Juan Francisco Vega, Appellant, v. The State of Florida, Appellee. (2025)

Appellant Juan Francisco Vega, asserting that no judge in Miami-Dade County can adjudicate his civil commitment status fairly under section 314.910 et seq. of the Florida Statutes (the “Act”),¹ filed a pro se motion in the trial court seeking to change the venue of his civil commitment proceedings from Miami to Tampa.²

We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Vega's motion. See Marques v. Garcia, 245 So. 3d 900, 904 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (holding that an order denying a motion to transfer venue is reviewed for an abuse of discretion).

While not entirely clear, it appears from Vega's initial brief that Vega is also seeking a writ from this Court permitting a belated appeal of the trial court's August 23, 2023 order finding no probable cause to end Vega's civil commitment. Not only does Vega's initial brief fail to comport with the requirements of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(c), but because involuntary commitment orders under the Act are civil in nature, our jurisdiction under rule 9.141(c) does not permit us to grant Vega relief. In re Commitment of May, 975 So. 2d 579, 580-81 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (“Generally, an appellate court is not authorized to grant a belated appeal in a civil proceeding as the filing of the notice of appeal is jurisdictional.”).

Order denying change of venue affirmed; petition seeking a writ permitting a belated appeal denied.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Known as The Jimmy Ryce Act, the Act establishes procedures for the civil commitment of sexually violent predators after their term of incarceration ends. § 394.917, Fla. Stat. (2024). The sexually violent predator is committed to the custody of the Florida Department of Children & Families, undergoes an annual mental health evaluation, and may be eligible for a limited hearing before the trial court as to whether there is probable cause of a change of condition that the person will not engage in sexual violence, if discharged. If the court finds probable cause, then the court will set a trial on the issue. § 394.918, Fla. Stat. (2024).

2.   Venue is proper in Miami-Dade County because this is the county where Vega was last charged and convicted. See Fla. R. Civ. P. – S.V.P. 4.060 (Venue is proper “in the county where the respondent was last charged and convicted of a qualifying offense.”). Vega sought the change of venue under section 47.101 of the Florida Statutes.

PER CURIAM.