Kaitlyn Haines v. LLC (2015)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION:  Motion to Strike # 103

The defendant, Ballo Restaurants, LLC, moves to strike counts three and four of the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the allegations are legally insufficient to state the claims asserted.   The plaintiff does not contest the motion to strike as to count three, which sounds in negligent infliction of emotional distress.   The plaintiff does object to the motion as to count four, which sounds in intentional infliction of emotional distress.   In count four, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant terminated her from her position as a bartender and server at the Ballo Italian Restaurant and Social Club after she reported to management that she witnessed the sale of illicit substances between two other restaurant employees.

“In order to prevail upon a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must establish:  (1) that the [defendant] intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct;  (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous;  (3) that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress;  and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Watts v. Chittenden, 301 Conn. 575, 605, 22 A.3d 1214 (2011).  “Whether a defendant's conduct is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that it be extreme and outrageous is initially a question for the court to determine ․ Only where reasonable minds disagree does it become an issue for the jury.”  (Citation omitted.)  Appleton v. Board of Education of Stonington, 254 Conn. 205, 210, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000).  “Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct that exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society ․ Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 210–11.  “The mere act of firing an employee, even if wrongfully motivated, does not transgress the bounds of socially tolerable behavior.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., 243 Conn. 66, 89, 700 A.2d 655 (1997).

Connecticut courts have held that employees were not subjected to extreme and outrageous conduct when their employment was terminated under very unpleasant circumstances.   See, e.g., Appleton v. Board of Education of Stonington, supra, 254 Conn. 211–12 (making condescending comments to teacher in front of colleagues, subjecting her to psychiatric examinations, forcing her to resign, and calling the police to escort her from the school did not constitute extreme and outrageous contact);  Gillians v. Vivanco–Small, 128 Conn.App. 207, 212–13, 15 A.3d 1200, cert. denied, 301 Conn. 933, 23 A.3d 726 (2011) (vindictive conspiracy to terminate plaintiff's employment not sufficiently extreme and outrageous).   In the present case, the plaintiff has simply alleged that the termination of her employment was unjustified.   The conduct alleged is neither extreme and outrageous.   Consequently the allegations are legally insufficient to sustain a cause of action in intentional infliction of emotional distress.   Accordingly, the defendant's motion to strike is granted.

Zemetis, J.

Zemetis, Terence A., J.