Amaury Villa v. FCT (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT # 118 AND # 120

ISSUE

Whether the court should grant the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the defendants' first and second special defenses as to the plaintiff's revised complaint and on the defendants' first special defense as to the intervening plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff's claims against them are barred by General Statutes § 31–284(a), the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act.

FACTS

On February 13, 2013, the plaintiff, Amaury Villa, filed a two-count complaint against the defendants, FCT Electronics, LP, and FCT Electronics Management, Inc. (collectively referred to as the “defendants”).   Thereafter, on March 4, 2013, Cornerstone Staffing Solutions (Cornerstone or intervening plaintiff) filed a motion to intervene with an intervening complaint.   As a result of a request to revise, the plaintiff filed a revised complaint on May 10, 2013, in which he alleges the following facts.   On January 12, 2012, the plaintiff was employed by Cornerstone and was working at the defendants' manufacturing facility.   On that day, while operating a pneumatic crimper on which the safety guards had been removed by the defendants, the plaintiff's hand caught inside the machine and was crushed.   As a result of this incident, the plaintiff suffered injuries and alleges that his injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendants.¹

In its intervening complaint, the intervening plaintiff Cornerstone alleges that the plaintiff's employment was within the scope of the Workers' Compensation Act and his injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment.   In addition, the intervening plaintiff alleges that it has paid benefits to the plaintiff and may be compelled to pay further sums for both compensation and medical costs.   Therefore, the intervening plaintiff claims that any damages the plaintiff recovers shall be apportioned so that it will be reimbursed for expenses already paid and for expenses that it may become obligated to pay.

On July 15, 2013, the defendants filed answers and special defenses to the revised complaint and the intervening complaint, asserting as special defenses that the causes of action contained within the revised complaint and the intervening complaint are barred by the exclusivity provision of General Statutes § 31–284(a), and that if the plaintiff sustained any injuries, the injuries were proximately caused by the plaintiff's own negligence.²  Thereafter, both the plaintiff and the intervening plaintiff replied to the special defenses, denying all allegations made therein.   On July 26, 2013, the defendants filed motions for summary judgment on the defendants' first and second special defenses as to the plaintiff's revised complaint and on the defendants' first special defense as to the intervening plaintiff's complaint, both motions asserting that the claims are barred by the exclusivity provision of § 31–284(a).³  The plaintiff and the intervening plaintiff both filed objections to the motions for summary judgment to which the defendants filed replies.   On December 13, 2013, the intervening plaintiff filed a supplement to its objection.   The matter was heard at short calendar on January 13, 2014.

DISCUSSION

“Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ․ The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried ․ However, since litigants ordinarily have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by a jury ․ the moving party for summary judgment is held to a strict standard ․ of demonstrating [its] entitlement to summary judgment.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534–35, 51 A.3d 367 (2012).   “In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact.   The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle [it] to a judgment as a matter of law ․ To satisfy [its] burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact ․ As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent ․ When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 10–11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).

“A genuine issue has been variously described as a triable, substantial or real issue of fact ․ and has been defined as one which can be maintained by substantial evidence.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  United Oil Co. v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 378, 260 A.2d 596 (1969).  “In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact ․ but rather to determine whether any such issues exist.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  RMS Residential Properties, LLC v. Miller, 303 Conn. 224, 233, 32 A.3d 307 (2011).

The defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on both the revised complaint and the intervening complaint because there is no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff's claims are barred by General Statutes § 31–284(a), the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. In moving for summary judgment on the intervening complaint, the defendants argue that because they are entitled to summary judgment on the revised complaint, they are also entitled to summary judgment on the intervening complaint because it is derivative of the plaintiff's underlying action.   Specifically, the defendants argue that the “dual employment doctrine” applies to this case so that the defendants, as well as the intervening plaintiff, were employers of the plaintiff at the time of the alleged incident and are all entitled to immunity under the Workers' Compensation Act. In support of their motions, the defendants attached as evidence an affidavit of Daniel Schreck, the president of FCT Electronics Management, Inc., and a copy of the “Employers First Report of Occupational Injury or Illness” filed pursuant to General Statutes § 31–316 by FCT Electronics, LP.

The plaintiff objects to the motion for summary judgment on the revised complaint on the grounds that (1) the intervening plaintiff was his sole employer under General Statutes § 31–292, (2) because the defendants were not the plaintiff's employers under the Workers' Compensation Act, they cannot claim immunity, and (3) Connecticut does not recognize the dual employment doctrine in the context of temporary employment.   In support of his objection, the plaintiff attached his affidavit and a copy of the Voluntary Agreement between him and the intervening plaintiff regarding workers' compensation for the alleged incident.   The intervening plaintiff objects to the motion for summary judgment on the intervening complaint by incorporating by reference the plaintiff's objection and adding that the defendants have not submitted any evidence showing that they procured workers' compensation coverage for the plaintiff, a requirement for immunity eligibility under § 31–284(a).   In support of its objection, the intervening plaintiff filed an affidavit and a list of workers' compensation benefits paid by the intervening plaintiff on behalf of the plaintiff in regard to the alleged incident.

In order to succeed on its motions for summary judgment, the defendants must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact that they qualify for workers' compensation immunity under § 31–284(a).   To do this, the defendants must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact that they were “employers” of the plaintiff as defined in General Statutes § 31–275(10) and that they have complied with the requirements of § 31–284(b).  The defendants do not dispute that the intervening plaintiff qualifies as the plaintiff's employer under § 31–275(10) and seemingly has complied with the requirements of § 31–284(b).  Therefore, in addition to the above two criteria, the defendants must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact that they, along with the intervening plaintiff, can be entitled to workers' compensation immunity under the doctrine of dual employment.

Under § 31–275(10), an “employer” is “any person, corporation, limited liability company, firm, [or] partnership ․ within the state using the services of any of one or more employees for pay ․” The Supreme Court has found that the “[r]ight to control test determines the [relationship between a worker and a putative employer] by asking whether the putative employer has the right to control the means and methods used by the worker in the performance of his or her job.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 680–81, 748 A.2d 834 (2000).   The right to control test has been described as follows:  “One is an employee of another when he renders a service for the other and when what he agrees to do, or is directed to do, is subject to the will of the other in the mode and manner in which the service is to be done and in the means to be employed in its accomplishment as well as in the result to be attained.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Hanson v. Transportation General, Inc., 45 Conn.App. 441, 443–44, 696 A.2d 1026 (1997), aff'd, 245 Conn. 613, 716 A.2d 857 (1998).   However, the Supreme Court has also held that the right to control test does not control employer liability in a situation to which General Statutes § 31–292, the lent employee statute, applies.⁴  Long v. Pennant Foods Co., LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–12–6027105–S (June 17, 2013, Wilson, J.) (56 Conn. L. Rptr. 369, 373).   In Lucarelli v. Earle C. Dodds, Inc., 121 Conn. 640, 186 A. 641 (1936), the Supreme Court stated:  “[T]he Legislature, in 1931, adopted an amendment of the [workers' compensation act] ․ [currently § 31–292, the lent employee statute] ․ The right of direction and control of the employee is no longer the test in determining the question of liability for compensation, but such liability is in all cases imposed upon an employer who has ‘temporarily lent or let on hire’ to another the services of one of his employees.”  Id., 644.

“The principle that an employee may have two simultaneous employers is called the ‘dual employment doctrine.’  “ Molnar v. Norcross, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV–10–6003123–S (December 20, 2010, Swienton, J.) (51 Conn. L. Rptr. 209, 213).  “Dual employment occurs when a single employee, under contract with two employers, and under the separate control of each performs services for the most part for each employer separately, and when the service for each employer is largely unrelated to that for the other.   In such a case, the employers may be liable for workmen's compensation separately or jointly, depending on the severability of the employee's activity at the time of injury.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Crespo v. BAGL, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV–09–5021661–S (December 15, 2009, Tobin, J.) [49 Conn. L. Rptr. 82].

“[T]he Connecticut Appellate and Supreme Courts have not made a clear-cut determination as to whether Connecticut accepts the dual-employment doctrine, and Connecticut Superior Courts disagree regarding this issue.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Long v. Pennant Foods Co., LLC, supra, 56 Conn. L. Rptr. 373.  “Connecticut does not appear to have adopted a ‘dual employee’ standard for those persons who work through a temporary employment agency.”   Moreno v. Thermospas, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV–00–0158226–S (March 13, 2001, Doherty, J.) (29 Conn. L. Rptr. 97, 98).

In the present case, the defendants arguably have sustained their burden of showing that they fall within the definition of “employer” under § 31–275(10).   However, the defendants have failed to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact that (1) they have complied with § 31–284(b), (2) the plaintiff was not a lent employee under § 31–292 to which the right to control test does not apply, and (3) Connecticut has adopted the dual employment doctrine.

First, under § 31–284(a), an employer who seeks to avail itself of the immunity offered by the Workers' Compensation Act must comply with subsection (b) of § 31–284.  General Statutes § 31–284(a) and (b) require an employer to secure compensation benefits for its employees.   The defendants have not argued or produced evidence showing that they secured any compensation benefits for the plaintiff.   Moreover, the defendants conceded during the short calendar argument that although they secured workers' compensation benefits for their other employees, they did not secure these benefits for the plaintiff.   This creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants were truly the plaintiff's employers and entitled to immunity from suit.

Second, the plaintiff has alleged that he was a lent employee under § 31–292.   Under § 31–292, the intervening plaintiff remained the plaintiff's employer while he was working for the defendants.   The defendants argue that the plaintiff was not a lent employee and attempt to distinguish the cases cited by the plaintiff.   In addition, the defendants argue that, even if the plaintiff was a lent employee, the language of § 31–292 does not preclude an additional employer.   However, this argument is insufficient for the court to conclusively determine that the plaintiff was not a lent employee or that the statute does not preclude an additional employer.   The potential status of the plaintiff as a lent employee is a question of fact for the trier of fact.   Long v. Pennant Foods Co., LLC, supra, 56 Conn. L. Rptr. 374;  Crespo v. BAGL, LLC, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV–09–5021661–S [49 Conn. L. Rptr. 82].   Therefore, the defendants have not sustained their burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact on this point.

Finally, even if the defendants had successfully shown that there was no genuine issue of material fact that they were employers of the plaintiff and satisfied the criteria in § 31–284(b), the defendants still cannot succeed on their motions for summary judgment because Connecticut has not adopted the doctrine of dual employment.   This court finds persuasive the discussion in Long v. Pennant Foods Co., supra, 56 Conn. L. Rptr. 373, in which the court stated:  “[A]lthough the defendant[s cite] several Connecticut cases in support of the right to control test and the dual employer doctrine, none of those cases reconcile § 31–292, the right to control test, and the dual employer doctrine ․ Until the Appellate Court or Supreme Court (1) reconciles § 31–292, the right to control test, and the dual employer doctrine, and also (2) adopts the right to control test or the dual employer doctrine within the context of a lent-employee statute scenario, this court concludes that § 31–292 takes precedence.”  (Footnote omitted.)

Therefore, because § 31–292 is applicable and Connecticut has not officially adopted the dual employment doctrine, the defendants have not sustained their burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact and therefore the present cause of action is barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court hereby denies the defendants' respective motions for summary judgment against both plaintiffs.

BY THE COURT,

V. ROCHE

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The plaintiff alleges that his injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendants in that (a) an agent of the defendants removed the safety mechanisms on the machine, when they knew or should have known that it was unreasonable and unsafe to do so;  (b) the defendants acted unreasonably by directing the plaintiff to operate a machine in an unsafe condition that could cause serious harm to his body, without warning the plaintiff;  (c) the defendants failed to provide the plaintiff with the proper training required to operate the machine;  (d) the defendants failed to have policies and procedures in place with regard to operating dangerous equipment and with regard to safety procedures for individuals working with dangerous machinery;  and (e) the defendants failed to properly and adequately supervise employees, agents, and representatives with regard to properly implementing safety policies and procedures..  FN1. The plaintiff alleges that his injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendants in that (a) an agent of the defendants removed the safety mechanisms on the machine, when they knew or should have known that it was unreasonable and unsafe to do so;  (b) the defendants acted unreasonably by directing the plaintiff to operate a machine in an unsafe condition that could cause serious harm to his body, without warning the plaintiff;  (c) the defendants failed to provide the plaintiff with the proper training required to operate the machine;  (d) the defendants failed to have policies and procedures in place with regard to operating dangerous equipment and with regard to safety procedures for individuals working with dangerous machinery;  and (e) the defendants failed to properly and adequately supervise employees, agents, and representatives with regard to properly implementing safety policies and procedures.

FN2. The special defense alleging that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by his own negligence is not relevant to the present motions for summary judgment, and, therefore, will not be discussed in this memorandum of decision..  FN2. The special defense alleging that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by his own negligence is not relevant to the present motions for summary judgment, and, therefore, will not be discussed in this memorandum of decision.

FN3. Because both motions for summary judgment by the defendants set forth the same arguments, both will be addressed and decided in this memorandum of decision..  FN3. Because both motions for summary judgment by the defendants set forth the same arguments, both will be addressed and decided in this memorandum of decision.

FN4. The lent employer statute, § 31–292, states:  “When the services of a worker are temporarily lent or let on hire to another person by the person with whom the worker has entered into a contract of service, the latter shall, for the purposes of this chapter, be deemed to continue to be the employer of such worker while he is so lent or hired by another.”.  FN4. The lent employer statute, § 31–292, states:  “When the services of a worker are temporarily lent or let on hire to another person by the person with whom the worker has entered into a contract of service, the latter shall, for the purposes of this chapter, be deemed to continue to be the employer of such worker while he is so lent or hired by another.”

Roche, Vincent E., J.