BRUCE v. BRUCE (2026)

Affirmed.

The record in this case presents no reversible error, and the result reached by the lower court is legally correct. The issues presented involve only the routine application of settled law to a fact-specific record. The issues raise no novel question, require no reconciliation of precedent, and present no basis for disturbing the trial court's judgment.

I agree that this appeal should be resolved by a simple per curiam affirmed (PCA) opinion without further discussion. The question I now address is not the merits of the dissolution judgment, which we have affirmed, but whether the PCA remains a legitimate and necessary method of appellate disposition in cases like this that present no unsettled legal issue and require no precedential elaboration. I think it does.

This case well illustrates a PCA's purpose. The appeal involves unpreserved error, invited error, harmless error, and no error. Its resolution turns on no unsettled doctrine, advances no novel contention, and requires only the routine application of clear statutory language, established precedent, and familiar rules. To clothe such a case in an elaborated opinion would add words, but not wisdom.

PCAs allow appellate courts to refrain from opining unnecessarily on matters not essential to resolving the case. A written opinion, even one carefully confined to the issues presented, can easily drift into broader commentary addressing alternative arguments, hypothetical variations, or peripheral concerns. In this way, what might begin as a narrow holding may become an advisory opinion. PCAs avoid that risk entirely. By affirming without discussion, the court communicates only what is required—that no reversible error has been shown—without venturing into dicta or unnecessary exposition. A PCA, far from being an evasion of duty, represents an exercise of restraint.

A concurring opinion issued in Mayfield v. State, 429 So. 3d 500 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026), highlighted some of the concerns regarding PCAs with the suggestion that a system of selective publication be adopted to reduce the use of PCAs as a case resolution method. Those concerns are not universally shared. While the Mayfield concurrence thoughtfully surveyed the historical debate surrounding PCAs and the perceived advantages of unpublished—and nonprecedential—opinions, several reasons explain why Florida has not limited the use of PCAs nor adopted a selective publication regime.

I. The PCA Serves a Deliberate and Well-Established Function

Florida appellate courts have long recognized that a PCA is an appropriate disposition when the issues presented are controlled by settled law or otherwise do not warrant a written opinion. That principle reflects the limited function of appellate precedent. Not every correct result requires a written explanation, and not every appeal warrants the creation of new decisional law.

The PCA's principle virtue is restraint. A PCA resolves the dispute before the court without creating precedent where none is needed. As the Mayfield concurrence acknowledges, a PCA has no precedential effect and binds only the parties through res judicata and the law-of-the-case doctrine. See St. Fort ex rel. St. Fort v. Post, Buckley, Schuh & Jernigan, 902 So. 2d 244, 248 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); State v. Swartz, 734 So. 2d 448, 448 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). That is not a deficiency. It is the point. The PCA allows an appellate court to decide the case before it without unnecessarily expanding the body of binding law.

That restraint serves an institutional function. Written opinions are not merely explanations to the parties. Our opinions become part of the law's architecture. Even narrowly written opinions may later be invoked in broader settings, cited for propositions which the opinions were not written to establish, or pressed into service beyond their facts. A PCA avoids that problem by saying no more than the case requires.

Suggestions about abolishing or reforming the use of PCAs have as their underlying premise the notion that a void exists in the case resolution process that needs to be filled by creating another avenue for judicial expression—one that is purportedly more litigant and attorney-friendly, yet non-binding outside of the given case. But Florida's appellate system already provides multiple tools for calibrating a balance between judicial explanation and precedential effect: 1) full written opinions, which develop and clarify the law as binding precedent; 2) citation PCAs, which signal that the disposition is sufficiently controlled by the named existing authority; and 3) PCAs without citation, which indicate that no additional explanation would meaningfully assist the bench, bar, or public. Those tools already permit appellate courts to match the disposition to a case's needs while preserving clarity within the law. Judges who feel constrained by the lack of sufficient outlets for their nonprecedential writing already have two well-used and familiar options available within this construct for their voice to be heard—concurrences and dissents—making the need for yet another outlet unnecessary.

This is why Florida courts have long relied on PCAs to reflect a simple but important truth: the function of precedent is not improved merely by increasing its quantity. To the contrary, the uncontrolled proliferation of written opinions risks obscuring, rather than clarifying, the governing law. When every routine dispute generates a written explanation, the precedential landscape becomes crowded with fact-bound decisions that offer little guidance beyond their specific circumstances. Lawyers and judges are then left to sift through an ever-growing body of opinions in search of controlling principles—a process that burdens legal research and increases the likelihood of doctrinal inconsistency. So, to write where nothing new can be said is not to clarify the law, but to cloud it.

PCAs can also send a subtle message to the litigants and their counsel that enough time and treasure was expended on the matter at hand, and that further pursuit of the case in the appellate courts, even by those with the wherewithal to do so, would be fruitless. See Horn v. Marine Hosp. Corp., 745 So. 2d 329, 330 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (“In cases so lacking in merit as this one, however, a written opinion would serve no useful purpose. An opinion would not explain anything to the appellant that would not already be apparent from the record in this case.”); Patton v. State Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 597 So. 2d 302, 303 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (“[A]n opinion in this case only demonstrates the utter futility of the appeal.”).

Given the volume of appeals handled by Florida's district courts, PCAs are not merely convenient. PCAs are essential to the orderly administration of justice.

II. The Absence of a Written Opinion Does Not Imply a Lack of Consideration

The absence of a written opinion does not suggest that an appeal received lesser consideration. It signifies only that a written opinion was unnecessary to resolve the appeal.

One criticism of PCAs is that parties may receive the impression that the arguments presented were not seriously considered. That baseless concern, while perhaps understandable from the subjective view of a losing party unhappy with the outcome, is an insufficient reason to make institutional design changes.

Every appeal filed in this Court, and in all other Florida appellate courts, receives full judicial review. The fact that a panel ultimately determines that the issues raised do not merit a written opinion does not mean that those issues were ignored or given short shrift. See Crittenden v. State, 67 So. 3d 1184, 1185 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (citing Elliot v. Elliot, 648 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)) (“We reiterate that a per curiam affirmance without opinion is not an indication that the case was not considered on the merits. Each and every appeal receives the same degree of attention.”). Rather, a PCA means the panel concluded that no reversible error occurred, the arguments raised were governed by existing law, or the issues lacked sufficient merit to justify further discussion. State Comm'n on Ethics v. Sullivan, 430 So. 2d 928, 932 (Fla. 1983) (quoting S. Fla. Hosp. Corp. v. McCrea, 118 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1960)) (the word “affirmed” when used as the sole utterance of an appellate court “necessarily means that the appellate court has carefully examined all points raised by all appealing parties and found them to be without merit.”).

We should also not overlook that judicial time is finite. Requiring written opinions in every case—or even in a substantially larger share of cases—would divert attention and effort from those matters that truly deserve a more robust discussion, resulting in the opposite of what PCA critics desire. See Elliott, 648 So. 2d at 138 (“The sheer volume of appeals, in and of itself, would seemingly indicate the impossibility of a written opinion on every affirmance.”); Ezequiel Lugo, The Conflict PCA: When an Affirmance Without Opinion Conflicts with a Written Opinion, 85 FLA. B.J. 46, 46 (2011) (“PCAs are necessary to efficiently handle the heavy case load shouldered by our appellate judges. Some cases might merit a written opinion, but the judges decide to address other pending cases instead.”).

PCAs also allow appellate courts to exercise jurisprudential restraint in cases that are poor vehicles for the development of legal doctrine. At times, an appeal may touch upon an area of law that is unsettled or evolving, yet the factual record, procedural posture, or issue framing makes the case ill-suited for meaningful clarification. In such circumstances, a written opinion risks introducing imprecision, creating tension with existing authority, or prematurely influencing the law's development. A PCA in those cases permits the court to resolve the dispute while reserving fuller consideration for a case better suited to that task.

By resisting the temptation to write on every case, appellate judges use PCAs as a safeguard against incremental doctrinal drift. Even well-reasoned opinions, when repeated across numerous cases, can gradually shift the emphasis or application of legal principles in ways which courts did not consciously intend. By declining to write where no clarification is needed, appellate courts reduce the risk that routine affirmances will, over time, alter the contours of established law.

Faced with an obligation to more fully explain routine affirmances, appellate courts would then be forced to draft opinions that do little more than restate well-settled principles. That degree of judicial effort is superfluous in such cases, but indispensable when needed to address a case that presents a novel legal question, when existing precedents must be reconciled, or when the law requires clarification.

When an appeal raises no such issues, the preparation of a written opinion—particularly one designated as nonprecedential—means that judicial economy is not well served, and instead, consumes resources without producing corresponding value. That opinion would add little to the jurisprudence. If settled law answers the question and no useful purpose would be served by elaboration, a written opinion adds length, not substance. The law is best served when appellate courts reserve their energies for the difficult, the doubtful, the helpful, and the new.

III. Selective Publication Introduces New Problems

The option to replace more PCAs with unpublished or nonprecedential written opinions does not solve the asserted problems. It creates different ones.

A central premise of selective publication is that appellate courts can issue more written decisions without expanding the law by labeling some of those opinions as nonprecedential. Experience has taught that what is written is rarely ignored, and nonprecedential decisions are often read, cited, and relied upon, regardless of formal designation. See, e.g., United Fed'n of Churches, LLC v. Johnson, 598 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 1099 n.9 (W.D. Wash. 2022) (citation omitted) (acknowledging that the court “may consider unpublished state decisions, even though such opinions have no precedential value”).

In time, these unpublished decisions will accumulate into a body of quasi-law—neither fully authoritative nor safely disregarded. In our view, that approach would prove far less satisfactory than a simple PCA. The result is not clarity, but confusion.

We can look to what has happened in the federal courts, as well as in state court systems like California, to illustrate how unpublished opinions often function as de facto precedent even when formal rules disclaim their precedential status or prohibit their use. In practice, lawyers and courts routinely use them, leading to the gradual and inexorable expansion of the case law in ways that are not always carefully considered. This results in muddying the jurisprudence on a host of issues.

Though unpublished opinions purport to resolve disputes while simultaneously disclaiming any precedential effect, the reality is that such opinions will rarely remain confined to the immediate parties, for such opinions are made widely available on the internet and electronic databases and thus frequently consulted by the bench and bar alike. For example, the U.S. Eleventh Circuit expressly permits their inclusion in briefs and arguments. According to Eleventh Circuit Rule 36-2, even though unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, such opinions may be cited as persuasive authority in briefs and arguments. And if the opinion is not available on the internet, those rules require that a copy be attached to the brief or motion. Id. Thus, a shadow body of law emerges that influences outcomes without having been intended to shape the development of legal doctrine.

That glut of new case law—a phenomenon akin to “jurisprudence pollution”—creates several institutional concerns, the most glaring of which is its high risk of generating inconsistency. Because unpublished opinions are not generally written with the expectation of guiding future cases, such opinions may not receive the same level of deliberation or doctrinal precision as formally published decisions. If these nonprecedential opinions are nevertheless relied on in later litigation, their reasoning exerts influence disproportionate to the care with which such opinions were originally crafted. See Nat'l Classification Comm. v. United States, 765 F.2d 164, 173 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citation omitted) (highlighting the criticism that unpublished opinions “result in less carefully prepared or soundly reasoned opinions; reduce judicial accountability; increase the risk of nonconformity; allow difficult issues to be swept under the carpet; and result in a body of ‘secret law’ practically inaccessible to many lawyers”).

Unpublished opinions can also complicate rather than simplify legal research. The Florida Supreme Court has already recognized that risk, warning against the creation of a body of law accessible only to those who happen to know where to find it. See Dep't of Legal Affs. v. District Court of Appeal, 5th DCA, 434 So. 2d 310, 312 (Fla. 1983) (“If there is a body of law floating around in unwritten or unpublished opinions, only those people privy to those cases understand those pronouncements.”). That concern remains sound. Attorneys who wish to provide diligent representation may feel compelled to review large numbers of nonprecedential decisions to ensure that no persuasive—even if not binding—authority has been missed. The distinction between published and unpublished opinions gets blurred, and thus becomes less meaningful in practice, while still contributing to an ever-expanding volume of written decisions creating both doctrinal sprawl and uncertainty about what law actually governs.

Issuing nonprecedential written opinions also risks giving the appearance of two tiers of appellate decision-making: one set of opinions that formally contributes to the law, and another that resolves disputes while disclaiming broader significance. Such a system would cause uncertainty about which decisions truly reflect the court's considered view of the governing legal principles. When a significant portion of appellate decisions are designated as nonprecedential, courts and counsel may struggle to determine which opinions meaningfully reflect the governing law and which do not.

Unpublished opinions may purport to provide increased transparency, but would actually do the opposite. The process of determining whether an opinion should be published will often not be readily known. Panels would have to not only decide the case, but also decide whether the written product meets some unestablished or perhaps non-quantifiable publication criteria—an inquiry that can itself invite dispute, controversy, and post-decisional motion practice about why some opinions are designated as precedential and others are not. See Nat'l Classification Comm., 765 F.2d at 173 n.2 (citation omitted) (expressing concern about unpublished opinions because “there is no uniformly enforced or practiced guidelines for making the publication decision; hence judges exercise considerable discretion in deciding when an opinion should be published, i.e., when an opinion will become law.”).

PCAs draw a cleaner line. When a court speaks, it speaks with consequence. When it does not, silence means that nothing needs to be added to what is already known. Opinions that explain reasoning become precedent; dispositions that do not explain reasoning, do not. By affirming a case without a written opinion, the court indicates that no further elaboration on the status of the law, or its application, is necessary. See Jones v. State, 468 So. 2d 253, 254 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (explaining PCAs prevent “repetition of well established principles of law.”). The function of the appellate court is thereby fulfilled, because the dispute gets resolved while the clarity of the precedential record is preserved. PCAs generate neither unnecessary legal writing nor invite reliance on reasoning that was never intended to guide future cases. That simplicity has virtues not easily improved upon.

IV. The PCA's Unique Value in Abuse of Discretion Cases

The PCA's utility is especially apparent in cases governed by the abuse-of-discretion standard of review. In such cases, the appellate court's task is not to determine whether it would have reached the same result as the trial court, but whether the trial court's decision falls within the range of reasonable choices permitted by law. As Judge Padovano says in his treatise:

A mere disagreement from an appellate perspective with the reasoning or opinion of the lower tribunal is not enough to justify the reversal of a discretionary decision. The judge or judicial officer presiding over the trial is in a better position to resolve discretionary issues, and it would be improper to overturn a discretionary decision simply because a panel of appellate judges might have resolved the issue in a different fashion had they been on the trial bench.

Phillip J. Padovano, Florida Appellate Practice § 19:5 (2026 ed.) (emphasis added).

The abuse of discretion standard of review naturally contemplates that more than one outcome may be legally acceptable. A lower court ruling may be affirmed even though a different judge—confronted with the same facts—might reasonably have decided the matter differently. As our Supreme Court recently explained, a trial court abuses its discretion only when it reaches a result with which no reasonable judge could agree. Williams v. State, 415 So. 3d 168, 173 (Fla. 2025) (citing Wells v. State, 364 So. 3d 1005, 1013 (Fla. 2023)) (“[W]e will not find an abuse of discretion unless the trial court makes a ruling which no reasonable judge would agree with.” (emphasis added)).

PCAs respect the trial court's role as the primary decision-maker in areas involving judgment, discretion, and case-specific balancing. PCAs further respect the trial court's unique role as a fact finder weighing witness credibility and resolving apparent conflicts. PCAs also efficiently resolve appeals where the issues raised are mere disagreements with how the court resolved those factual disputes.

This might beg the question—what harm is there in writing an unpublished or nonprecedential opinion to resolve an issue? Simply put, a written opinion affirming the lower court's exercise of discretion can carry several unintended consequences that make a PCA the best option.

First, any attempt to explain why a particular discretionary ruling was reasonable risks being read as an endorsement of that specific course of action. Future litigants and courts may cite such an opinion not merely for the unremarkable proposition that the ruling was permissible, but for the broader—and often inaccurate—suggestion that the same reasoning should be followed in other cases. Over time, this can harden flexible discretionary standards into quasi-rigid rules, subtly transforming what should be a range of permissible options into a perceived set of preferred or required practices.

Second, written opinions in abuse-of-discretion cases may inadvertently constrain trial judges by suggesting that certain factors must be emphasized, certain procedures followed, or certain outcomes favored. Even careful language acknowledging the deferential standard may not prevent later readers from extracting prescriptive guidance from fact-bound reasoning. The result would be a gradual erosion of the very discretion which the standard is meant to protect.

Third, because discretionary rulings are often highly dependent on the specific facts, context, and dynamics of the proceedings below, written explanations tend to be of limited general applicability. An opinion that painstakingly justifies a discretionary decision in one factual setting may provide little meaningful guidance in another, while still being cited as though it does. PCAs guard against the overgeneralization of fact-bound decisions, because many appeals turn on highly specific factual circumstances unlikely to recur in precisely the same form. A written opinion explaining the affirmance in such a case may invite later courts and litigants to draw analogies that the original panel never intended in a certain context. Over time, this process can distort legal doctrine by elevating isolated factual applications into perceived rules of broader applicability.

PCAs avoid the problem of transforming case-specific reasoning into unintended precedent. By affirming without discussion, the appellate court communicates a single, precise conclusion: the trial court did not abuse its discretion. That disposition maintains the breadth and flexibility inherent in the standard of review. The PCA neither elevates one permissible approach over others, nor invites the development of unintended doctrinal constraints.

Written opinions remain appropriate in abuse-of-discretion cases when clarification of governing principles is necessary—such as when a trial court applies the wrong legal standard or misunderstands the scope of its discretion. In those cases, a written opinion serves an important function. But where the only question is whether a particular decision falls within the wide bounds of reasonableness, a PCA represents the more disciplined judicial response. See Whipple v. State, 431 So. 2d 1011, 1012 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (declining to write opinion where it “would not have been of any significant assistance to the bench or bar of this state”). In this way, PCAs safeguard the proper allocation of authority between trial and appellate courts by ensuring that discretion remains genuinely discretionary, rather than being unwittingly reshaped into a set of appellate preferences.

V. The Role of Issue Preservation in PCA Dispositions

Issue preservation also explains why many appeals are properly resolved by PCA. Florida law is clear that an alleged error must be timely and specifically raised in the trial court to be reviewable on appeal. See Aills v. Boemi, 29 So. 3d 1105, 1108-09 (Fla. 2010); Doorbal v. State, 983 So. 2d 464, 492 (Fla. 2008). “In order to be preserved for further review by a higher court, an issue must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal or review must be part of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved.” Sunset Harbour Condo. Ass'n v. Robbins, 914 So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. 2005).

That rule is foundational, not technical. It ensures that the trial court has the first opportunity to address and correct alleged error and prevents parties from reserving objections for appellate advantage. See Fittipaldi USA, Inc. v. Castroneves, 905 So. 2d 182,185 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (citing Crumbley v. State, 876 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)) (explaining that the purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule is to put the trial court on notice of the error, give the court a chance to correct the error, “and to prevent a litigant from not challenging an error so that he or she may later use it as a tactical advantage”).

When an issue is not preserved, appellate review ordinarily ends there, regardless of how interesting or dispositive the question might be. “It is well established that issues not properly preserved are waived.” State v. Clark, 373 So. 3d 1128, 1131 (Fla. 2023) (citation omitted). The same is true when the record is inadequate to permit meaningful review. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979) (“Without a record of the trial proceedings, the appellate court can not properly resolve the underlying factual issues so as to conclude that the trial court's judgment is not supported by the evidence or by an alternative theory. Without knowing the factual context, neither can an appellate court reasonably conclude that the trial judge so misconceived the law as to require reversal.”). In such cases, a PCA does not signify that the underlying argument lacked substantive force. The PCA signifies only that the issue is not reviewable in the posture presented.

This principle helps explain why PCAs remain a necessary and appropriate mechanism for resolving many appeals. And it is against this backdrop that other sound institutional reasons exist for resolving these cases by PCA rather than by a written opinion, even one that is “unpublished.”

A written opinion reciting routine preservation failures rarely advances the law. This preservation requirement is well settled, so repeating its application in an untold number of fact-specific contexts would add little to the body of Florida jurisprudence. Attempting to explain each disposition in a written opinion identifying the precise preservation deficiency can sometimes be difficult without engaging in a tedious reconstruction of the record, a parsing of objections, or a recital of omissions. Preservation questions often involve nuanced determinations regarding the existence, timing, specificity, and context of objections. Explaining those determinations in writing may require extensive discussion of the proceedings below, which in turn risks creating the impression that the appellate court has adjudicated factual disputes, rather than simply applying settled procedural rules.

Next, written opinions cataloging preservation failures can unintentionally create confusion in the law. Because preservation issues are highly dependent on the particular language used and the circumstances of the trial proceedings, a fact-intensive explanation of why preservation failed in one case may later be cited as authority in inapt contexts that differ in subtle but important ways.

Additionally, opinions focusing on lack of preservation, as well as invited or harmless error, can create unintended issues not related to an appeal's proper disposition. Many cases involve sensitive factual determinations, credibility assessments, or litigation errors that, while perhaps relevant to the disposition, do not warrant permanent memorialization in a published or even unpublished opinion. Writing in such cases may invite collateral litigation, reputational harm, or ancillary proceedings unrelated to the appeal's proper disposition.

The result would be opinions that teach little, risk much, and serve chiefly to amplify counsel's missteps. For example, explicitly identifying attorneys’ shortcomings—in both civil and criminal cases—may inadvertently invite meritless legal malpractice claims, Bar complaints, ineffective assistance claims, or other post-decisional proceedings or challenges. While preservation errors can sometimes have important legal significance and are appropriately highlighted in a written opinion, see, e.g., Homeowner's Choice Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Oakes, 2026 WL 758382 (Fla. 4th DCA, March 18, 2026), many should not.

The appellate courts’ role is not to create unnecessary fodder for these ancillary proceedings whenever, for example, a strategic trial decision to not object, or to decline raising an issue below, is unsuccessful. A PCA resolves the dispute without generating those unintended effects. When the dispositive point is simply that an issue was not properly preserved, a PCA communicates the result without needless flyspecking that neither advances the law, clarifies it, or improves the administration of justice.

VI. Nonprecedential Opinions’ Cost Implications

Replacing PCAs with more written opinions would also increase litigation costs. While unpublished opinions might theoretically offer a modest compromise between full precedential decisions and PCAs, such opinions would instead impose significant additional burdens on litigants.

While the demand for written judicial output would increase the pressure on courts to allocate resources in ways that may ultimately cause delay, the more substantial and less appreciated consequences would fall on the parties themselves. The Florida Supreme Court has acknowledged the problem of rising costs associated with litigation that strain both parties and the court system as a whole, becoming a significant barrier to affordable access to justice. In Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 583 So. 2d 1022, 1025 (Fla. 1991), the Court observed that “[c]omplex litigation ․ has helped contribute to the heavy burdens now imposed upon judicial resources and the enormous costs increasingly passed along to clients.” The systemic consequence of higher costs is the deterrence of meritorious litigation and appeals by those of limited means, encouragement of strategic over-litigation by those with greater resources, and additional pressure on an already burdened judicial system.

It is easy to see why. Whether designated as precedential or not, written opinions invite response, by providing language to analyze, reasoning to challenge, and potential grounds for further review. Litigants who receive an adverse written opinion are far more likely to pursue rehearing, rehearing en banc, or discretionary review—not necessarily because the likelihood of success is greater, but because the written rationale creates something to contest.

Introducing nonprecedential opinions into the appellate resolution process would not only expand post-decision collateral litigation as discussed above, but would also further delay the conclusion of the subject appeal. Parties would expend additional time and costs parsing a court's reasoning, identifying arguable ambiguities, and advancing further arguments in a perhaps quixotic effort to obtain a different outcome. What might otherwise have been the endpoint of the appellate process would instead become merely an intermediate step.

A larger body of written nonprecedential opinions would also increase costs at each step in the litigation process, not just on appeal. Even if formally nonbinding, such opinions could not be ignored by prudent counsel. Attorneys would feel compelled to locate, review, and distinguish a growing universe of fact-specific decisions, many of which would offer limited guidance but nonetheless require attention. Creating a larger body of nonprecedential written opinions would increase research costs, expand briefing burdens, and encourage additional post-decision motion practice without corresponding gains in clarity.

PCAs, by contrast, serve an important cost-containing function by promoting not only judicial economy, but also accessibility and proportionality in the trial and appellate process. PCAs also limits follow-on litigation. While litigants are always free to seek additional review where appropriate, the absence of a written opinion tends to discourage pointless, reflexive, or exploratory post-disposition motions and other proceedings.

VII. The PCA's Additional Institutional Advantages

Beyond the considerations already discussed, PCAs serve important institutional interests within the appellate process.

PCAs facilitate collegial decision-making within multi-judge appellate panels. Unanimous agreement on the proper end-result does not always mean agreement on the reasoning that justifies it. An expectation of producing written opinions in nearly every case may force compromise language that lacks precision or generates separate concurrences that needlessly highlight differences in analytical approach. By contrast, a PCA allows the panel to speak with a single, unified voice as to the outcome, without the need to reconcile divergent rationales that have no broader jurisprudential significance.

PCAs also play an important structural role within Florida's constitutional framework by limiting the unintended expansion of discretionary review. Under article V, section 3, subsection (b)(3) of the Florida Constitution, the Florida Supreme Court's jurisdiction may be invoked based on express and direct conflict created by written opinions. Even a brief or nonprecedential opinion can give rise to arguments that such conflict exists, thereby inviting further appellate review. PCAs eliminate that possibility, ensuring that discretionary review is reserved for cases in which the appellate court has deliberately articulated a rule of law that may warrant higher court intervention.

These are not incidental benefits, but rather reflect the institutional discipline which the appellate function requires.

VIII. Conclusion

PCAs are a legitimate and valuable part of Florida appellate practice. PCAs permit appellate courts to resolve routine appeals efficiently, preserve the coherence of precedent, avoid unnecessary doctrinal accretion, and direct judicial resources to cases that require written guidance. PCAs are not a symbol of systemic inadequacy, indifference or low work ethic, but of judicial practicality, humility and restraint.

I do not suggest that deciding cases by issuing full written opinions lacks importance. To the contrary, the legitimacy of the appellate process depends upon the transparent explanation of legal rules which are developed, modified, or applied in ways that shape future disputes. PCAs simply recognize the reality that not every case performs that function. PCAs provide cost-efficiency for judges, attorneys, and litigants. But at its core, PCAs reflect a judgment that the law is already adequate to resolve the given case, and that nothing useful would be gained by saying more. Acme Specialty Corp. v. City of Miami, 292 So. 2d 379, 380 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) (PCAs “may be employed to dispose of cases in which anything written on the points raised would add nothing to the law.”).

That judgment, like any other, may be debated. But it is one that the Florida Supreme Court has recognized appellate courts must be free to make if they are to discharge their responsibilities wisely. As the Court noted after amending Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.330:

Nothing in the amendment to rule 9.330(a) mandates that a district court of appeal issue a written opinion upon request of a party. In fact, by leaving the final decision on whether to issue a written opinion to the district court of appeal, the amendment preserves the inherent discretion of that court to issue a written opinion when, in its reasoned judgment, a written opinion is required.

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Kenyon, 882 So. 2d 986, 989 (Fla. 2004).

Taken together, these considerations underscore a central point: an appellate panel's decision to issue a PCA is not a refusal to explain a result, nor an abdication of judicial responsibility. A PCA is instead an exercise of judicial responsibility. The appellate function is not to explain every correct result, but to speak when doing so advances the law. Where speaking does not, restraint is not only appropriate, but essential.

Because this case presents no reversible error and no issue warranting further explanation in a written opinion, I concur with the PCA issued in this case.

Per Curiam.

Gross, May, and Klingensmith, JJ., concur. Klingensmith, J., concurs with separate opinion, in which Gross, J., concurs.