Shannon Jones et al. v. Catherine Jones (2015)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE (# 106)

The plaintiffs, Shannon Jones and Patricia Hackett, filed a revised complaint dated November 19, 2014, alleging four counts.   On January 14, 2015, the defendant, Catherine Jones, moved to strike count four, which is for intentional infliction of emotional distress.   The plaintiffs filed an opposing brief on January 22, 2015, to which the defendant replied on February 6, 2015.   The motion was submitted on the papers on March 9, 2015.

FACTS

In ruling on a motion to strike, the court takes the facts to be those alleged, construed in favor of the legal sufficiency of the pleading.   See New London County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Nantes, 303 Conn. 737, 747, 36 A.3d 224 (2012);  see also Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 252–53, 990 A.2d 206 (2010) (complaint is construed broadly;  necessarily implied allegations are accepted as true).   However, opinions and legal conclusions are not deemed true.  Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).   Viewing count four in this light, the pertinent facts are as follows.

On and for some time before July 1, 2013, the defendant owned, possessed, managed and/or controlled a home at 49 Pomfret Road in Brooklyn, Connecticut (the premises), and the plaintiffs were her tenants there.   On that day, the home was destroyed by a fire ¹ which destroyed all its contents, including all of the plaintiffs' personal property.   The defendant was compensated by an insurance policy for the value of both the structure at the premises and the plaintiffs' personal property destroyed in the fire, including keepsakes, over which personal property the defendant had no legal interest.²  The defendant's conduct was intentional and for the purpose of inflicting emotional distress on the plaintiffs.

DISCUSSION

A motion to strike contests the legal sufficiency of the allegations of a complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).   A motion to strike is confined to the facts alleged.   See Zirinsky v. Zirinsky, 87 Conn.App. 257, 268 n.9, 865 A.2d 488, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 916, 871 A.2d 372 (2005);  see also Rowe v. Godou, 209 Conn. 273, 278, 550 A.2d 1073 (1988).   The interpretation of pleadings is a question of law for the court.   Boone v. William W. Backus Hospital, 272 Conn. 551, 559, 864 A.2d 1 (2005).

In order to prevail on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must prove:  (1) that the defendant intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct;  (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous;  (3) that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress;  and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe.  Gagnon v. Housatonic Valley Tourism District Commission, 92 Conn.App. 835, 846, 888 A.2d 104 (2006);  Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 253, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986).   Facts showing all four elements must be alleged because such facts must be established at trial.   See Muniz v. Kravis, 59 Conn.App. 704, 708–09, 757 A.2d 1207 (2000).   In ruling on the present motion, the court must determine whether count four alleges all four elements, including acts which a reasonable fact finder could find to be extreme or outrageous.   See Gagnon v. Housatonic Valley Tourism District Commission, supra, 92 Conn.App. 847.

“Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society, of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very serious kind.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ancona v. Manafort Bros., Inc., 56 Conn.App. 701, 712, 746 A.2d 184, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 954 (2000).  “Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.   Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’   1 Restatement (Second), Torts § 46, comment (d), p. 73 (1965).   Conduct on the part of the defendant that is merely insulting or displays bad manners or results in hurt feelings is insufficient to form the basis for an action based upon intentional infliction of emotional distress.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 210–11, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000).   Actions which understandably, even naturally, upset and distress someone do not necessarily meet what has been called the “high threshold required to sustain a claim based on intentional infliction of emotional distress.”  Gillians v. Vivanco–Small, 128 Conn.App. 207, 211–12, 15 A.3d 1200, cert. denied, 301 Conn. 933, 23 A.3d 726 (2011).

Turning to count four, the facts alleged, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, basically charges larceny or theft.   While theft is a serious matter ³ inherently distressing to victims, particularly when the suspected perpetrator is a family member, the facts alleged are insufficient to constitute a case for intentional infliction of emotional distress because, in essence, the conduct alleged to be “outrageous” is only the theft.   If count four states a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, any alleged theft from someone with a claim of special vulnerability to the thief could form the basis for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.   See Marquez v. Housing Authority of the City of Norwalk, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk, Docket No. CV–12–5014008–S (December 2, 2013) (alleged conversion by landlord of tenant's personal property did not support count for intentional infliction of emotional distress).   Viewed another way, while any theft may be outrageous in the eyes of the victim, not every theft is “extreme and outrageous” for purposes of tort law.   It is not for this court to lower the “high threshold” for intentional infliction of emotional distress claims to conclude otherwise.   See Gillians v. Vivanco–Small, supra, 128 Conn.App. 212.

In addition, the facts alleged in count four fail to show the third and fourth elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress, causation by the defendant's actions of emotional distress to the plaintiffs and actual, severe emotional distress.

For these reasons, the defendant's motion to strike count four is granted.

Cole–Chu, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The plaintiffs allege, “the structure was destroyed by fire while occupied by the Plaintiffs.”   From the fact that the plaintiffs survived, the court finds that the last five words are not literally true and, therefore, are a conclusion of law about their right to occupy the premises..  FN1. The plaintiffs allege, “the structure was destroyed by fire while occupied by the Plaintiffs.”   From the fact that the plaintiffs survived, the court finds that the last five words are not literally true and, therefore, are a conclusion of law about their right to occupy the premises.

FN2. Paragraph 2 of count four repeats this factual allegation and alleges the legal conclusion—not deemed admitted—that the defendant engaged in fraudulent conduct.   Paragraph 3 adds little to incorporated paragraph 4 of count one, but modifies it in that the latter alleges all of the plaintiffs' personal property was destroyed in the fire and the former claims that the personal property in which the defendant had no legal interest, but for which she accepted compensation was “a significant portion of the plaintiffs' worldly goods.”.  FN2. Paragraph 2 of count four repeats this factual allegation and alleges the legal conclusion—not deemed admitted—that the defendant engaged in fraudulent conduct.   Paragraph 3 adds little to incorporated paragraph 4 of count one, but modifies it in that the latter alleges all of the plaintiffs' personal property was destroyed in the fire and the former claims that the personal property in which the defendant had no legal interest, but for which she accepted compensation was “a significant portion of the plaintiffs' worldly goods.”

FN3. General Statutes § 52–564 provides treble damages for theft..  FN3. General Statutes § 52–564 provides treble damages for theft.

Cole–Chu, Leeland J., J.