IN RE: Steven F.-M. (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PETITION TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS

In accordance with General Statute § 46b–124 and Practice Book § 32a–7, the names of the parties involved in this case are not to be disclosed, and the records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and only upon order of the Superior Court.

Before this court is the termination of parental rights petition filed by the petitioner, the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) in the interest of Steve F.-M. and Orion M. The termination of parental rights petition was filed on October 1, 2013.   The respondents are Mamie M. (“mother”).  Marquis H. (father of Steven F.-M.) and Russean L. and John Doe (putative fathers of Orion M.).   The respondent parents were served.   Mother was advised and appointed counsel Father Marquis H. was advised and appointed counsel.   The children were appointed counsel.   The Indian Child Welfare Act was confirmed to be not applicable.   Judgments of default were entered against putative fathers Russean L. and John Doe on October 31, 2013 for their failure to appear.   At the onset of the termination of rights trial on February 3, 2014 Mother consented to the termination of her parental rights as to Steven F.-M and Orion M., her sons.   She was represented by counsel.   She filed a written consent with the court and the court found that mother voluntarily and knowingly consented to the termination of her parental rights, having received the advice and assistance of competent legal counsel and having understood the consequences of her actions.   Her consent was accepted by the court.   The father of Steven, Marquis H., did not consent to the termination of his parental rights as to his child.

The court finds that it has proper jurisdiction and there are no pending actions affecting the custody of the minor children.

This matter was tried to the court on February 3, 2014.   The respondent father Marquis H. appeared for trial and was represented by counsel.   Steven and Orion were represented by counsel.   The court heard testimony from two DCF social workers, Dr. Logan Green and the respondent father Marquis H. Eleven exhibits were entered into evidence as full exhibits.   These included father Marquis H.'s certified criminal history, an Affidavit of the DCF social worker, a letter from Dr. Nina Livingston of the Connecticut Children's Medical Center dated September 7, 2012, Protection Order Registry, Court Memorandum of Hearing dated April 6, 2010, Report of Dr. Logan Green, father Marquis H.'s Specific Steps dated February 4, 2013,¹ Mother's Specific Steps dated September 7, 2012, Mother's Specific Steps dated February 4, 2012, DCF's Termination of Parental Rights Study dated September 30, 2013 and DCF's Supplemental Report dated January 6, 2014.   Pursuant to an oral motion by DCF, judicial notice was taken of the court's finding of paternity of father Marquis H. on December 18, 2012.   The court takes judicial notice of the entire record of the prior non-delinquency proceedings including pleadings, petitions, social studies, status reports, evaluations, court memoranda and specific steps as well as the dates and contents of the court's findings, orders, rulings and judgments.²  All counsel participated in the examination of the witnesses and closing arguments.

By way of procedural background, on September 7, 2012, DCF filed a Petition of alleged Neglect and Motion for Order of Temporary Custody regarding Steven F.-M. and Orion M. The Motion for Order of Temporary Custody was sustained by agreement on September 14, 2012 with regard to mother and without prejudice to the fathers pending their appearance in court.   A motion to cite in father Marquis H. was granted on December 18, 2012 pursuant to the confirmation of paternity of father Marquis H. of Steven F.-M. pursuant to the findings of the court-ordered DNA testing.   The Motion for Order of Temporary Custody as to Steven was sustained by agreement by father Marquis H. on April 16, 2013 and as to Orion on October 16, 2012.   Father Russean L. did not appear and was defaulted.   Final Specific steps were ordered as to mother on February 4, 2013, and father Marquis H. on April 16, 2013.   Steven F.-M. and Orion M. were adjudicated neglected on April 16, 2013 and committed to the care and custody of the Commissioner of DCF. The termination of parental rights petition was subsequently filed on October 1, 2013 as to Steven and Orion.

DCF has alleged as to father, Marquis H., the adjudicatory grounds of B1:  failure to rehabilitate pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(I);  A:  abandonment pursuant to General Statute § 17a–112(j)(3)(A) ³ and;  E:  that he is the father of a child under the age of 7 years who is neglected or uncared for, has failed, is unable or unwilling to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, that he could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and his rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families.   The petition further alleges that the DCF has made reasonable efforts to locate father Marquis H. and to reunify Steven with his father and alleges that the father, Marquis H., is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification effort.   DCF orally withdrew its allegation that reasonable efforts are not required because the court approved a permanency plan other than reunification on the date of trial.   DCF filed a Motion for Technical Correction on January 13, 2013 seeking to correct the petition to reflect Ground E as to father Marquis H. That motion was granted by the court on January 14, 2014.   DCF has alleged as to putative father, Russean L., the adjudicatory grounds of B1:  failure to rehabilitate pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(I) and ground A:  abandonment pursuant to General Statute § 17a–112(j)(3)(A).

These proceedings are governed by General Statutes § 17a–112 et seq.   In a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the petitioner must first prove by clear and convincing evidence, in the adjudicatory phase, a ground for termination as alleged in the petition, as of the date of filing the petition or the last amendment.  Practice Book § 32a–3(b) and 35a–7;  In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 163, 962 A.2d 81 (2009);  In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, 597 A.2d 842, cert. denied, 221 Conn. 901, 600 A.2d 1028 (1991).   Only one ground need be established for the granting of the petition.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984);  In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. 234, 242, 753 A.2d 409 (2000).

If a ground for termination is proven, the court must next consider the disposition stage.   Therein, the court must consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interest.  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 689, 741 A.2d 873 (1999).   As is permitted under our law, the evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases was heard at the same trial.   Practice Book § 35a–7(b).

The court has carefully considered the petition, all of the evidence and testimony presented, and the arguments of counsel, according to the standards required by law.   On the basis of the evidence presented and for the reasons stated below, the court finds in favor of the petition and hereby terminates the parental rights of the respondent father Marquis H. and the respondent fathers Russean L. and John Doe.

The court finds the following by clear and convincing evidence.

Mother

Mother was born on May 30, 1988.   Mother was abandoned by her mother in 1989 and her parental rights were terminated.   Mother has been in numerous foster homes during her childhood.   She reports being sexually assaulted in at least seven of her foster homes.   She graduated from high school and had limited attendance at community college and secretarial college.   She has no work experience.   Mother has a history of mental health issues and residential treatment.   She has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Major Depressive Disorder, Reactive Attachment Disorder and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.   Mother has a history of domestic violence with her paramours including father Marquis H. Mother has four expired protective orders with father Marquis H. Mother's oldest daughter, Sarah, was in mother's care for one week and was removed when mother presented with mental health issues.   Mother had a second daughter, Sharon, on May 28, 2009.   Mother tested positive for marijuana during that pregnancy.   On November 6, 2009, DCF filed Petition for Termination of Parental against mother as to Sarah and Sharon on the grounds of failure to rehabilitate and on the ground of abandonment as to their father, Marquis H. Both mother and father Marquis H. consented to the termination of parental rights on April 6, 2010.   Mother subsequently gave birth to Steven F.-M. on April 22, 2010 and Orion M. on March 9, 2012, both of whom are the subject of the instant Termination of Parental Rights Petition.   Mother's trauma history has impacted her ability to parent her children and she has not complied with specific steps regarding her mental health treatment and substance abuse issues and recommendations for parenting service and parent education.   As noted above, mother consented to the termination of her parental rights as to Steven F.-M. and Orion M.

Father Marquis H.

Father Marquis H. is presently 26 years of age.   His family has a history with DCF. He was in DCF's care for one year when he was eight years old.   His family has a history of 16 referrals with DCF since 1996.   He consented to the termination of his parental rights with regard to his daughters, Sarah and Sharon, on April 6, 2010 on the ground of Abandonment.   He attended high school until the 10th grade.   He obtained his Graduate Equivalency Diploma in 2007.   He has been employed in the past but not for significant periods of time.   Father Marquis H. has a significant criminal history.   He was involved with the Juvenile Court as a delinquent.   He has a criminal conviction history of three counts of Marijuana Possession, one court of Breach of Peace, one count of Assault 3rd, one count of Robbery 1st with a firearm threat, and three counts of Violation of Probation.   He has been incarcerated since January 14, 2013 for Violation of Probation.   His projected release date is December 7, 2014.   Notably, father was incarcerated at the time of Steven's commitment.   Father has a history of four expired protective orders wherein he was the perpetrator and mother was the protected party.   Father has reported that he has smoked marijuana for many years to cope with stress.   He has not participated in any substance abuse treatment since paternity of Steven was confirmed in November 2012 and pursuant to the court ordered specific steps.   Father was aware that he was Steven's father in 2011 but did not come forward to legally acknowledge his relationship with Steven.   Father Marquis H. has not been able to come forward as a placement resource for Steven due to his continued incarceration.   Of note, father has been incarcerated for all but five months of Steven's young life.   Father Marquis H. has been recommended to engage in services for domestic violence, substance abuse and parenting following his release from prison.   He is on a waiting list for services offered through the Department of Corrections.   Father attended a court-ordered evaluation with Dr. Logan Green, a forensic psychologist on June 11, 2013 and July 23, 2013.   Dr. Green opined that father requires psychotherapy via group therapy to address his emotional and low self-esteem issues.   He diagnosed father with other Specified Personality Disorder with Mixed Cluster Types.   He stated that father will not be in a position to care for Steven's physical, cognitive, and social/emotional needs within a reasonable period of time due to his incarceration.   Further, he noted that upon his release from prison, father will require housing and a legal income prior to being able to attend to Steven's needs as a full-time parent, and that he would take twelve months to begin to develop skills to live socially and interpersonally.   Even assuming father made sufficient progress at the time of his release from prison, Dr. Green indicated that it would be approximately four to six months after release from prison before reunification could occur.   Dr. Green found that Steven is not psychologically attached to his father.

Father Russean L.

Father Russean L. is the alleged father of Orion.   He is a convicted felon with criminal convictions of Robbery 2nd, Larceny 2 and two convictions of Risk of Injury and Probation Violation.   He has not come forward and his present whereabouts remain unknown.

Children Steven F.-M. and Orion M.

Steven F.-M. was born on April 22, 2010.   He is presently 3 years of age.   Mother disclosed that Steven F. was the biological father.   As noted above, father Marquis H. was subsequently found to be his father pursuant to a court-ordered paternity test.

Steven came into DCF's care on September 4, 2012 after falling from the third floor of his apartment He sustained a skull fracture with cranial bleeding and was hospitalized at Connecticut Children's Medical Center Intensive Care Unit. He was subsequently released to a medically fragile home.   He received follow up care at Connecticut Children's Medical Center and was medically cleared.   He has been reported to present with aggressive behaviors with hitting and throwing toys since that time.   Due to concerns about Steve's development and possible symptoms of Traumatic Brain Injury, he was referred to Connecticut Children's Medical Center Developmental Pediatric Department for an assessment evaluation.   In March 2013, his foster parents requested Steven and Orion's removal from the home due to behavioral problems with their biological son.   Steven and Orion were placed in a foster home in May 2013 who wished to be a permanent placement resource if reunification with their parents did not occur.   Unfortunately, the foster mother's foster care license was denied on December 20, 2013.   Steven and Orion were then placed in the same foster home of their younger brother, Timothy M. on December 20, 2013.   The placement in the current foster home has gone very smoothly.   Both Steven and Orion have adjusted well to the new placement and seem happy in the home.   Steven's developmental delays in speech and language have diminished and he has made significant progress since being placed in his new foster home.   His pediatrician felt he might have some signs of Autism and a referral was made to the Connecticut Children's Medical Center for further assessment.   He receives special education services in his pre-school program for speech and language where he has been doing well.   All of Steven's and Orion's education, medical and emotional needs are being met.   Foster mother did seek additional support with regard to some of his behaviors and she seeks to further educate herself with regard to both of the boys' needs.   Foster mother has indicated that she is agreeable to Steven having contact with his father.

Steven continues to have monthly supervised visitation with father at prison.   Several visits were missed due to scheduling errors but these visits will be made up.

Dr. Green noted that Steven is blossoming in his foster home and is developing a strong bond with his foster family.   He also opined that it would be emotionally very damaging to Steven if he was removed from his foster home.

Orion was born on March 9, 2012 and is presently one year old.   Mother disclosed putative father Russean L. as his father.   Orion was originally diagnosed with Failure to Thrive but made progress once he was placed on a feeding schedule.   He has done well and is walking.   He is happy and content.   He is very alert and attentive to his surroundings.   He has adjusted well to his present foster placement as discussed above.   He has bonded with his foster mother who is sensitive to Orion's needs.   She has met all of Orion's emotional and medical needs.   Orion engaged in Birth to Three Services to address the delay in his fine motor skills and he has continued to make steady progress.

Foster mother is committed to Steven and Orion and wishes to adopt them if they become legally free to do so.

III. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PETITION

A. Reasonable Efforts

As to fathers Marquis H. and Russean L., DCF has alleged that it made reasonable efforts to locate fathers and to reunify and that in the alternative, fathers are unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reunification services.

In order to terminate parental rights, unless the court grants the petition due to the consent of the respondent parent, DCF must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that it made “reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1).  “[The] court need not make that finding, however, if the evidence establishes that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Shaiesha O., 93 Conn.App. 42, 47, 887 A.2d 415 (2005).   See also In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 550–53, 979 A.2d 469 (2009).   Moreover, “such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to [§ ]17a–111b, or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1).   See also In re Jaiden S., 120 Conn.App. 795, 993 A.2d 1017 (2010).

“The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Shaiesha O., supra, 93 Conn.App. 48.   Although “[n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is ․ defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn ․ [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Ryan R., 102 Conn.App. 608, 619, 926 A.2d 690, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 923, 924, 933 A.2d 724 (2007);  In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000).   The court must look to events that occurred prior to the date the petition was filed, to determine whether reasonable efforts at reunification were made.  In re Shaiesha O., supra, 93 Conn.App. 47.

This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that as of October 1, 2013, DCF made reasonable efforts to locate fathers.   Both fathers were duly served with notice of the temporary custody notice and the neglect petition and termination petitions in accordance with the law.   As noted above, father Marquis H. was present in court and advised of his rights.   Both putative fathers, Russean L. and John Doe, did not appear and were subsequently defaulted

This court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that by October 1, 2013, when DCF filed the termination of parental rights petition, the fathers were unable and unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.   The evidence is undisputed that Steven and Orion were adjudicated neglected on April 16, 2013 and committed to the custody of DCF. Further, during the entire period prior to the adjudicatory date, father Marquis H. did not or was unable to address his outstanding issues.   Due to father Marquis H.'s ongoing involvement with the criminal justice system and his ongoing incarceration, as well as his lack of employment and housing, he cannot parent Steven.   Further, he is anticipated to remain incarcerated until December 2014.   His incarceration further hinders his already quite lacking ability to engage in reunification efforts.  “Although incarceration alone is not a sufficient basis to terminate parental rights, incarceration, nonetheless, may prove an obstacle to reunification due to the parent's unavailability ․” In re Katia M., 124 Conn.App. 650, 661 (2010).   This court concludes, therefore, that as of the adjudicatory date of October 1, 2013, DCF has met its burden as to this ground by clear and convincing evidence.   DCF clearly and convincingly made reasonable efforts to reunify Steven with father to the extent possible, given his lack of compliance with his specific steps and continued criminal behavior.   Accordingly, DCF has proven that it made reasonable efforts to locate and reunify father with Steven and that, in the alternative, father was both unable and unwilling to benefit from reunification services as of the adjudicatory date.

Putative fathers of Orion, Russean L. and John Doe have not come forward to engage in services and therefore, they are unable or unwilling to engage in reunification services.   Accordingly, DCF has proven it made reasonable efforts to locate putative fathers and to reunify them with Orion, and that in the alternative they are unable and unwilling to benefit from reunification services.

B. Adjudicatory Grounds of the Termination of Parent Rights Petition

1. Failure to Rehabilitate

General Statutes § 17a–112(j) provides in relevant part, that the court may grant a petition for termination of parental rights “if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (B) the child ․ has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding ․ and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child ․” “Personal rehabilitation, as used in the statute refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ․ [Section 17a–112] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Jordon T., 119 Conn.App. 748 (2010), citing In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706 (1999).   Moreover, “[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time.   In assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved his or her ability to manage his or her life, but rather whether the parent has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.”   In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. 157, 180, 743 A.2d 165 (1999).

In light of the statutory elements of this ground, as well as the case law interpreting it, this court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has met its burden as to Steven and Orion.   As noted in this court's findings of fact, Steven was adjudicated neglected on April 16, 2013.   With regard to Marquis H., he has failed to engage in services due to his incarceration.   The evidence clearly and convincingly supports the court's finding that both fathers, as of the date of the filing of the termination of parental rights petition, have not achieved a reasonable degree of rehabilitation.   There is no evidence of conduct on the part of father Marquis H., subsequent to the date of the filing of the petition, that would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of Steven, he could assume a responsible position as his parent.   DCF made reasonable and ongoing efforts to engage father in services and visitation with Steven.   Father was unable to engage in services due to his consistent incarceration.   Further, as also noted above, he will remain incarcerated until December 2014.   As noted above, father failed to comply with his court ordered Specific Steps.   A parent's compliance with Specific Steps set during the pendency of a neglect case is a relevant and important consideration in reaching a rehabilitation finding.  In re Luis C., supra, 210 Conn. 167–68;  In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. 167, 179 (1999).   The court does not find father Marquis H.'s testimony credible that he wishes to parent his son.   In addition to the other evidence submitted, and based on father's continuing involvement in the criminal justice system, this court concludes that father has no interest in parenting Steven.   He has put his own interests before those of Steven's and he continues to do so at the present time.   While father has expressed having a desire to care for Steven, it is much too little much too late.   He is not anywhere close to establishing an ability to care for himself let alone Steven.   The evidence reveals that he will need many months of services once he is released from incarceration before reunification with Steven could even be contemplated.   Steven cannot wait any longer for permanency in his life.   Father has been a cipher in Steven's life directly as the result of his own choices.   Steven has had little contact with his father and is not psychologically attached to him.   Any further delay of permanency to allow for parental rehabilitation will only prolong Steven's almost two and a half years lack of permanency.   He requires a patient, sober, reliable and informed caretaker which he has with his foster parent.   There is no satisfactory evidence presented to the court that father could ever meet the level of parenting and attentiveness that Steven's needs require.

The court, therefore, finds by clear and convincing evidence that as of the adjudicatory date, father Marquis H. had not achieved a status where he was more able to capably parent Steven than at the time of the initiation of the neglect petition.   Furthermore it is quite clear that there is no evidence to conclude that rehabilitation by father into the role of a constructive parent for Steven could be achieved by him within a reasonable period of time especially in light of his current incarceration and lack of participation in his court ordered services.   These facts overwhelmingly support DCFs claims that father cannot rehabilitate within a reasonable period of time, given the age and needs of Steven.   Accordingly, father's failure to rehabilitate, pursuant to § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(I) has been established by clear and convincing evidence.

With regard to putative fathers Russean L. and John Doe, neither has presented himself to the court nor have they availed themselves of services.   Therefore, the court finds that the putative fathers' failure to rehabilitate has been established by clear and convincing evidence.

2. Abandonment

In addressing this ground, the court determines whether the proof provides that abandonment existed as of the adjudicatory date.   The court, in determining whether or not abandonment has occurred, is limited to events preceding the date of the time of the filing of the petition.  In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230 (2000).

“A parent abandons a child if the parents has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child ․ Abandonment focuses on the parent's conduct ․ Abandonment occurs when a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the chills welfare ․ Section 17a–112[ (j)(3)(A) ] does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of the child.   A parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child.   Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern.”  (Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted).  In re Ilyssa G., 105 ConnApp. 41 (2007) cert. denied, 285 Conn 918 (2008).  “The commonly understood obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes:  (1) express love and affection for the child;  (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child;  (3) the duty to supply necessary food, clothing and medical care;  (4) the duty to provide adequate domicile;  and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance.”  (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Jaime S., 120 Conn.App. 712, 732 (2010);  In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 53 (1998);  In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 17–18 (1993).   Indicia of interest, concern and responsibility includes “attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the send of cards and gifts and financial support.”  In re Drew R., 47 Conn.App. 124, 129 (1997).

The court finds that putative fathers have abandoned Orion by clear and convincing evidence with the meaning of 17a–112[ (j)(3)(A) ].   Neither putative father has come forward to claim paternity of Orion nor to engage in services.   Neither putative father has ever visited Orion.   They never contacted DCF to inquire as to his welfare.   They provided no financial, emotional or physical support to him.   They have never met him.   They have not met with DCF, have failed to participate in administrative case reviews and has failed to engage in any services as recommended by DCF pursuant to his court ordered Specific Steps.   They have sent no cards, gifts or letters to Orion nor have they acknowledge his birthday or other special days.   He has no relationship with them whatsoever.   He is a complete stranger to them.

Therefore, the putative fathers of Orion have clearly failed to demonstrate any reasonable degree of care, interest, concern or responsibility for Orion and, therefore, they have abandoned him within the meaning of 17a–112[ (j) (3)(A).   See In re Ashley C., 62 Conn.App. 305, 314–15 (2001).   To allow these fathers, who has completely abandoned Orion, further time to establish a relationship with Orion would be detrimental to his best interest in permanency.

3. Ground E:  C.GS. § 17a–112(j)(3)(E)

The third statutory ground alleged in the petition against the respondent father Marquis H. alleges that he is the parent of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected and uncared for or that he has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, that he could assume a responsible position in the life of the child, and the parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the commissioner of children and families.  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(E).  “Personal rehabilitation refers to the restoration of the [parent] to [his] former constructive and useful role as [a parent] ․ [and] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time ․ The statute does not require the parent to prove precisely when [he] will be able to resume a responsible position in [his] child's life.   Nor does it require [him] to prove that [he] will be able to assume full responsibility for [his] child, unaided by available support systems.   It requires the court to find by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [he] has achieved, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [he] can assume a responsible position in [his] child's life.”  (Citations omitted;  emphasis in original;  internal quotations marks omitted.)  In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 628, 847 A.2d 883 (2004).

The ultimate question is whether the father at the time of the filing of the termination petition is more able to assume the responsibilities of a parent than he was at the time of the making of the commitment.  In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112 (1992).   In making this determination, the court may properly rely on events occurring after the date of the petition when considering whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time.  In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230 (2000).

In light of the statutory elements of this ground, as well as the case law interpreting it, this court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has met its burden as to father Marquis H. for the reasons as detailed above.   The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has met its burden of proving that father is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.   He has failed to achieve the necessary degree of rehabilitation.   The court finds that Steven F.-M. was born on April 22, 2010 and is, therefore, less than seven years old.   Steven was adjudicated neglected on April 16, 2013.   Father Marquis H.'s presenting problems were his continued involvement with the criminal justice system and ongoing incarceration, his unaddressed mental health and substance abuse issues and his history of domestic violence with mother.   Father Marquis H. continues to be involved in the criminal justice system and will remain incarcerated until at least the end of December 2014.   Father's extensive criminal history and his ongoing involvement with the criminal justice system clearly demonstrate his failure to rehabilitate and his inability to do so.   Further, father is unable to assume a responsible position in Steven's life within a reasonable period of time, considering Steven's age and needs.   Father has two prior judgments of termination of parental rights with regard to his daughters Sarah and Sharon that was entered on April 6, 2010.   Accordingly, the court finds that as of the date of the filing of the petition, by clear and convincing evidence, that Marquis H. is the biological father of Steven F.-M., who is under the age of seven years and who is neglected, and that father has failed, or is unable or unwilling to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of Steven, that father could achieve a responsible position in Steven's life, and the father's parental rights to another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by DCF.

DISPOSITION

In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, “the emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of the child.”  In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345, 356–57 (1994).   During this dispositional phase, “the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent's parental rights is not in the best interest of the child.   In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in § 17a–112[k].”  In re Tabitha P., 39 Conn.App. 353, 361–62 (1995).   We note that those “seven factors serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered ․ There is no requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”   (Citation omitted.)  In re Victoria B., 79 Conn.App. 245, 261 (2003).

No findings need be made for the consenting mother Mamie M.

The seven statutory findings, which have been established by clear and convincing evidence, are as follows:

1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.

Appropriate and timely services for substance abuse, parenting and domestic violence were offered to the fathers by DCF. Father Marquis H. made aware of the court's expectations and was offered services to assist him in meeting those expectations.   Due to father Marquis's incarcerations, he was not available for the delivery of these services.   The services were appropriate and made available to the fathers.   Putative fathers Russean L. and John Doe did not make themselves available to engage in the services.

2. Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

Reasonable efforts to reunify Steven and Orion with their parents were made by DCF pursuant to the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980.   Father Marquis H. has been offered substance abuse testing, evaluation and treatment, intensive outpatient treatment at the Alcohol and Drug Recovery Center.   He received supervised visitation, transportation and case management through Reconnecting Families.   The CT Works Program provided him with job training skills, employment listing and employment application assistance.   Children First provided him with supervised visitation and parenting education.   The Department of Adult Probation provided him with substance abuse testing and community supervision.   The Department of Corrections provided him with housing and food.   Father Marquis H. failed to comply with these order to facilitate reunification with Steven and willingly engaged in criminal activities resulting in his incarceration.   Putative fathers Russean L. and John Doe did not come forward to participate in the court proceedings.

3. The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order.

Fathers Marquis H. and Russean L. have failed to fulfill their obligations pursuant to the court ordered specific steps.   Father Marquis H. has been offered substance abuse testing, evaluation and treatment, intensive outpatient treatment at the Alcohol and Drug Recovery Center.   He received supervised visitation, transportation and case management through Reconnecting Families.   The CT Works Program provided him with job training skills, employment listings and employment application assistance.   Children First provided him with supervised visitation and parenting education The Department of Adult Probation provided him with substance abuse testing and community supervision The Department of Corrections provided him with housing and food.   Father Marquis H. remains involved in the criminal justice system and is currently incarcerated.   He has not maintained adequate housing nor is he currently employed due to his incarceration.   He has gained no insight whatsoever into his issues and their impact on his parenting skills.   Putative fathers Russean L. and John Doe have not come forward to participate in the court proceedings and avail themselves of the offered services.

4. The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person, and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.

Steven has been observed to have no psychological relationship with father Marquis H. Steven has a strong relationship with his foster mother since his placement with her in December 2013.   All of his needs are being met.   He has made remarkable progress since being placed with this family.   He is happy and well-adjusted.   Steven seeks comfort and attention from them.   He recognizes them and appears happy and comfortable in the household.   His foster mother has expressed a desire to adopt him.   Orion has no relationship with putative fathers whom he has never met.   His foster family is meeting all of his needs.   He is happy and comfortable with them.

5. The age of the children.

Steven is almost four years of age.   He was born on April 22, 2010.

Orion is almost two years of age.   He was born on March 9, 2012.

6. The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child.

Father Marquis H. has made insufficient efforts to adjust his circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in Steven's best interest to return to father's home in the foreseeable future.   Notably, father does not have a home due to his incarceration nor is he employed.   Further, father has a history of transience.   Steven has had visitation with father Marquis H. during his incarceration.   Putative fathers Russean L. and John Doe have not come forward to be offered services and visitation.

7. The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.

No unreasonable act or conduct of any person or the other parent has prevented the fathers from a meaningful relationship with their children.   DCF has encouraged father Marquis H. to maintain a meaningful relationship with Steven.   The economic circumstances of father have not prevented him from having a relationship or visits with Steven.   There has been no claim that father was unable to obtain services due to lack of financial resources.   Legal counsel was appointed for him at no cost to him.

BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN

The court must now address the issue of whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the children.   The court finds that termination of the respondent father Marquis H.'s parental rights is in the best interest of Steven.   The court further finds that termination of the putative fathers' parental rights, Russean L. and John Doe, is in the best interest of Orion.   It is abundantly clear that each of these fathers are in no better position today to provide for their children than they were at the time of their removal in September 2012.   The problems that led to the removal have not been rectified and the prospects of improvement, particularly with regard to the father Marquis H.'s ongoing involvement with the criminal justice system, are bleak.   The putative fathers have not come forward since the inception of the case.   This conclusion is supported by the testimony of the social workers as well as the information contained in the exhibits presented at the time of trial.

In addition to the above the court has considered multiple relevant factors including Steven and Orion's interest in sustained growth, development, wellbeing, stability, continuity of their environment, the length of stay in their foster home as well as the nature of their relationship with their foster parents.   Steven has an almost non-existent relationship with Marquis H. due to his incarcerations.   Orion has no relationship whatsoever with the putative fathers.   The court has balanced Steven's and Orion's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with their fathers.

Steven and Orion have been in the care and custody of DCF since September 2012.   They are healthy, active, happy children.   Their needs are those of all children.   Their fathers are not able to provide a home for them nor will they be able to do so within a reasonable period of time considering the children's age and needs.   In light of father Russean L.'s complete lack of contact with Orion since his birth and his abandonment of him, Orion should not have to wait any longer for permanency in his life.   Further, in light of father Marquis H.'s continued involvement in the criminal justice system and his ongoing incarcerations, Steven should not have to wait any longer for permanency in his life.   To allow that lack of permanency to continue any longer is clearly inconsistent with his best interests.   Father Marquis H. will continue to need substantial help to maintain himself once he is released from incarceration, with no reasonable prospect for success in the foreseeable future.   To expose Steven to the same degree of uncertainty is not in his best interests.   Steven and Orion's attorney advocates for termination of their fathers' parental rights and as being in their best interest.   The court agrees.   In deciding the issue of best interest in this case, the court has considered the adjudicatory and dispositional evidence in its entirety, and has concluded that there is no other credible and realistic plan achievable within a reasonable time to secure and protect Steven and Orion's best interests other than a termination of the fathers' parental rights.

Accordingly, based upon the foregoing findings, and having considered the exhibits, testimony, judicially noticed items and arguments of counsel, the court concludes that DCF has proven by clear and convincing evidence that it is in Steven's and Orion's best interests to terminate the parental rights of father Marquis H. and putative fathers Russean L. and John Doe so that they may be free for adoption.

It is accordingly ORDERED that the parental right of Marquis H. are hereby TERMINATED as to Steven F.-M. and the parental rights of Russean L. and John Doe are hereby terminated as to Orion M.

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, based upon the foregoing findings and having considered all of the evidence, after due consideration of the children's need for a secure, permanent placement, the totality of the circumstances, and having considered all statutory criteria, and having found by clear and convincing evidence that efforts at reunification with fathers were made and that fathers were and continue to be unable or unwilling to benefit from those efforts, and that further efforts are no longer required, that grounds exist to terminate fathers' parental rights as alleged, and that it is in the children's best interest to do so, it is accordingly ordered:

That the parental rights of the respondent father, Marquis H., are hereby terminated as to his child, Steven F.-M., born April 22, 2010;

That the parental rights of the putative respondent fathers, Russean L. and John Doe, are hereby terminated as to Orion M., born on March 9, 2012;

That the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is appointed statutory parent of the children for the purpose of securing the children's adoption as expeditiously as possible, with first consideration to be given to the current foster parent;

That a written report of the plan for the children shall be submitted to the court within thirty days and such further reports shall be timely filed and presented to the court as required by law;

That should DCF file adoption petitions in the Probate Court, the Clerk of the Probate Court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of the child shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford of the date when said adoption is finalized, as shall the petitioner.

Judgment shall enter accordingly.

BY THE COURT

BURGDORFF, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Father's specific steps included the following:  cooperate and keep appointments with DCF and keep the department informed of his address;  undergo individual and parenting counseling and cooperate with recommendations regarding assessment and treatment;  submit to substance abuse evaluation, treatment and random drug testing;  refrain from drug and alcohol use, and involvement with the criminal justice system;  cooperate with restraining, protective order or other appropriate safety plan approved by DCF and avoid more domestic violence incidents;  cooperate with court ordered evaluations and testing;  accept in-home support services referred by DCF and cooperate with them;  sign releases to enable DCF to communicate with service providers;  get and maintain adequate housing and income;  visit child as often as DCF permits;  and inform DCF of any person who the parent would like DCF to consider as a placement for the child.   The goals specified for father were to “model safe behavior as a parent, remain sober, learn and demonstrate appropriate anger management skills, co-operate with service providers recommended specifically wheeler clinic, Catholic Charities and Nova Program following release from jail.”.  FN1. Father's specific steps included the following:  cooperate and keep appointments with DCF and keep the department informed of his address;  undergo individual and parenting counseling and cooperate with recommendations regarding assessment and treatment;  submit to substance abuse evaluation, treatment and random drug testing;  refrain from drug and alcohol use, and involvement with the criminal justice system;  cooperate with restraining, protective order or other appropriate safety plan approved by DCF and avoid more domestic violence incidents;  cooperate with court ordered evaluations and testing;  accept in-home support services referred by DCF and cooperate with them;  sign releases to enable DCF to communicate with service providers;  get and maintain adequate housing and income;  visit child as often as DCF permits;  and inform DCF of any person who the parent would like DCF to consider as a placement for the child.   The goals specified for father were to “model safe behavior as a parent, remain sober, learn and demonstrate appropriate anger management skills, co-operate with service providers recommended specifically wheeler clinic, Catholic Charities and Nova Program following release from jail.”

FN2. The trial court may take judicial notice of relevant court actions.   In re Amanda A., 58 Conn.App. 451, 452–53 (2000)..  FN2. The trial court may take judicial notice of relevant court actions.   In re Amanda A., 58 Conn.App. 451, 452–53 (2000).

FN3. With regard to the ground of Abandonment, DGF has not met its burden of proof in that it failed to present sufficient evidence to support that claim by clear and convincing evidence.   Specifically, the social study in support of the termination of parental rights petition fails to address the ground of Abandonment as to father Marquis H. The court, therefore, dismisses the claim on the ground of Abandonment as to Marquis H..  FN3. With regard to the ground of Abandonment, DGF has not met its burden of proof in that it failed to present sufficient evidence to support that claim by clear and convincing evidence.   Specifically, the social study in support of the termination of parental rights petition fails to address the ground of Abandonment as to father Marquis H. The court, therefore, dismisses the claim on the ground of Abandonment as to Marquis H.

Burgdorff, Mary–Margaret D., J.