PANIRY v. PANIRY (2026)

David and Dawn Paniry resolved their dissolution of marriage action through a marital settlement agreement, memorialized in an agreed final judgment entered September 2023. Seven months later, Dawn moved to vacate the agreed final judgment based on David's allegedly fraudulent representations of his income. The trial court allowed limited financial discovery. David petitions for certiorari relief, arguing that Dawn's claims of David's increased income were conclusory and insufficient to warrant post-judgment financial discovery. We agree.

In a September 2023 hearing prior to entry of the agreed final judgment, Dawn stated that “David didn't even provide his correct salary amount” and characterized the failure as a “deal breaker.” Even so, the trial court entered an agreed final judgment based on the parties’ marital settlement agreement and resolution of any outstanding issues. While Dawn now claims that the final judgment wasn't agreed, she didn't move for rehearing or appeal the final judgment. And she collected the agreed child support and alimony payments for months before filing the motion to vacate.

“Florida has a well-recognized policy favoring the finality of judgments, especially in family law contexts.” Romero v. Romero, 959 So. 2d 333, 336 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). But in the case of an adverse party's fraud, Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.540(b)(3) permits a court to set aside a final order, including one ratifying and incorporating an agreement. See Corrigan v. Vargas, 277 So. 3d 642, 645 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019). Dawn's motion to vacate the agreed final judgment alleges fraud based on David's failure to update his financial affidavit. After the affidavit was prepared but prior to the final hearing, David received a promotion from assistant chief financial officer at HCA Florida Kendall Hospital to chief financial officer of HCA Florida Northwest Hospital. Dawn claims the failure to update the affidavit to account for the increased income associated with the promotion constitutes fraud. But the motion contains nothing to support the allegation that the income increased other than attaching a January 2023 article referencing David's new job title, with no salary information.

The salient issue here turns on whether David should be compelled to produce the discovery requested by Dawn before a determination of the validity of the marital settlement agreement that formed the basis of the agreed final judgment. And our sister court's opinion in Duke v. Duke, 360 So. 3d 1163 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), is instructive here. In Duke, the former wife sought to set aside a marital settlement agreement based on fraud because the former husband failed to disclose the existence of two recently opened bank accounts on his financial affidavits. Id. at 1164. The Fourth District granted certiorari relief and quashed the discovery order, explaining that:

Even though Former Wife's motion included specifics about the assets which she claims Former Husband failed to disclose, the trial court should consider whether these allegations are sufficient for establishing fraud or misrepresentation, and if so, conduct an evidentiary hearing before permitting discovery on whether Former Wife could or should have discovered this information before signing the MSA.

Id. at 1165. So first things first—it's not enough to show that some fact was not disclosed by the other spouse. Dawn's allegations must establish the prima facie elements of fraud or misrepresentation. And fraud requires reliance on alleged false statements. See Taylor Woodrow Homes Fla., Inc. v. 4/46-A Corp., 850 So. 2d 536, 542 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (“Reliance on the alleged false statement is an essential element and if the evidence shows that the recipient of the statement knew it was false, reliance on the statement is unjustified.”).

Here, Dawn testified at the final hearing that David's financial information was false. Yet despite this apparent knowledge, she entered into a settlement agreement that necessarily relied on that allegedly false information. Dawn did not move for rehearing and did not appeal the agreed final judgment. The Florida Supreme Court has explained that a party challenging a final judgment cannot claim lack of knowledge where “through due diligence, they could have unearthed all relevant facts.” Macar v. Macar, 803 So. 2d 707, 713 (Fla. 2001). Further, the Fifth District affirmed a finding that the allegations of fraud were insufficient to set aside a marital settlement agreement for fraud where the former wife “knew about the inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the affidavit of her husband but signed the Mediated Settlement Agreement anyway.” Crupi v. Crupi, 784 So. 2d 611, 614 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).

This court has explained that “the trial court was duty-bound to determine the validity of the marital settlement agreement prior to granting the Wife's discovery requests.” Parra de Rey v. Rey, 114 So. 3d 371, 385 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). The trial court correctly prevented more invasive financial discovery pending such a determination, but it improperly permitted the request for admissions that is the subject of this petition. We take no position at this time on the ultimate outcome, but prior to permitting any discovery, the trial court should have first determined whether the allegations sufficiently establish a prima facie case of fraud. And if so, next the trial court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing on whether Dawn could have or should have discovered the information before agreeing to the terms of the marital settlement agreement. We therefore grant the petition and quash the order on review.

Petition granted; order quashed.

BOKOR, J.