Sylvester Traylor v. Cathy Gambrell et al. (2015)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION (# 120.00) TO REOPEN AND RECONSIDER FEE WAIVERS GRANTED TO PLAINTIFF

The motion of the defendant, Town of Waterford, to reopen and reconsider two fee waivers was submitted on the papers at this court's January 5, 2015, short calendar.   The plaintiff, Sylvester Traylor, and Russell Jarem, counsel for the Town of Waterford, were present for argument on other matters in this case.

The present motion is really two motions.   First, it is a motion to Judge Hillary Strackbein for reconsideration of her September 8, 2014, order granting the plaintiff Sylvester Traylor's application for a) waiver of the fee for filing this action and b) the state to pay the marshal's fees for service of process on the defendants.   Judge Strackbein will rule on that motion, i.e., that part of the present motion.

Second, this motion seeks reconsideration by the undersigned of his October 8, 2014, order granting the plaintiff's motion (# 104.00) for waiver of the jury fee in this case.   This ruling is on that part of the present motion.

The plaintiff's motion # 104.00 for waiver of the jury fee was submitted ex parte on or about October 7, 2014.   It is customary for applications or, in this case, a motion for waiver of fees to be submitted ex parte.   The record reveals neither a claim by the plaintiff that he notified the movant, or any of the defendants, that he was filing the motion nor any basis for finding that the defendants otherwise knew the motion was being made and had time to object to it.

The movant bases its motion on one general ground, to wit, that the court has, and should exercise, the discretion to deny a fee waiver under General Statutes § 52–259b(c).¹  The movant argues that all four of the factors—whether deemed facts and/or conclusions—in § 52–259b(c)(2) which must be shown for the court to deny an indigent person's request for waiver of fees are present.   After review of the 122–page motion and the plaintiff's 3–page opposition (plus a two-page exhibit which does not pertain to the application for waiver of the jury fee), the court agrees with the movant in these regards.   The plaintiff's objection to the present motion, intense and presumably sincere as it is, attacks the movant's motives but does not specifically rebut the movant's legal or factual claims.   Regarding § 52–259b(c)(2)(A), the plaintiff has repeatedly filed actions with respect to matters that are substantially the same as, or similar to, this suit against the defendants for intentional spoliation of evidence (count one) and the claim, in count two, of violation by the Connecticut Interlocal Risk Management Agency (CIRMA), Attorney Maciej A. Piatkowski and Ryan, Ryan & Deluca, LLP, of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act by the acts alleged in count one.   There have been at least two such cases, Traylor v. Steward (Docket No. KNL–CV–10–5013979–S) (Traylor I ), in which a defendant in this case (Ryan, Ryan and Deluca, LLP) was a defendant, and Traylor v. Waterford (Docket No. KNL–CV–13–5014559–S) (Traylor II ).²  Regarding § 52–259b(c)(2)(B), the plaintiff's filings do establish an extended pattern of frivolous filings the gravamen of which has been found by two federal judges to be without merit.   These include claims of replevin of the trust document which is the subject of this case, spoliation of that document, the plaintiff's “Monell claim” for the town's alleged violations of his civil rights with regard to that document,³ discrimination, “retaliation practice” and declaratory and injunctive relief.⁴  Regarding § 52–259b(c)(2)(C), motion # 104 is in connection with a case—this case—consistent with the plaintiff's previous pattern of frivolous filings.   Finally, regarding § 52–259b(c)(2)(D), in light of the findings on the three prior factors, the jury fee waiver would, in light of the information brought to the court's attention by the present motion, constitute a flagrant misuse of Judicial Branch resources.

The movant bases its motion on one ground specific to waiver of the jury fee.   That argument is that requiring the plaintiff to pay the jury fee does not, like requiring him to pay the entry fee and costs of service, threaten to deprive him of, or unreasonably burden, his right to seek redress in the courts.   In other words, even if the § 52–259b(c)(2) factors were not present—even if this were the first lawsuit the plaintiff ever filed—requiring him to pay the jury fee does not deprive him of either due process or the equal protection of laws.  Robertson v. Apuzzo, 170 Conn. 367, 371, 365 A.2d 824, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 852, 97 S.Ct. 142, 50 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976).   Nor does equity require courts to defray all costs of litigation for all self-represented and/or indigent litigants.  Doe v. State, 216 Conn. 85, 99, 579 A.2d 37 (1990).   In this light, and considering that the plaintiff claimed no reason other than indigency in his motion for waiver of the jury fee, the absence of any exception to the requirement of General Statutes § 52–258 that the jury fee must be paid “by the party at whose request the case is placed upon the jury docket” is compelling.

The motion to re-open and reconsider the court's order 104.01 is granted and that order is vacated.   The plaintiff may pay the jury fee within ten days of the date of this order.   See General Statutes § 52–215.   If he does not do so, the clerk is ordered immediately and without further notice to move this case to the list of cases awaiting trial to the court.

Cole–Chu, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Section 52–259b(c), as amended by No. 13–310 of the 2013 Public Acts, provides:Nothing in this section shall preclude the court from (1) finding that a person whose income does not meet the criteria of subsection (b) of this section is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process, or (2) denying an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or the cost of service of process when the court finds that (A) the applicant has repeatedly filed actions with respect to the same or similar matters, (B) such filings establish an extended pattern of frivolous filings that have been without merit, (C) the application sought is in connection with an action before the court that is consistent with the applicant's previous pattern of frivolous filings, and (D) the granting of such application would constitute a flagrant misuse of Judicial Branch resources.   If an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or the cost of service of process is denied, the court clerk shall, upon the request of the applicant, schedule a hearing on the application.   Nothing in this section shall affect the inherent authority of the court to manage its docket..  FN1. Section 52–259b(c), as amended by No. 13–310 of the 2013 Public Acts, provides:Nothing in this section shall preclude the court from (1) finding that a person whose income does not meet the criteria of subsection (b) of this section is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process, or (2) denying an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or the cost of service of process when the court finds that (A) the applicant has repeatedly filed actions with respect to the same or similar matters, (B) such filings establish an extended pattern of frivolous filings that have been without merit, (C) the application sought is in connection with an action before the court that is consistent with the applicant's previous pattern of frivolous filings, and (D) the granting of such application would constitute a flagrant misuse of Judicial Branch resources.   If an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or the cost of service of process is denied, the court clerk shall, upon the request of the applicant, schedule a hearing on the application.   Nothing in this section shall affect the inherent authority of the court to manage its docket.

FN2. In the latter, more recent case, after removal to the U.S. District Court, Chief Judge Thompson dismissed all claims except a state law claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (“count six,” since the removed complaint included two counts “four”).   That claim is not part of the present suit..  FN2. In the latter, more recent case, after removal to the U.S. District Court, Chief Judge Thompson dismissed all claims except a state law claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (“count six,” since the removed complaint included two counts “four”).   That claim is not part of the present suit.

FN3. See Cowan ex rel Estate of Cooper v. Breen, 352 F.3d 756, 758 n.1 (2d Cir.2003), citing Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (municipal liability must be premised on a custom or policy of the municipality)..  FN3. See Cowan ex rel Estate of Cooper v. Breen, 352 F.3d 756, 758 n.1 (2d Cir.2003), citing Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (municipal liability must be premised on a custom or policy of the municipality).

FN4. The count in Traylor II labeled “nine,” and, being the seventh count in number, referred to by Judge Thompson's decision as count seven, is labeled as being against Connecticut College.   However, 54 of its 58 paragraphs are incorporated from prior counts concerning the Town, with no reference to Connecticut College, which is not listed in the summons or in the caption as a defendant..  FN4. The count in Traylor II labeled “nine,” and, being the seventh count in number, referred to by Judge Thompson's decision as count seven, is labeled as being against Connecticut College.   However, 54 of its 58 paragraphs are incorporated from prior counts concerning the Town, with no reference to Connecticut College, which is not listed in the summons or in the caption as a defendant.

Cole–Chu, Leeland J., J.