DRINKS v. STATE (2025)

Appellant, Abigail L. Drinks, also known as Abigail Laticia King and Abigail L. Johnson, appeals from the trial court's summary denial of her motion for postconviction relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. On appeal, she contends the trial court reversibly erred in summarily denying relief because she continues to suffer the collateral consequences of a not guilty by reason of insanity finding rendered over three decades ago. We affirm.

I

In 1992, Drinks was adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity of five counts of attempted first degree murder and involuntarily committed to a secure, inpatient forensic facility. Drinks eventually no longer met the criteria for involuntary hospitalization; and, in 2010, the trial court entered an order purporting to terminate its jurisdiction over the case. See §§ 916.15(1), 916.16(1), Fla. Stat.

Fifteen years later, Drinks filed a statement with the trial court identifying herself as a member of the Sovereign Nuwaupian Nation and declaring her lineage.¹ She subsequently sought postconviction relief on a myriad of grounds, including newly discovered evidence and various civil rights violations. After receiving a response from the State, the trial court summarily denied relief. This appeal ensued.

II

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 provides an avenue for relief from judgment or a custody release for any “person who has been tried and found guilty or has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere before a court established by the laws of Florida.” Id. By its plain text, the rule self-limits to findings of guilt. See Dorton v. State, 247 So. 3d 714, 715 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018).

Here, Drinks was not found guilty. Instead, she was adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to a psychiatric facility. As a result, she is not procedurally postured to fall within the ambit of rule 3.850. Accordingly, we affirm the order under review.

Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Drinks's allegations contain many of the similar arguments made by others using the “sovereign citizen” theory. See Trevino v. Florida, 687 F. App'x 861, 862 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal of sovereign citizen lawsuit as frivolous that was filed by a prisoner alleging that “Florida has no jurisdiction over him because he is a ‘natural born, free ․ [l]iving, breathing, flesh and blood human [being]’ ”); United States v. Alexio, Nos. 13–01017 JMS, 13–01018 JMS, 2015 WL 4069160, at *4 (D. Haw. July 2, 2015) (denying defendant's sovereign citizen theory and agreeing with “many other courts across the United States, conclud[ing] that ‘sovereign citizens,’ like all citizens of the United States, are subject to the laws of the jurisdiction in which they reside” (quotation marks and citations omitted (quoting Paul v. New York, No. 13-CV-5047 (SJF)(AKT), 2013 WL 5973138, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2013)))); United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 233 n.1 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting that sovereign citizen claims from defendants “who believe they are not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts and who frequently deny that they are the defendants in the action” are rejected by courts across the United States as they are “frivolous” (citation omitted)); United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that sovereign citizen theories should “be rejected summarily, however they are presented”); Roach v. Arrisi, No. 8:15–cv–2547–T–33AEP, 2016 WL 8943290, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 7, 2016) (noting that sovereign citizen theories have not only been consistently rejected by the courts, but they have been described as “utterly frivolous” (citation omitted)).

MILLER, J.