BONCZYK v. WOLFE (2026)

Petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent her fourth assigned trial judge from further presiding over her civil dispute. Because at least one of her myriad of previous disqualification efforts proved successful, the lower tribunal correctly applied the successive motion provision contained within Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.330(i). See Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.330(i) (“If a judge has been previously disqualified on motion for alleged prejudice or partiality under subdivision (e), a successor judge cannot be disqualified based on a successive motion by the same party unless the successor judge rules that he or she is in fact not fair or impartial in the case. Such a successor judge may rule on the truth of the facts alleged in support of the motion.”). Given this provision, our review is more deferential than that employed in evaluating the denial of an initial disqualification motion. We are limited to determining “ ‘whether the record clearly refutes the successor judge's decision to deny the motion.’ ” Ardis v. Ardis, 130 So. 3d 791, 795 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (quoting Kokal v. State, 901 So. 2d 766, 774 (Fla. 2005)). And here, the record discloses no basis for disturbing the ruling below. See Universal X Rays, Corp. v. Infinity Auto Ins. Co., 399 So. 3d 1145, 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (“[T]he fact that a judge has ruled adversely to the party in the past does not constitute a legally sufficient ground for a motion to disqualify.” (quoting Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 659 (Fla. 2000))). Accordingly, we deny the petition.

Petition denied.

PER CURIAM.