Angelo Magliocco v. Easton Planning & Zoning (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

FACTS

The Defendant, MG Easton Company, is the owner of a 29.52–acre parcel, which has been utilized as a cemetery since the late 1970s.   Although the property is located entirely within the Town of Easton, access to the site is obtained via Harvester Road, a residential street located entirely within the Town of Trumbull.

MG Easton Company, which is a subsidiary of the Mountain Grove Cemetery Association, purchased the property in 2001.   The parent company operates a cemetery on a 125–acre tract, adjacent to North Avenue, in the City of Bridgeport.

The history of the property reveals that an attempt was made to develop it as a nine (9) lot residential subdivision, before it was dedicated to its present use as a cemetery.   In 1973, the Defendant, Easton Planning and Zoning Commission, approved a nine (9) lot subdivision.   The commission's approval, however, was conditioned upon the following stipulation:

“No zoning approval or building permit shall be issued for the construction of any residential building within this subdivision until such time as the proposed public road within the subdivision is connected to a public street or highway in the Town of Easton.”

The proposed developer, a contract purchaser, appealed the decision of the Planning and Zoning Commission.   The Court of Common Pleas (Hanrahan, J.) found that the condition was invalid, and modified the approval, eliminating the condition.   The Town of Easton appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed the lower court decision, and upheld the condition.  Nicoli v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 171 Conn. 89, 96 (1976).

Since the 29.52–acre undeveloped parcel did not abut any public highway in the Town of Easton, the record reveals no attempt subsequent to the Nicoli decision, to utilize the property for single-family residential purposes.

In the aftermath of Nicoli, Congregation B'Nai Torah, a Conservative Synogogue located in the Town of Trumbull, applied to the Easton Planning and Zoning Commission for permission to use the property as a cemetery.   The property is located in Easton's District B Zone. A cemetery located on not less than ten (10) acres may be operated in the zone, subject to the special permit process.¹

On December 20, 1976, the Easton Planning and Zoning Commission approved B'Nai Torah's special permit application (ROR 33).   The approval acknowledged the Nicoli decision, and noted that the site has no access from Easton, and that evidence presented at the public hearing indicated that traffic to the cemetery would be less than the subdivision proposed in Nicoli.   The commission found that “no traffic hazards will be created.”  (ROR 33, p. 2–3.)

As a stipulation of the special permit approval, the Planning and Zoning Commission required:  (ROR 33, Condition # 4).

4. All monuments and grave markers will be flush with the surface of the ground in order to provide for easy maintenance to provide for a park like atmosphere and a feeling of large, open space.

After it acquired the cemetery in 2001, MG Easton Company began efforts to further develop the property.   In September of 2003, it obtained an approval from the Easton Conservation Commission, in its capacity as the municipal wetlands agency, for a permit to conduct a regulated activity (ROR 18;  ROR 4).   The 2003 permit was issued, in anticipation of the construction of “a small building with parking area, a septic system, and creation of several new drives ․”

In 2004, MG Easton sought a modification of the special permit issued to Congregation B'Nai Torah in 1976.   According to newspaper accounts (ROR 43), the new owners asked the Easton Planning and Zoning Commission to approve the construction of a building which would be used for office space and indoor services.   The building would also be used to store equipment, and would contain a small apartment for use by a caretaker.

Paths, sidewalks and driveways were also requested, along with permission to use above ground headstones of the type prohibited by the existing special permit (ROR 43).

The 2004 proposal drew opposition from neighbors, and elected officials in the Town of Trumbull.   No change in the 1976 special permit was authorized, and the application was withdrawn (ROR 60, p. 13).

In July of 2012, MG Easton submitted another application for site plan approval, and modification of the special permit conditions (ROR 1;  ROR 26).   Unlike the 2004 application, the 2012 proposal did not seek approval for any permanent buildings for storage, office space, or lodging.   Internal driveways and pathways were proposed, and a revised site plan was submitted (ROR 5;  ROR 27).   The proposed site plan showed proposed walkways, and areas to be developed.

As part of the special permit application, (ROR 1) MG Easton Company asked the commission to eliminate Condition # 4, contained in the special permit issued to Congregation B'Nai Torah.   According to the application, removal of the condition in certain underdeveloped areas of the property was “ ․ essential to insure the long term stability of our operation” (ROR 1;  ROR 26).

Prior to the public hearing concerning MG Easton's special permit application, the Easton Conservation Commission extended the permit it had issued to conduct a regulated activity for five years.   Therefore, the permit, issued initially in 2003, was extended for an additional five years in 2008 (ROR 1, letter dated July 9, 2008).

The public hearing drew neighborhood opposition from those Trumbull residents whose homes abut or are in close proximity to the cemetery.   Several reviewed the history of the cemetery's operation, and commented that the number of funeral processions had increased since the cemetery was first opened by Congregation B'Nai Torah (ROR 60, p. 22–23).   Some further commented that the introduction of raised monuments would compromise the “park like” setting, contemplated by the 1976 special permit.

Those speaking in opposition to the special permit application claimed that allowing upright monuments would constitute an expansion of the cemetery's operation.   The 2004 application by MG Easton Company, which had been scaled back in 2012, was also mentioned.

Traffic considerations regarding the current operation were described, as well as the use of heavy equipment on the property (ROR 60, p. 30–33).   Counsel for the Harvester Road and Lauderdale Road Neighborhood Association also addressed the commission in opposition to the revised special permit proposal (ROR 60, p. 38–66).   The Easton regulations concerning special permit approval, Article 7, Section 7.2 of the Easton Zoning Regulations (ROR 64, p. 23–24), were reviewed in light of the findings which the commission, when acting upon a special permit request, is required to make.

The hearing was continued until October 22 (ROR 61), at which time it was closed (ROR 45).

Prior to the close of the hearing, counsel for MG Easton Company acknowledged that the introduction of monumentation to the site could increase the number of burials per year, but opined that any increase would not be dramatic (ROR 61, p. 18–19).

The Commission discussed the special permit application at its December 10, 2012 meeting, (ROR 62) and on December 17, 2012, voted unanimously, 5–0, to approve the applications with conditions (ROR 4).

In its letter of December 27, 2012, addressed to MG Easton Company, (ROR 57), the commission chair articulated the findings required by Section 7.2.1 of the Easton Zoning Regulations.²

The commission determined that the proposed use served a community need or convenience, and that the location was in harmony with the appropriate and orderly development of the neighborhood.

This letter (ROR 57) noted that no buildings or walls were to be constructed, and that landscaping plans provide appropriate screening.   It was further found by the Commission, that the use would not discourage the use and development of adjoining lands.

The Commission determined that the granting of the special permit requested by MG Easton Company, “will not be more objectionable to nearby properties” than would other permitted uses such as those generated by a residential subdivision or by agricultural activity (ROR 57, p. 2).

Notice of the Commission's action was published in the Easton Courier on December 20, 2012 (ROR 51).

From that decision, the Plaintiff, Angelo Magliocco, brings this appeal.

AGGRIEVEMENT

The Plaintiff, Angelo Magliocco, is the owner of 49 Harvester Road, Trumbull.   He took title to the property in May of 2012, and owns the real estate with his wife, Jennifer (Ex. 1 & 2).

49 Harvester Road abuts the cemetery property.

Pleading and proof of aggrievement are jurisdictional, and a prerequisite for maintaining an appeal.  Winchester Woods Associates v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 219 Conn. 303, 307 (1991).   The question of aggrievement is one of fact, to be determined by the trial court, based upon evidence at trial.   Primerica v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 85, 93 (1989);  Hughes v. Town Planning & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 505, 508 (1968).

Aggrievement falls into two basic categories—statutory aggrievement, and classical aggrievement.

Statutory aggrievement exists by virtue of legislative fiat, which grants standing to appeal by virtue of a particular statute, rather than through an analysis of the facts of a particular case.  Weill v. Lieberman, 195 Conn. 123, 124–25 (1985);  Pierce v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 7 Conn.App. 632, 635–36 (1986).

Classical aggrievement, on the other hand, requires a party to satisfy a well-established two-fold test:  1) the party claiming to be aggrieved must demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest in the decision appealed from, as distinguished from a general interest such as the concern of all members of the community as a whole, and 2) the party must show that the specific personal and legal interest has been specifically and injuriously affected by the action which produced the appeal.  Cannavo Enterprises v. Burns, 194 Conn. 43, 47 (1984).

Section 8–8(a)(1) of the General Statutes, defines “Aggrieved Person” to mean:

(1) Aggrieved Person ․ includes any person owning land that abuts of is within one hundred feet of any portion of the land involved in the decision of the board.

Based upon his ownership of property which abuts the land which is the subject of the special permit application by MG Easton Company, it is found that the Plaintiff is aggrieved by the decision which generated this appeal.

Because the Plaintiff has satisfied the criteria for statutory aggrievement, it is not necessary to determine whether he is also classically aggrieved by the decision of the Easton Planning and Zoning Commission.

STANDARD OF REVIEW—SPECIAL PERMIT

A special permit allows a property owner to use his property in a manner which is expressly permitted by the zoning regulations.  A.P. & W. Holding Corporation v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 167 Conn. 182, 85 (1984);  Kobyluck v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 84 Conn.App. 160, 169–70 (2004).   The terms “special permit” and “special exception” have the same meaning, and may be used interchangeably.  Summ v. Zoning Commission, 150 Conn. 79, 87 (1962).

When ruling upon an application for a special permit, a planning and zoning commission sits in an administrative capacity, rather than in a legislative or quasi judicial capacity.  Irwin v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 244 Conn. 619, 627 (1988);  Goldberg v. Zoning Commission, 173 Conn. 23, 29 (1977);  Farina v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 157 Conn. 420, 422 (1969).   The proposal before the commission must satisfy all conditions imposed by the regulations, as well as conditions necessary to protect the public health, safety and convenience.  MacKenzie v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 146 Conn.App. 406, 441–42 (2013).   The conditions under which a special permit is permitted, must be found in the regulations themselves.  Beckish v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 162 Conn. 11, 15 (1971).

The commission's authority to issue a special permit, is derived from S. 8–2 3 of the General Statutes.   The statute does not permit a commission, in the exercise of its discretion, to vary the application of the regulations on a case by case basis.  MacKenzie v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 428–29.   While S. 8–2 permits the imposition of conditions, those conditions must be authorized by the zoning regulations themselves, and must be necessary to protect the public health, safety, convenience and property values.   Housatonic Terminal Corporation v. Planning & Zoning Board, 168 Conn. 304, 307 (1975).

Although a special permit enables a property owner to use his property in a manner permitted by the zoning regulations, a permit must be obtained, because the nature of the use is such that its exact location and operation must be regulated, due to unique topographical conditions, traffic problems, and neighborhood uses.  Barberino Realty & Development Corporation v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 222 Conn. 607, 612 (1992).

Even though the planning and zoning commission sits in an administrative capacity when evaluating a special permit application, and is bound by its regulations, that does not mean that the process is purely ministerial.   A commission may decide, in the exercise of its discretion, whether general standards contained in the regulations have been met.  Irwin v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 626–27;  Whisper Wind Development Corporation v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 229 Conn. 176, 177 (1994).

In applying the law to the facts of a particular case, the commission is endowed with liberal discretion, and its actions are subject to review by a court only to determine whether its action was unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal.  Schwartz v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 208 Conn. 146, 152 (1988).   On factual questions, a reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the municipal land use body.  Timber Trails Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 222 Conn. 380, 401 (1992).

Conclusions reached by the commission must be upheld, if supported by substantial evidence in the record.   Substantial evidence is enough evidence to justify, if the trial were to a jury, the refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion to be drawn is one of fact.  Huck v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency, 203 Conn. 525, 541 (1987).   The possibility of drawing inconsistent conclusions does not prevent a decision from being supported by substantial evidence.  Sampieri v. Inland Wetlands Agency, 226 Conn. 579, 588 (1993).

CRITERIA CONTAINED IN EASTON REGULATIONS

The Plaintiff claims that the requirements for the issuance of a special permit, as specified in the Easton Zoning Regulations, have not been satisfied.   He maintains that the findings of the Commission (ROR 57), are not supported by substantial evidence.

Section 7.2.1 of the Easton Regulations, by its express language, requires that “all” of the conditions and standards must be satisfied, before a special permit is approved.   Therefore, each of the requirements for the issuance of a special permit, where applicable, must be examined, to determine whether substantial evidence supports the decision to grant the special permit.

The record reveals that approximately eighty-four (84) burials take place at the cemetery each year.   The fact that above ground monumentation is desired, in order to render the purchase of plots more desirable, attests to the demand for burial plots.   Therefore, substantial evidence supports the Commission's finding that a community need is served by the requested special permit.   The record supports the finding that S. 7.2.1A of the regulations has been satisfied.

Neighbors objected to the amended special permit, citing the traffic which is produced by the quasi-commercial enterprise conducted by MG Easton Company.   They also objected to the introduction of monuments, claiming that the park like atmosphere promised in the 1976 special permit, would be compromised.

However, notwithstanding those observations made during the public hearing process, applying the substantial evidence test supports the finding that S. 7.2.1B of the Easton Regulations has been satisfied.

Although a contrary finding could have been made by the Commission, in its discretion, the record supports the finding that the special permit is “․ in harmony with the appropriate and orderly development of the neighborhood” in which the cemetery is located.

The record reveals that the area in which monuments would be permitted, is restricted, and additional screening has been mandated.   Furthermore, additional room for parking on the site has been provided.

Unlike the MG Easton Company proposal submitted in 2004, no buildings will be constructed on the site.   Substantial evidence supports the finding that the special permit application satisfies S. 7.2.1C of the Regulations.

There exists substantial evidence in the record compiled during two nights of public hearings, to support the conclusion that the contemplated use is in harmony with the neighborhood, and that the appropriate use and development of neighboring properties will not be hindered, and the value of those properties will not be impaired.

Therefore, the Easton Planning and Zoning Commission's findings that S. 7.2.1E, 7.2.1F and 7.2.1G of the Regulations have been satisfied, is supported by substantial evidence in the record.

However, notwithstanding the fact that substantial evidence supports the Commission's findings concerning subsections A, B, C, E, F and G of S. 7.2.1, before any special permit may issue, the commission is required to find that the criteria contained in S. 7.2.1D has been satisfied.   The commission, according to the regulations which it has adopted, must determine that “all” of the conditions and standards promulgated in its regulations, have been satisfied.

The analysis of S. 7.2.1D requires a finding that substantial evidence supports the Commission's finding that a quasi-commercial cemetery operation by MG Easton Company, will not be “more objectionable to nearby properties by reason of noise, fumes or other characteristics, than would be the operation of any permitted use not requiring a special permit.”

No such conclusion, applying the substantial evidence standard, can be justified, based upon a review of the record of the public hearing.

Section 7.2.1D of the Easton Regulations establishes an extremely high standard, which an applicant for a special permit must satisfy.   Compliance with this restrictive standard is very difficult, in most situations involving a residential side street or cul-de-sac.

The uses permitted in Easton's B Zone as of right, pursuant to S. 4.1 of the Regulations, are 1) a single-family dwelling, not to exceed one per lot, and 2) farming, nursery and agricultural activities.

Unquestionably, by electing to adopt a very high bar for a special permit applicant to scale, the Commission, in the exercise of its discretion, may reject all but the most inoffensive applications.

On virtually any residential side street or quiet cul-de-sac, in the Town of Easton, a recreational facility, a municipal building, a firehouse, a private school, a farmer's market, or other use requiring a special permit, could be found “more objectionable” than a single-family residence, a farm, or a nursery.

Here, the Commission suggests that the appropriate comparison is between a cemetery with monuments, operated by MG Easton Company, and a nine (9) lot residential subdivision.

In support of its special permit application, the applicant did not submit a traffic study.   Although a letter was obtained from the Easton Chief of Police, no communication was received from Trumbull's Chief of Police, or from the Trumbull Police Commission, the town's traffic authority.

Neighbors testified to the inconvenience and annoyance occasioned by funeral processions, and work conducted at the cemetery with the use of heavy equipment.   Some equipment is also stored on the property, and the introduction of raised monuments will occasion additional activity.

Comparisons with other cemeteries (ROR 32) revealed that very few are situated along side roads.   Those located in Trumbull and Easton are all located on or near state highways.

The record is devoid of any evidence, which would support a finding that use of the property as a cemetery with raised monuments, is less “objectionable” to nearby property owners, than a nine (9) lot residential subdivision.

Furthermore, in light of Nicoli, use of the property as a theoretical nine (9) lot residential subdivision is highly problematic.   A predecessor to Easton's current Planning and Zoning Commission attached a condition to subdivision approval which the applicant could not meet.   The Connecticut Supreme Court, upheld the condition.

Therefore, based upon the Nicoli decision, one, or perhaps two single-family homes may be situated on the parcel.   More than two dwellings would require subdivision approval.⁴

The Easton Planning and Zoning Commission, by adopting S. 7.2.1D, has rendered it difficult, and extremely challenging, for a special permit applicant to secure approval of a use, on a residential side street.   It has opted for this restrictive standard, presumably, in order to protect the residents and taxpayers of the Town of Easton from unwanted development.

Although the court expresses no opinion concerning the public policy embodied in this exclusionary regulation, the Town of Easton cannot be heard to complain, when it is asked to abide by and to follow the letter of its own regulation, under circumstances in which the impact of a proposed special permit will only be incurred by residents and taxpayers of a neighboring town.

In this case, the “not more objectionable” standard established by the Easton Planning and Zoning Commission, must be applied to Trumbull homeowners, on a residential side street, which is more densely developed than the Easton Zoning Regulations would permit.

The Defendant, Easton Planning and Zoning Commission, is, of course, free to amend its regulations, in order to provide for a less restrictive standard, and one more conductive to development.

This court, however, will not relax Regulation 7.2.1D, in the absence of legislative action by the Easton Planning and Zoning Commission.

Therefore, the Plaintiff's appeal must be sustained.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL

The Plaintiff maintains that his appeal should be sustained, based upon the actions of the Commission, during and subsequent to the public hearing process.

He claims that he was not permitted to review and comment upon the evidence presented, and that new evidence was accepted during the course of the October 22, 2012 hearing, in violation of an agreement of the parties.   He also argues that the Commission received evidence and information from Easton's Land Use Director, John Hayes, after the public hearing had been closed.

These claims will not avail the Plaintiff.

Although no constitutional due process right attaches to a proceeding before a municipal land use body, the conduct of a hearing must not violate the fundamentals of natural justice.  Miklus v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 154 Conn. 399, 406 (1967);  Megin v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 106 Conn.App. 602, 608 (2008).   During the course of a public hearing, no one may be denied the right to provide relevant evidence, or to cross examine witnesses produced by an adverse party.  Ward v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 153 Conn. 141, 146–47 (1965).   A party is entitled to know the facts on which the commission is asked to act, and to offer rebuttal evidence.  Grimes v. Conservation Commission, 243 Conn. 266, 274 (1997).

Information supplied by a party ex parte, may not be received by the commission, without giving an adverse party an opportunity to know of the information, and offer evidence in light of that information.  Pizzola v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 167 Conn. 202, 208 (1974).   However, a land use body may obtain and receive assistance from its professional staff.   Unless a plaintiff can demonstrate that he was prejudiced by receipt of such information, no basis for invalidating the action exists.  Hawes v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 207, 212–13 (1968).

In this case, a newly prepared map was received by the Commission on October 22, 2012.   However, the color-coded maps did not contain new information.   The maps merely showed the areas subject to the proposed Conservation easement, and confirmed information which was already in the record, or shown on other maps.   No new evidence was provided.

Furthermore, participation by Land Use Director John Hayes, in the December 17 meeting, in no way prejudiced the Plaintiff.   Hayes merely supplied the Commission with documents concerning the 1976 special permit, which were already part of the public record.   A commission may receive input from its staff and consultants, after the close of a public hearing.  Spero v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 217 Conn. 435, 444 (1991).

The process of the hearing, and post-hearing deliberations complied with standards of fundamental fairness.   The Commission's decision cannot be successfully challenged on those grounds.

Nor can the Plaintiff prevail on his claim that the Commission, in its decision, (ROR 57, p. 4–5) required the applicant to submit a revised site plan in the future.   The items to be included in the revised site plan were specifically set forth in the Commission's letter (ROR 57) of December 27, 2012.

A site plan was submitted with the application for a special permit, as required by the Easton Regulations.   The revised site plan merely takes account of conditions of approval established by the commission.   The conditions which would be imposed by the Commission could not be known in advance of the public hearing process.

CONCLUSION

The appeal of the Plaintiff, Angelo Magliocco, is SUSTAINED.

RADCLIFFE, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Section 4.3.11, Easton Zoning Regulations (ROR 64)..  FN1. Section 4.3.11, Easton Zoning Regulations (ROR 64).

FN2. Easton Zoning Regulations, Article 7, Section 7.2.1The commission may approve the application and issue a special permit provided it finds that all of the following conditions and standards have been met;A.  The proposed use will serve a community need or convenience.B. The location and scope of the use, the nature and intensity of the operations involved or conducted in connection with it, the size of the site in relation to it, are such that it will be in harmony with the appropriate and orderly development of the neighborhood in which it is located.C. The location, nature and height of all improvements, buildings, structures, walls and fences and the nature and extent of landscaping, screen plantings and exterior illumination on the site are such that the use will not hinder or discourage the appropriate use and development of adjacent land and buildings or impair the value thereof.D. Operations in connection with any such special permit use will not be more objectionable to nearby properties by reason of noise, fumes, vibrations or other characteristics than would the operation of any permitted use not requiring a special permit and will not impose an undue burden on town facilities.E. The parking area will be of sufficient size for the proposed use and shall be properly located and suitably screened with plantings walls or fences, or combination thereof, as required by the Commission and the entrance and exit drives shall be designed and located so as to minimize traffic hazards.F. Unless the facility is served by public water supply and municipal sanitary sewers, the source of water supply and sewage disposal system are sufficient for the proposed use and are approved by the Town Health Officer and any other applicable government agency.G. In cases where it is proposed to convert a building or structure originally built and designed for other purposes, it must be shown that such a building or structure is adaptable to the proposed use from the point of view of public health and safety and meets other requirements of these Regulations, as determined by the Commission..  FN2. Easton Zoning Regulations, Article 7, Section 7.2.1The commission may approve the application and issue a special permit provided it finds that all of the following conditions and standards have been met;A.  The proposed use will serve a community need or convenience.B. The location and scope of the use, the nature and intensity of the operations involved or conducted in connection with it, the size of the site in relation to it, are such that it will be in harmony with the appropriate and orderly development of the neighborhood in which it is located.C. The location, nature and height of all improvements, buildings, structures, walls and fences and the nature and extent of landscaping, screen plantings and exterior illumination on the site are such that the use will not hinder or discourage the appropriate use and development of adjacent land and buildings or impair the value thereof.D. Operations in connection with any such special permit use will not be more objectionable to nearby properties by reason of noise, fumes, vibrations or other characteristics than would the operation of any permitted use not requiring a special permit and will not impose an undue burden on town facilities.E. The parking area will be of sufficient size for the proposed use and shall be properly located and suitably screened with plantings walls or fences, or combination thereof, as required by the Commission and the entrance and exit drives shall be designed and located so as to minimize traffic hazards.F. Unless the facility is served by public water supply and municipal sanitary sewers, the source of water supply and sewage disposal system are sufficient for the proposed use and are approved by the Town Health Officer and any other applicable government agency.G. In cases where it is proposed to convert a building or structure originally built and designed for other purposes, it must be shown that such a building or structure is adaptable to the proposed use from the point of view of public health and safety and meets other requirements of these Regulations, as determined by the Commission.

FN3. Section 8–2, C.G.S.— “․ regulations ․ may provide that certain ․ uses of land are permitted only after obtaining a special permit ․ subject to standards set forth in the regulations and conditions necessary to protect the public health, safety, convenience and property values.”.  FN3. Section 8–2, C.G.S.— “․ regulations ․ may provide that certain ․ uses of land are permitted only after obtaining a special permit ․ subject to standards set forth in the regulations and conditions necessary to protect the public health, safety, convenience and property values.”

FN4. Section 8–18, C.J.S.—”subdivision” means the division of a tract or parcel of land into three or more parts or lots.”.  FN4. Section 8–18, C.J.S.—”subdivision” means the division of a tract or parcel of land into three or more parts or lots.”

Radcliffe, Dale W., J.