Jonathan Arias, Appellant, v. The State of Florida, Appellee. (2025)

Appellant, Jonathan Arias, appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). The essence of his claim below was that Florida's enhanced sentencing statutes are facially unconstitutional under the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), and therefore his sentences, imposed as a prison releasee reoffender and habitual violent felony offender, are illegal. See § 775.082(9)(a)(1), (3), Fla. Stat. (2010); § 775.084(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2010); Amends. V–VI, U.S. Const. Observing that the purported error was unpreserved and is not apparent on the face of the record, and even more significantly, “[n]o Court of Appeals, let alone [the Supreme Court], has held that Apprendi has retroactive effect,” Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 581 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting), and the Florida Supreme Court has rejected this ground for relief in at least two reported postconviction cases, we affirm the order under review in all respects. See Ford v. State, 402 So. 3d 973, 981 (Fla. 2025) (“Erlinger was a direct-appeal case—not a postconviction case like Ford's—and it involved required jury findings regarding an element. Based on these fundamental distinctions, it is clear that Erlinger provides no support for vacating Ford's death sentences.”); Tanzi v. State, 407 So. 3d 385, 394–95 (Fla. 2025) (finding postconviction review of a defendant's sentence based on Erlinger was improper); Figarola v. State, 841 So. 2d 576, 577 n.3 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (“Apprendi was characterized as a procedural rule by the Supreme Court. Since announcing Teague, the Supreme Court has not given retroactive effect to any decisions announcing new constitutional rules of criminal procedure.”) (citation omitted); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004) (“Ring announced a new procedural rule that does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review.”); Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 926 (Fla. 1980) (“[T]he essential considerations in determining whether a new rule of law should be applied retroactively are essentially three: (a) the purpose to be served by the new rule; (b) the extent of reliance on the old rule; and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule.”); Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837, 848 (Fla. 2005) (concluding Apprendi does not apply retroactively); Luton v. State, 934 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (noting defendant did not object that jury, not judge, must determine his HVFO qualifications and therefore issue was not preserved); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a)(1) (“A court may at any time correct an illegal sentence imposed by it, or an incorrect calculation made by it in a sentencing scoresheet, when it is affirmatively alleged that the court records demonstrate on their face an entitlement to that relief ․”); Jackson v. State, 803 So. 2d 842, 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (“To raise an illegal sentence claim under Rule 3.800(a), 1) the error must have resulted in an illegal sentence, 2) the error must appear on the face of the record, and 3) the motion must affirmatively allege that the court records demonstrate on their face an entitlement to relief.”) (quotations and alterations omitted); see, e.g., Theophile v. State, 967 So. 2d 948, 949 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (“Relief under rule 3.800(a) is precluded where an evidentiary determination is required. For this reason, Appellant could not demonstrate entitlement to relief under rule 3.800(a) without citing to facts established in the trial transcript or otherwise apparent on the face of the record.”) (citation omitted); see also Plott v. State, 148 So. 3d 90, 94 (Fla. 2014) (“A claim of error under Apprendi and Blakely is subject to a harmless error analysis.”).

Affirmed.

MILLER, J.