2010 v. Florida Insurance Guaranty Association, Appellee. (2025)

On Motion for Written Opinion

After oral argument, we issued a per curiam affirmance of the trial court's dismissal order. Roberts moved for a written opinion, arguing that our decision conflicts with precedent about the “four corners rule.” No conflict exists.

Roberts owns a house in Titusville, which was insured by United Property & Casualty Insurance Company (“UPC”). The house suffered damage. After UPC denied her claim, Roberts sent notice of her intent to initiate litigation. UPC responded that the pre-suit notice was invalid, as it made “only generic, conclusory allegations.” UPC asked Roberts to amend the notice. Roberts did not do so. She sued for breach of contract.

UPC moved for dismissal, arguing that the notice did not “state with specificity” the “alleged acts or omissions of the insurer giving rise to the suit.” See § 627.70152(3)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2022). The court agreed and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. See id. § 627.70152(5). Roberts appealed.^* The appeal was stayed because of UPC's liquidation. Afterwards, the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association replaced UPC as the Appellee.

In her motion for written opinion, Roberts notes that the “primary issue on appeal” was whether the trial court erred by looking beyond the four corners of the complaint. She reiterates that the complaint did not include the pre-suit notice as an attachment. See Enlow v. E.C. Scott Wright, P.A., 274 So. 3d 1192, 1193 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (“When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court is strictly confined to the allegations contained within the four corners of the complaint and its attachments.”). Instead, the notice first appeared as an attachment to UPC's motion to dismiss.

But under the invited error doctrine, a party cannot win on appeal by complaining about something that it asked the trial court to do. Gjokhila v. Seymour, 349 So. 3d 496, 501 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (quoting Alexander v. Quail Pointe II Condo., 170 So. 3d 817, 822 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)). “In such circumstances, fault is not attributable to the trial court; instead, it is placed upon the party or attorney who led the court into the error.” Id.

In her opposition to UPC's motion to dismiss, Roberts referenced multiple exhibits. Her pre-suit notice was among them. Citing the notice, Roberts asserted that the court had to deny UPC's motion because she complied with section 627.70152(3). She repeatedly argued her notice met all the statutory requirements. Thus, her appeal attacks a procedure that she advocated below. Roberts cannot obtain reversal in this manner. See Dunson v. Dunson, 369 So. 3d 1188, 1191–92 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (holding that the invited error doctrine barred the appellant's argument, which essentially was that the trial court “should have ignored” a request the appellant made); Gjokhila, 349 So. 3d at 501–02 (holding that a party could not complain on appeal about “an agreement that she asked the court to approve”); Bryan v. Bryan, 930 So. 2d 693, 697 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (rejecting a challenge to “the procedure employed” by the trial court since it “was in fact requested by” the appellant's attorney).

Affirmed.

I concur with this Court's conclusion that Appellant Dorian Roberts cannot prevail in her argument that the trial court erred when it strayed beyond the four corners of the complaint by reviewing her statutorily required (yet unattached) notice of intent to initiate litigation. Such an argument is barred by the invited error doctrine.

As discussed more fully below, however, where I part ways with my esteemed colleagues is in my view that the notice—though certainly not the model of specificity for other litigants to follow—was not so fatally flawed in this case as to require dismissal.

As noted by the majority, Roberts provided her notice of intent to initiate litigation against United Property & Casualty Insurance Co. after it denied her claim for damage sustained to her Titusville, Florida residence. After Roberts filed suit, United moved to dismiss her complaint on the sole basis that Roberts's notice failed to state with sufficient specificity the alleged acts or omissions giving rise to the suit, as required by section 627.70152(3)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2022).¹ Following hearing, the trial court granted the motion on that lone basis and dismissed the case without prejudice, concluding “that additional specificity is required” for Roberts to achieve “strict compliance” with the statute.²

Whether Roberts fully satisfied the presuit requirements of section 627.70152 is a question of law. See Citizens Prop. Ins. v. Walden, 395 So. 3d 216, 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). And in this case, the trial court's error in dismissing her case is, in my view, apparent on the face of the record before us.

Section 627.70152 requires, “[a]s a condition precedent to filing a suit under a property insurance policy,” a claimant must provide a written notice of intent to initiate litigation no less than ten business days before filing suit under a property insurance policy. See § 627.70152(3), Fla. Stat. The notice must “state with specificity” the information set forth in the statute. See § 627.70152(3)(a)1.–5., Fla. Stat. Pertinent here, the statute required Roberts to state with specificity “[t]he alleged acts or omissions of the insurer giving rise to the suit, which may include a denial of coverage.” See § 627.70152(3)(a)2., Fla. Stat.

The purpose of the notice required by section 627.70152 is made plain by the statute.³ After an insurance company receives the notice required by section 627.70152(3), subsection (4) requires the insurance company to promptly “investigat[e], review, and evaluat[e] ․ the dispute stated in the notice” and respond in writing within ten business days of receiving the notice whether it accepts coverage, continues to deny coverage, or asserts a right to reinspect the property. See § 627.70152(4), Fla. Stat. Thus, the statute is designed to promote the negotiated settlement of disputed property insurance claims without the need for costly, time-consuming litigation.

Roberts's notice sufficiently complied with section 627.70152(3) to fulfill that purpose. In her notice, Roberts identified United's “Underpayment/Non-payment of claim” as the alleged act or omission giving rise to the suit. On the facts of this case, where it is undisputed that United denied Roberts's claim, this statement, though it could provide more specificity by deleting the word “Underpayment,” was sufficient to apprise United of its alleged conduct giving rise to Roberts's suit.⁴ On the record before us, it is clear that United fully understood that its denial of Roberts's claim was the complained-of act giving rise to her suit.

Provided with Roberts's notice, United was required to further evaluate and consider Roberts's claim. See § 627.70152(4), Fla. Stat. And having that opportunity do so, United maintained its denial and declined the opportunity to resolve the dispute without the need for litigation. So be it. As a result, Roberts should be permitted to proceed with her suit filed below and have her “day in court” in a timely manner.

Therefore, I would reverse the trial court's order dismissing Roberts's case and remand for further proceedings.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.   A dismissal without prejudice is generally not appealable, but it is when it requires the plaintiff to file a new lawsuit. Pipeline Constructors, Inc. v. Trans. House, Inc., 257 So. 3d 606, 608 n.2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). Such is the case here. See Sanchez v. Sec. First Ins., Co., 49 Fla. L. Weekly D524, D525 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA Mar. 6, 2024) (Scales, J., specially concurring) (explaining that a dismissal without prejudice under section 627.70152(5) is appealable since it requires the plaintiff to file a new lawsuit instead of merely amending the existing one).

1.   While United's motion alternatively sought summary judgment, dismissal without prejudice is the only statutory remedy when a claimant/plaintiff fails to provide sufficient notice as required by section 627.70152. See § 627.70152(5), Fla. Stat. (“A court must dismiss without prejudice any claimant's suit relating to a claim for which a notice of intent to initiate litigation was not given as required by this section ․”).

2.   Where does the trial court's insistence on “strict compliance” come from? Whatever its origin, it does not appear to be born of the statute. Certainly, Roberts must fully comply with every requirement of section 627.70152; but heightened notions of requiring “strict compliance” seem an artificial burden superimposed upon the plain text of the statute. See, e.g., Prop. Registration Champions, LLC v. Mulberry, 373 So. 3d 675, 679 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (“A text should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.” (quoting Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 23 (new ed.)).

3.   A statute's purpose is properly gleaned from the language of the statute itself, consistent with its context. See Baldwin v. Lab'y Corp. of Am., 396 So. 3d 798, 803 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024) (citing Mercury Indem. Co. of Am. v. Cent. Fla. Med. & Chiropractic Ctr., Inc., 380 So. 3d 477, 481 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023)).

4.   It is unquestionably a much better practice to be as specific as possible when setting forth those matters required by section 627.70152(3). If, as it appears from the record, the “Underpayment/Non-payment of claim” language was simply routine language counsel used in the required notices, such a “cut-and-paste approach” to the practice of law is ill-advised and fraught with risks, as this case plainly demonstrates.

Jay, C.J.

Wallis, J., concurs. Soud, J., concurs in part, dissents in part, with opinion.