Sylvester Traylor v. Cathy Gambrell et al. (2015)

decisions in this case;  i.e., that this judge's prior representation of the Town “causes his integrity to be in question” and that this judge “clearly has a conflict of interest” [note use of the present tense] and “should have recused himself from any of the Plaintiff's actions.”  In this light, this judge infers that the plaintiff did not really mean, on January 5, 2015, to leave the recusal decision up to this judge's discretion.  In this regard, it is pertinent that the plaintiff is not a lawyer by training and he is representing himself.  Moreover, though this judge's denial of the Town's motion argued that day did no harm to the plaintiff, it is not clear that the plaintiff's leaving recusal up to this judge was for all purposes, as distinguished from just as to the motion argued that day.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION (# 153) FOR AN ORDER UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

The plaintiff's unopposed motion # 153.00 for an order under the Freedom of Information Act,¹ filed January 13, 2015, was on Judge Emmet Cosgrove's January 5, 2015, short calendar and submitted to Judge Cosgrove on the papers.   Judge Cosgrove has referred the motion to this judge because the motion concerns this judge and this judge had a similar motion under submission.   (See Traylor v. State, Docket No. KNL–CV–13–5014624–S, motion # 262 and order # 262.01.) The present motion is to the Superior Court, not to any particular judge, let alone this judge.

As the motion reveals, the plaintiff has been informed that this judge practiced law in a firm which represented the Town of Waterford (Town), a defendant in this case.   This judge disclosed that law firm relationship on January 5, 2015—and the fact that this judge recalls handling only one matter of substance for the Town. This judge believes that occasion was the first time a matter in this case was argued before this judge.   On that occasion, this judge stated, in essence, that he was sure of his lack of bias and confident of his ability to decide issues in this case fairly and impartially and inquired whether either the plaintiff or the Town objected to proceeding to the merits of the motions that day.   The plaintiff did object, without expressed cause other than the disclosed representation, but stated that he left the issue of recusal up to this judge.   For the reasons stated above, this judge decided that it was not necessary to recuse himself and proceeded to hear argument on the Town's motion to dismiss.  (That motion was denied today.)

The present motion reveals a new ground of objection to this judge making

Therefore, this judge will not rule on any further motions in this case unless the plaintiff promptly files a written consent that this judge do so, and then only to the extent of such written consent.   If such consent is not filed by 5:00 p.m. on February 13, 2015, the court will deem such consent to be denied and will refer all pending matters in this case, Traylor v. Gambrell, docket no.   KNL–CV–14–5014782–S, to another judge.

Cole–Chu, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The motion is not a “request” pursuant to General Statutes § 1–206(a).   Though the motion seeks an order under the Freedom of Information Act, the plaintiff does not explain how the requested documents, assuming they exist, are records of a public agency as defined in § 1–200(1)(A);  are public records, as defined in § 1–200(5);  or are required to be made available to the public under § 1–210(a)..  FN1. The motion is not a “request” pursuant to General Statutes § 1–206(a).   Though the motion seeks an order under the Freedom of Information Act, the plaintiff does not explain how the requested documents, assuming they exist, are records of a public agency as defined in § 1–200(1)(A);  are public records, as defined in § 1–200(5);  or are required to be made available to the public under § 1–210(a).

Cole–Chu, Leeland J., J.