DAVIS v. DAVIS (2023)

Appellant, Adam Davis (“Father”), appeals the trial court's supplemental final judgment modifying timesharing and granting petition for relocation in favor of Appellee, Angela Lea Davis n/k/a Angela Griffin (“Mother”).¹ His appeal is timely, and this Court has jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A).

Father asserts that the trial court failed to set forth the statutory findings for the best interests of the minor children as required by section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (2022). The statute provides, in pertinent part:

For purposes of establishing or modifying parental responsibility and creating, developing, approving, or modifying a parenting plan, including a time-sharing schedule, which governs each parent's relationship with his or her minor child and the relationship between each parent with regard to his or her minor child, the best interest of the child shall be the primary consideration. A determination of parental responsibility, a parenting plan, or a time-sharing schedule may not be modified without a showing of a substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circumstances and a determination that the modification is in the best interests of the child. Determination of the best interests of the child shall be made by evaluating all of the factors affecting the welfare and interests of the particular minor child and the circumstances of that family, including, but not limited to: [factors (a) through (t)].

Id.

The lower court held an evidentiary hearing on Mother's supplemental petition to modify final judgment. The court outlined the various witnesses’ testimony, expressly found, “there is a substantial change in circumstances,” then set forth the modification to the prior timesharing schedule. The lower court's order failed to make any factual findings relative to the statutory factors set forth in section 61.13. While the court found there was a “substantial” change in circumstances, the court did not set forth a finding that the change in circumstances was “material” or “unanticipated.” Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to make appropriate findings of fact. Brown v. Brown, 239 So. 3d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (“[B]ecause the record does not contain adequate factual findings for this court to conduct meaningful appellate review of the parental time-sharing schedule, we reverse the amended parenting plan and remand for the trial court to make the necessary factual findings.”). Upon remand, we leave the decision to the trial court to determine whether the current record is sufficient to resolve these issues or whether additional evidence is needed. Id.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This case was transferred from the Second District Court of Appeal to this Court on January 1, 2023.

SMITH, J.

TRAVER and MIZE, JJ., concur.