pose a substantial risk of significant harm to the children. Under these circumstances, termination constituted the least restrictive means of protecting the children.

Lastly, the father argues that termination of his parental rights was not in the manifest best interests of the children. We disagree.

Before terminating parental rights, the circuit court must determine by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's manifest best interests. B.K., 166 So. 3d at 873. In making that determination, the circuit court must consider the nonexclusive factors set forth in section 39.810, which collectively focus on the child's safety, stability, permanency, and long-term welfare. § 39.810, Fla. Stat. (2025).

Although the circuit court must evaluate each statutory factor, it is not required to assign equal weight to each factor or to quantify the weight given to any particular factor. A.F. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 276 So. 3d 61, 63–64 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019); see also E.A. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 332 So. 3d 493, 499–500 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). Rather, the circuit court satisfies its obligation by making findings sufficient to demonstrate that it considered the statutory factors and exercised its discretion in determining the child's manifest best interests. A.F., 276 So. 3d at 63–64; E.A., 332 So. 3d at 499–500.

Measured against this standard, the father's challenge fails. As an initial matter, the father does not meaningfully challenge any specific manifest best interests finding made by the circuit court. Instead, he broadly asserts that the evidence supporting the statutory factors was “little to none.” Such conclusory argument is inadequate to preserve the issue for appellate review. Hammond v. State, 34 So. 3d 58, 59 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Coolen v. State, 696 So. 2d 738, 742 n.2 (Fla. 1997).

In any event, the record contains competent, substantial evidence supporting the circuit court's findings. The circuit court made written findings addressing each of the eleven manifest best interests factors under section 39.810. Those findings were supported by testimony from the Department's dependency case manager that the children were placed in licensed care, had no special needs, and were performing well academically as straight-A students. The case manager also testified that the Department had been unable to locate an approved relative placement, the children were capable of forming bonds with a parental substitute, and the children had expressed that they did not wish to have any further contact with the father. The circuit court also considered the unanimous recommendations of the Guardian ad Litem Office and the children's attorney ad litem that termination of the father's parental rights was in the children's manifest best interests.

The father's argument ultimately asks this Court to reweigh the evidence considered by the circuit court. That we cannot do. Appellate courts do not substitute their judgment for that of the circuit court where the findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence. See E.A., 332 So. 3d at 500.

Because the circuit court's findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence and the father has demonstrated no fundamental error, we affirm the final judgment terminating his parental rights.

Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The father relies on Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure 8.500(g) and 8.520(c) to support his assertion that the circuit court was required to ensure that the father's termination of his rights was made knowingly and voluntarily. This argument, however, fails to distinguish between surrenders of parental rights executed in court and those made outside of court. Neither rule applies where, as here, a parent executes a written Affidavit and Acknowledgment of Surrender, Consent, and Waiver of Notice outside of court.

Shepherd, J.

Levine and Forst, JJ., concur.