NELSON v. STATE (2025)

The State charged Damien Nashaun Nelson with driving while having been designated a habitual traffic offender (HTO). Nelson moved to dismiss, arguing that the State could not charge that offense because his HTO designation relied on prior convictions to which he entered pleas without the representation of counsel. The court denied the motion. A jury found Nelson guilty as charged and the court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment. Nelson appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss. We affirm.^*

Hlad v. State, 585 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1991), and State v. Beach, 592 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1992), place limits on the State's ability to use a criminal defendant's prior uncounseled convictions to increase a subsequent charge. However, the Second District ruled that these cases do not apply to a defendant charged with driving while having been designated an HTO, because the offense was defined “not by reference to prior convictions, but to an administrative designation based upon such convictions.” Patterson v. State, 938 So. 2d 625, 630 n.4 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). We agree.

We reject Nelson's argument that Patterson is no longer good law based on State v. Kelly, 999 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 2008). Kelly merely reaffirmed Hlad and Beach in light of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 128 L.Ed.2d 745 (1994). The rule of law set forth in Patterson remains sound, and controls here.

Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.   We reject Nelson's argument regarding sufficiency of the evidence without further comment.

Per Curiam.

Lewis, Bilbrey, and Winokur, JJ., concur.