IN RE: Bailey G. (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On November 7, 2012, the commissioner of the department of children and families (the department or DCF) filed a petition pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112 to terminate the parental rights of the respondent mother Stacey B.¹ and the respondent father Michael G. with respect to the minor child Bailey G., born on July 31, 2010.   For the reasons set forth below, the court finds in favor of the petitioner and terminates the parental rights of Stacey B. and Michael G. with respect to Bailey.

I

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 29, 2011, Bailey was taken into the care of the department on an administrative ninety-six-hour hold and placed with her paternal grandmother, Kathy J. The department filed a motion for an order of temporary custody and a neglect petition with respect to Bailey on November 2, 2011.   The court (Sommer, J.) granted the order of temporary custody the same day.

Michael G. appeared on November 9, 2011 for the preliminary hearing on the order of temporary custody.   He was advised of his rights, and he entered a pro forma denial.   The court (Sommer, J.) also ordered preliminary specific steps for Michael G. at that time.   Stacey B. was not present because she was incarcerated.   The court (Sommer, J.) ordered that the order of temporary custody would remain in effect until further order of the court.

Stacey B. appeared on December 14, 2011.   She was advised of her rights, and she entered a pro forma denial.   On January 18, 2012, the court (Sommer, J.) ordered preliminary specific steps for Stacey B.

On January 13, 2012, the department moved for a psychological evaluation of Stacey B. and an interactional evaluation of Bailey with Stacey B. The court (Sommer, J.) granted the department's motion on January 25, 2012.

Bailey's maternal grandmother, Lynn B., sought to intervene in the neglect proceeding.   On January 18, 2012, the court (Sommer, J.) ordered that Lynn B. would have monthly supervised visits with Bailey, overruling the objections of Stacey B. and Michael G., and marked the motion to intervene “off.”

On March 26, 2012, Stacey B. and Michael G. entered written pleas of nolo contendere to the neglect petition.   Bailey was adjudicated neglected and committed to the department until further order of the court (Sommer, J.).   The court also ordered final specific steps for Stacey B. and Michael G. at that time.

Stacey B. filed an administrative appeal on May 14, 2012 from a decision of the department's hearing officer denying Stacey B.'s request that she and Michael G. have a third weekly joint visit with Bailey, in addition to their two separate supervised visits each week.   Stacey B. withdrew the administrative appeal on June 28, 2012.

The department filed a motion for review and approval of its permanency plan for Bailey on July 23, 2012.   The proposed permanency plan was termination of parental rights and adoption.

On September 4, 2012, Stacey B. filed a motion regarding visitation with Bailey.   The department objected, and the court heard argument on September 19, 2012.

On September 5, 2012, the court approved the permanency plan without prejudice to Stacey B. and Michael B. The respondent parents' motion in opposition to the permanency plan was consolidated for trial with the termination of parental rights petition.

On November 7, 2012, the department filed a petition for termination of the parental rights of Stacey B. and Michael G. with respect to Bailey.   The respondent parents appeared on December 19, 2012.   They were advised of their rights, and they entered pro forma denials to the termination of parental rights petition.

Stacey B. moved for a continuance of the termination of parental rights hearing on February 25, 2013.   The department objected to the continuance.   The motion for continuance was granted on March 13, 2013, and the department withdrew its objection.

On March 12, 2013, Stacey B. filed a motion to modify the disposition from commitment to a subsidized transfer of guardianship of Bailey to her paternal grandmother, Kathy J. The motion to modify the disposition was consolidated for trial with the termination of parental rights petition.

The department filed a motion for review and approval of its permanency plan for Bailey on May 21, 2013.   The proposed permanency plan was termination of parental rights and adoption.

On June 25, 2013, Stacey B. filed a motion in opposition to the department's motion for review and approval of the permanency plan.   Stacey B. objected to the proposed permanency plan.

The court approved the permanency plan on July 3, 2013, without prejudice to Stacey B. Her objection to the permanency plan was consolidated for trial with the termination of parental rights petition.

The hearing on the department's petition to terminate the parental rights of Stacey B. and Michael G. commenced on July 10, 2013.   Michael G. appeared by videoconference and consented to the termination of his parental rights.   His attorney submitted Michael G.'s “Affidavit/Consent to Termination of Parental Rights,” Form JD–JM–60, signed on July 3, 2013.   Michael G.'s consent was conditioned upon the execution of an open adoption agreement and the termination of Stacey B.'s parental rights.   The court fully canvassed Michael G. and accepted his consent, subject to satisfaction of the two conditions.   The department moved to amend the grounds set forth in the petition with respect to terminating Michael G.'s parental rights to provide that the termination was based upon his consent.

The department filed a motion for emergency relief to suspend Stacey B.'s visitation with Bailey on July 19, 2013, because Stacey B. was incarcerated in New York at that time.   The court granted the motion on July 31, 2013.

On July 22, 2013, Stacey B. filed an administrative appeal from a decision of the department's hearing officer denying her request to increase the visitation between Bailey and Bailey's maternal grandmother, Lynn B.

On August 14, 2013, the department moved to amend the petition by adding acts of parental commission or omission (Ground C), General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(c), as an additional ground for termination of Stacey B.'s parental rights.   On August 25, 2013, Stacey B. objected to the proposed amendment.   Stacey B. also moved to strike the additional ground from the petition, if the court granted the motion to amend.   The department objected to the motion to strike on August 27, 2013.

The hearing resumed on August 30, 2013.   The court granted the department's motion to amend the petition and denied Stacey B.'s motion to strike.   The court ordered that the adjudicatory date be changed to August 30, 2013.

On September 25, 2013, Stacey B. moved to reargue the motion to strike.   The motion for reargument was denied, and the hearing proceeded on that date.

The hearing continued on September 27, 2013.   Counsel for Bailey advised the court that the open adoption agreement had been fully executed, thus satisfying one of the two conditions to Michael G.'s consent to the termination of his parental rights.

The hearing concluded on October 10, 2013.   On October 10, 2013, Stacey B. moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the department had failed to present a prima facie case.   The motion to dismiss was denied.

The court heard oral argument on Stacey B.'s July 22, 2013 administrative appeal on November 12, 2013.   The court reserved decision at that time.²

On December 26, 2013, Stacey B. moved to reopen the evidence to introduce documents relating to events that occurred after the conclusion of the hearing on October 10, 2013.   The department objected to the motion on January 3, 2014.   The court heard oral argument and granted the motion on January 30, 2014.   The additional documents offered by Stacey B. were admitted into evidence on that date.

II

FINDINGS OF FACT

The respondent mother Stacey B. appeared and was represented by counsel each day of the termination of parental rights hearing.³  The respondent father Michael G. appeared by videoconference on July 10, 2013, the first day of the hearing, to consent to the termination of his parental rights.   Michael G. did not appear thereafter.   The minor child Bailey was represented by counsel.   The department was represented by an assistant attorney general.

Neither the respondent mother nor the respondent father has claimed to have Native American tribal affiliation.   The court is not aware of any proceedings pending in any other court regarding the custody of the minor child.   The court has jurisdiction.

The court heard testimony from Deborah Gurney, addiction counselor, Midwestern Connecticut Council on Alcoholism (MCCA);  Lisa Fox, case manager at Danbury Alternatives to Incarceration (AIC);  Kristin Muller, correctional counselor, Connecticut Department of Corrections (DOC);  Detective Steven Cohan, New York City Police Department;  Detective Denis O'Keefe, New York City Police Department;  Megan Duffy–Knight, DCF social worker;  Robert Gerard, counselor, Connecticut Counseling Center (CCC);  Detective James Lalli, Danbury Police Department;  Kathy J., Michael G.'s mother and Bailey's paternal grandmother;  Lynn B., Stacey B.'s mother and Bailey's maternal grandmother;  and the respondent mother Stacey B.

The court reviewed the documents that were entered into evidence and, as requested by the department, took judicial notice of the following:  on November 2, 2011, the court (Sommer, J.) granted the department's motion for an order of temporary custody;  the court (Sommer, J.) ordered preliminary specific steps for Stacey B. on January 18, 2012;  on March 26, 2012, the court (Sommer, J.) adjudicated Bailey neglected and committed her to the care and custody of the department;  the court (Sommer, J.) ordered final specific steps for Stacey B. and Michael G. on March 26, 2012;  and on September 5, 2012, the court approved the permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption, without prejudice.   Upon the request of counsel for Stacey B., the court also took judicial notice of the following:  the administrative appeal filed by Stacey B. on May 14, 2012 from a decision of the department's hearing officer denying Stacey B.'s request that she and Michael G. have a third weekly joint visit with Bailey, in addition to their two separate supervised visits each week;  the motion filed by Stacey B. on September 4, 2012 regarding visitation with Bailey;  and the administrative appeal filed by Stacey B. on July 22, 2013 from a decision of the department's hearing officer denying Stacey B.'s request to increase the visitation between Bailey and her maternal grandmother, Lynn B.⁴

After considering all of the testimony and documentary evidence presented and judicially noticed, and having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses, the court finds that the following facts were proven by clear and convincing evidence, unless otherwise specified.

As a preliminary matter, the court notes that October 29, 2011 was not the first time that Bailey and her parents came to the attention of the department.   The department began working with them in September 2010, after the department received a report concerning substance abuse and specifically, that Michael G. had relapsed.⁵  The department substantiated allegations of physical neglect of Bailey against both Stacey B. and Michael G. at that time.   Bailey was removed from the home temporarily and placed with her paternal grandmother Kathy J. The department began to provide services and referrals to the respondent parents, and Bailey was eventually returned to Stacey B. and Michael G.⁶

The respondent mother Stacey B.

Stacey B. was born on April 24, 1984 in Stamford, Connecticut, to Lynn and Geoffrey B. Her parents were divorced when she was approximately eight years old.   Stacey B. and her sister, Arielle, who is two years younger than Stacey B., were raised by their mother, Lynn B., in Ridgefield, Connecticut.

Stacey B. attended the Ridgefield public schools.   She graduated from high school and attended some college courses at Western Connecticut State University and Norwalk Community College.

Stacey B. was unemployed when the order of temporary custody was issued on November 2, 2011.   She had previously worked in retail at Old Navy and Journeys.   She was employed at Denny's for approximately three years.   She was a night manager when she left Denny's.   She was also a manager at Journeys until May 2011, when she was fired.   Stacey B. collected unemployment compensation after she was terminated from her position at Journeys.   She also sold heroin to earn money and support her own habit.

Stacey B. was residing with Michael G. in a condominium in Danbury when they were arrested on October 28, 2011.   In November 2011, she told her counselor at AIC that she was on the verge of being homeless, and that she was staying with friends—”couch surfing”—at the time.   The department reported that when Stacey B. was incarcerated, she was about to be evicted.

Stacey B. has a history of violent relationships with men.   The department reported that approximately six months prior to the start of her relationship with Michael G., Stacey B. was involved with a man who was so physically abusive that he caused her serious injury.   Stacey B. met Michael G. when they were both in treatment at McDonough House.   Although their relationship was unstable, with episodes of domestic violence,⁷ Stacey B. considered them to be engaged at one time.   Shortly before his incarceration in December 2012, however, Michael G. married Stacey B.'s friend, Kim R. Stacey B. and Michael G. have one child together, Bailey.

Stacey B. has a criminal history in Connecticut and New York. On August 8, 2011, Stacey B. was arrested in the Bronx, New York, for possession of approximately 400 glassine packets containing heroin.   She was arrested again in the Bronx on October 6, 2011, for possession of approximately 100 glassine packets of heroin.   On November 4, 2011, Stacey B. was indicted by a Bronx County grand jury on eight counts arising from these two arrests:  two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, New York Penal Law § 220.16(1);  two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree, New York Penal Law § 220.09(1);  two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree, New York Penal Law § 220.06(1):  and two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, New York Penal Law § 220.03.

On October 28, 2011, the Danbury police executed a warrant at the condominium where Stacey B. and Michael G. resided and placed Stacey B. and Michael G. under arrest.   The Danbury police reported that the condominium was strewn with glassine packets containing heroin, various pills, syringes and other drug paraphernalia, all well within the reach of a fifteen-month-old child.   Stacey B. was charged with possession of narcotics, General Statutes § 21a–279(a);  possession of drugs with intent to sell, General Statutes § 21a–277(a);  possession of drug paraphernalia, General Statutes § 21a–277(c);  possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana, General Statutes § 21a–279a;  conspiracy to commit possession with intent to sell, General Statutes § 21a–277(a);  and risk of injury to a child, General Statutes § 53–21(a)(1).

After an altercation with Michael G. on November 4, 2011, Stacey B. was arrested again and charged with disorderly conduct, General Statutes § 53a–182, assault in the third degree, General Statutes § 53a–61, and threatening, General Statutes § 53a–62.   She remained in custody until November 11, 2011, when she was released on bond.

On January 10, 2012, the court raised Stacey B.'s bond and remanded her for a week because she was not compliant with the conditions of her release.   Stacey B. failed to appear in court on May 18, 2012, and the court (Blawie, J.) ordered her re-arrest.   Rather than turn herself in, Stacey B. went into hiding.   A bail bondsman located her in a garage, and she was arrested on June 25, 2012.   She has been incarcerated in Connecticut or in New York since that time.

Stacey B. pled guilty under the Alford doctrine ⁸ on April 5, 2013 to possession of drugs with intent to sell, General Statutes § 21a–277(a), and risk of injury to a child, General Statutes § 53–21(a)(1).   She was sentenced to serve two years and one day in prison on each count, the sentences to run concurrently, followed by five years of special parole.   On July 12, 2013, Stacey B. pled guilty in New York to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, New York Penal Law § 220.16(1).   She was sentenced to serve one year in prison, to run concurrently with her Connecticut jail time, followed by one year of supervised release.

Stacey B. has a mental health history.   Stacey B. told the department that her mother brought her to counseling when she was nine years old, but it was not very helpful.   She was hospitalized for psychiatric treatment for four or five days when she was a teenager.   She reported that her mother changed her medications back to whatever she thought was appropriate when she was discharged.   Stacey B. has been diagnosed with attention deficit disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and bipolar disorder.

At the request of the department, Stacey B. participated in a psychological evaluation with Dr. Ralph Balducci in May 2011.   The main concerns at the time were Stacey's attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and her ability to function.   She seemed to be unsure of her parenting skills, and she had struggled with her stress level in parenting Bailey.   The testing administered as part of the psychological evaluation showed that Stacey B. had significant levels of anxiety and suffered from depression and attention deficit disorder.   In addition, the Child Abuse Potential Inventory test indicated that Stacey B. was at high risk for committing physical abuse against children.   The department believed that Stacey B. needed extensive parent coaching because she had difficulty reading cues from Bailey during visits, and she personalized Bailey's age appropriate behavior, reacting to the child in a defensive manner.

The department was concerned about Stacey B.'s emotional volatility and observed that, although Stacey B. was intelligent, she could present as very tearful and emotional at times, and then become highly agitated and aggressive.   In the department's view, Stacey B. had continued to deny the extent and severity of her substance abuse and mental health issues and the impact that those issues could have on Bailey.

The department also recommended that Stacey B. and Michael G. attend couples' counseling at Catholic Charities, with a goal of gaining insight into their unhealthy interactions and the impact of substance abuse on their relationship, as well as for Stacey B. to address her anxiety disorder.   Neither of the respondent parents attended counseling at Catholic Charities, and their relationship ended in 2012.

Stacey B. has a history of substance abuse, beginning when she tried marijuana at the age of thirteen.   She told the department that she was twenty-four years old when she began to use heroin.⁹  She considered herself to be an intravenous drug user.

Stacey B. entered a detoxification program in June 2009 and went on methadone maintenance.   After a relapse, Stacey B. entered a twenty-eight-day treatment program at McDonough House.   Stacey B. was in treatment at CCC from December 6, 2009 until September 21, 2010.   She tested positive for cocaine during the week of September 10, 2010, and then left the CCC program, against medical advice.   She reported to her counselor at CCC that she was in treatment at MCCA, and that she had transferred to a suboxone program.

Stacey B. advised the department's social worker that she had relapsed in December 2010 and in April 2011.   After her April 2011 relapse, Stacey B. reported that she was clean until after September 2011,¹⁰ when she relapsed again.

Stacey B. participated in intensive outpatient (IOP) group sessions and individual counseling at MCCA from July 2009 to January 2010.   She had periodic urine screens, beginning in September 2009.   After a four-month hiatus, Stacey B. returned to MCCA in May 2010 for individual counseling, with urinalysis.   After attending one appointment in August 2010, she continued with individual counseling sessions from September 2010 until November 2010.   In January 2011, Stacey B. began to attend the IOP group sessions as well as individual counseling.   She also had periodic urine screens.   Stacey B. started participating in the relapse prevention group and individual sessions in mid-February 2011.   She joined the suboxone group in June 2011, and she submitted to a hair test in September 2011.   She continued to have urinalysis during this time.   At the time of her October 2011 arrest, Stacey B. was attending her scheduled sessions at MCCA.

Following her arrest on November 4, 2011, Stacey B. was required, as a condition of her pretrial release, to participate in the AIC program.   She had her intake assessment at AIC on November 14, 2011.   Her risk score for recidivism was very high, and her urine screen tested positive for opiates at that time.   On November 25, 2011, her urine screen was positive for opiates and cocaine.   After a December 27, 2011 urine screen was positive for opiates and benzodiazepines, AIC recommended that Stacey B. enter an in-patient program.   Stacey B. had another positive urine test on January 5, 2012.

AIC reported to the court on January 10, 2012 that Stacey B. was not compliant because she had four positive urine tests for cocaine and/or opiates since she was referred to AIC. The court raised Stacey B.'s bond and remanded her for a week.   Following her release on January 17, 2012, Stacey B. was supposed to report directly to AIC. Stacey B. did not report until January 19, 2012, after AIC located her and instructed her to come in as soon as possible.   Her urine test that day was positive for opiates.

Stacey B. began the AIC substance abuse group on December 1, 2011.   Stacey B.'s attendance at the group sessions was sporadic.   Due to a conflict with another group member, Stacey B. did one-on-one sessions with the group leader.   Stacey B. was discharged from the AIC substance abuse group on January 27, 2012 because she had positive urine screens for opiates.   AIC also indicated that the services that Stacey B. was receiving at MCCA and CCC were more appropriate for her than the AIC substance abuse group.

Stacey B. had a positive urine screen for opiates at AIC on February 29, 2012.   She also had a positive urine screen for cocaine on April 12, 2012.   Stacey B. was not cooperative with AIC and the services that were recommended for her.   On April 17, 2012, Stacey B. revoked all of the releases that she had provided to AIC, so that AIC could no longer speak with anyone from MCCA, CCC or DCF concerning Stacey B.

On May 18, 2012, Stacey B. failed to appear in court.   AIC reported to the court that Stacey B. was not compliant with the conditions of her release.   The court (Blawie, J.) ordered her re-arrest, and she was discharged from AIC that day.

AIC recommended that Stacey B. participate in services at CCC and MCCA. AIC referred Stacey B. to CCC for an intake evaluation.   Her CCC intake evaluation was on November 22, 2011.   She had a positive urine screen for opiates, cocaine, benzodiazepines, and THC on that date.   Stacey B. was admitted to CCC on November 29, 2011, and she participated in treatment through December 21, 2011.

Stacey B. was readmitted to CCC on January 18, 2012, after her one-week remand.   She tested positive for opiates and oxycodone at that time.   She was not compliant with the course of treatment at CCC. She struggled with her use of opiates and cocaine, and she received warnings for continued drug use.   Stacey B. failed to attend the recommended individual and group therapy, which was part of the treatment.   Stacey B. was discharged from CCC on June 27, 2012 due to her incarceration.   Her last urine screen, on June 1, 2012, was positive for cocaine, benzodiazepines, and methadone.

Stacey B. continued treatment at MCCA following her November 4, 2011 arrest.   After attending three relapse prevention sessions in November 2011, Stacey B. returned to the IOP individual and group sessions at MCCA in December 2011.   She participated in the IOP program, including urine screens, until she again moved to the relapse prevention program in March 2012.   She had Breathalyzer tests for alcohol abuse in January, February, and March 2012, and a hair test in January 2012.   After a positive urine screen for cocaine on April 24, 2012, Stacey B. was referred for a higher level of care.   Stacey B. had another positive urine screen on May 8, 2012 for cocaine and opiates.   On May 18, 2012, a hair test was positive for cocaine and opiates.   Stacey B. missed phone screening interviews with the New Prospects program on May 23, 2012 and May 30, 2012.   Stacey B.'s last appointment at MCCA was on May 25, 2012.   Stacey B. was discharged from MCCA on June 8, 2012 due to her noncompliance with treatment recommendations.

Stacey B. remains at the York Correctional Institution (York Correctional).   As of the last hearing date, January 30, 2014, she was eligible for transfer to a halfway house.   Her estimated release date is May 22, 2014.   Prior to her sentencing on the New York charges, Stacey B. was limited in the programs that were available to her at York Correctional.   She participated in Target, a mental health group with a trauma focus, Healthy Relationships, Parenting from a Distance, and Sisters Standing Strong.   More recently, now that she is a sentenced prisoner, Stacey B. has completed the Tier II program and the Good Intentions, Bad Choices course.

Stacey B. has not used drugs and her behavior has improved during the time she has spent at York Correctional.   She received two disciplinary tickets for fighting in August and September 2012.   In 2014, her course evaluations indicated that her attendance, initiative, productivity, and overall attitude were excellent.

The respondent father Michael G.

Michael G. was born on June 30, 1982 in Mount Kisco, New York, to Kathy and Robert G. Michael G. reported that his parents divorced when he was a year old.   His mother, now known as Kathy J., resides with her husband, Terry J., in New Fairfield, Connecticut.   Michael G. has a half-brother, Matt, through his mother's remarriage.   Michael G.'s father also remarried.   Michael G. has three step-siblings, Sam, Sara, and Rob, and two half-siblings, James and Melissa, as a result of his father's remarriage.

Michael G. has offered differing accounts of his childhood.   He told the department that he had a “lower-class upbringing,” that he was a victim of child abuse, and that his family had a significant history of mental health and substance abuse issues.   During a court-ordered psychological evaluation on February 11, 2012, however, Michael G. reported that he had a “good childhood.”

Michael G. told the department that he went to live with his father when he was sixteen years old, and he attended Monroe–Woodbury High School.   He said that he made friends at first, but then he was picked on and beaten up frequently.   He told the department that he failed every class and was asked to leave the high school, but he did not recall the reason.   He said that he received his G.E.D. with very high scores.   Michael G. reportedly told the court-appointed evaluator that he graduated from a high school in New York, that he did well in school, and that he had no learning or behavioral problems.   Michael G. has not attended college.

Michael G.'s first job was at the Super Stop and Shop in Monroe, New York. He also worked as a hotel bellboy and did landscaping.   From March 2007 to September 2009, Michael G. worked for his step-father's business, T.J's Outdoor Services.   Michael G. was employed by Greenstar from September 2009 until the summer of 2011.   He was unemployed thereafter until his incarceration in December 2012.

Michael G. is currently married to Kim R., whom he met through Stacey B. Michael G. has one child, Bailey, with Stacey B.

Michael G. has offered conflicting reports regarding his mental health history.   He told that department that he was treated with psychotropic medication for depression as a teenager.   He said that he was hospitalized for mental health issues at Four Winds when he was around sixteen years old because he was cutting his arms.   Michael G. explained that he cut himself because he had always been fascinated by “gore”;  he did not cut himself for self-mutilation.

Michael G. has a substance abuse history.   Michael G. reported that he began using cocaine when he was twelve years old.   He was hospitalized when he was eighteen for substance abuse.   Michael G. reported that he last used cocaine in November 2011, but subsequent hair tests indicated that he continued to use the drug.

Michael G. identified heroin as his second drug of choice.   Michael G. told the department's social worker and the court-appointed evaluator that he had been clean for a year and a half prior to relapsing in September 2011.   According to the department's records, however.   Michael G. admitted to relapsing in September 2010.   When he was arrested on October 28, 2011, Michael G. told the police that he had been using approximately ten bags of heroin a day, for three to four months.

The department referred Michael G. to MCCA for treatment.   He was not compliant with the MCCA program.   He failed to attend as required, and his hair tests showed that he was continuing to use cocaine and/or opiates.   On January 20, 2012, a hair test was positive for both cocaine and opiates.   Another hair test on April 24, 2012 was positive for cocaine and opiates.   Michael G. did not comply with hair tests scheduled for August 2, 2012 and October 12, 2012.   MCCA also recommended that Michael G. become involved in a twelve-step program, but he did not do so.

Michael G. was also referred to CCC. He was not compliant with his treatment at CCC. He did not attend the recommended group therapy sessions.

Michael G. has a criminal history, beginning when he was a teenager.   Michael G. advised the department that most of his arrests were in New York. He said that he was first arrested for possession of marijuana when he was about seventeen or eighteen years old.   He was arrested for shoplifting cigarettes at the age of eighteen, and he was arrested for driving under the influence when he was approximately twenty-two or twenty-three years old.   Michael G. also had arrests in Danbury.   On November 3, 2008, Michael G. was arrested and charged with having a weapon in a motor vehicle, General Statutes § 29–38, possession of narcotics, General Statutes § 21a–279(a), possession of drug paraphernalia, General Statutes § 21a–277(c), and possession of marijuana, General Statutes § 21a–279(b).

As discussed above, Michael G. and Stacey B. were arrested at their condominium in Danbury on October 28, 2011.   Michael G. was charged with possession of narcotics, General Statutes § 21a–279(a);  possession of drugs with intent to sell, General Statutes § 21a–277(a);  possession of drug paraphernalia, General Statutes § 21a–277(c);  conspiracy to commit possession with intent to sell, General Statutes § 21a–277(a);  risk of injury to a child, General Statutes § 53–21(a)(1);  and possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana, General Statutes § 21a–279a.

Michael G. was arrested again on November 4, 2011 after a domestic dispute with Stacey B. He was charged with disorderly conduct, General Statutes § 53a–182, strangulation in the third degree, General Statutes § 53a–64cc, and interfering with an emergency call, General Statutes § 53a–183b.

Michael G. pled guilty on October 16, 2012 to conspiracy to commit possession with intent to sell, General Statutes § 21a–277(a), risk of injury to a child, General Statutes § 53–21(a)(1), and disorderly conduct.  General Statutes § 53a–182.   On December 12, 2012, he was sentenced to serve two years and one day of incarceration, to be followed by three years of special parole.   He was also sentenced to ninety days in jail on the disorderly conduct charge.

Michael G. consented to the termination of his parental rights on July 10, 2013.   He appeared by videoconference because he was incarcerated.   His attorney submitted an “Affidavit/Consent to Termination of Parental Rights,” Form JD–JM–60, that was signed by Michael G. on July 3, 2013 before his attorney, a Commissioner of the Superior Court.   Michael G.'s consent was subject to two conditions:  the execution of an open adoption agreement, and the termination of Stacey B.'s parental rights.   The court fully canvassed Michael G. on his consent and found by clear and convincing evidence that the consent had been knowingly and voluntarily made, with the advice and assistance of competent counsel, and with a full understanding of the legal consequences of the consent.   The court accepted the consent, to become effective upon satisfaction of the stated conditions.

At the hearing on September 27, 2013, counsel for Bailey reported to the court that the open adoption agreement had been fully executed, satisfying one of the two conditions to Michael G.'s consent.

The minor child Bailey G.

Bailey was born on July 31, 2010.   She is the only child born to Michael G. and Stacey B. Bailey is living in a DCF-licensed relative foster home, with her paternal grandmother, Kathy J., and her step-grandfather, Terry J. (the paternal grandparents).   Both paternal grandparents are licensed foster parents for Bailey.   Bailey calls them “Grandma” and “Grandpa,” and she is bonded to them.   She has thrived in her paternal grandparents' home due to the security and the exceptional care that they have provided her.

The paternal grandparents' house is a single-family house.   Only Bailey and her grandparents reside there.   Bailey has her own room, decorated in “princess” style.   At the head of her bed is a large bulletin board decorated with family pictures, including pictures of Michael G. and Stacey B. Bailey has many toys, including an outdoor playhouse, a sandbox, a kiddie pool, a tricycle, a ride-on car, and a plastic wheelie ramp.   Bailey has her own iPad, with age appropriate learning games and songs.

Bailey attends full-day preschool twice a week.   She has many friends at school.   She is a very outgoing child.

Bailey prefers to be outdoors, playing or going for walks.   She enjoys fishing, camping, and riding on her grandparents' boat.   Bailey's paternal grandparents are very active, and Bailey looked forward to skiing with them this winter.

Bailey is in good health.   She was brought up to date medically after she entered her paternal grandparents' care.   She is developmentally on schedule.   She understands everything that is said to her, and she expresses herself freely.   She is quick to voice her own preferences.   She picks out her own clothes.

Bailey helps with the chores at home, including picking up her toys and putting her clothes in the laundry basket.   She enjoys vacuuming, loading the dishwasher, and working in the garage with her grandfather.

Bailey has a large extended paternal family, and she visits with these relatives often.   Bailey also regularly spends time with her paternal great-grandmother in New York.

Bailey visits with her maternal grandmother, Lynn B., once a month at the department's offices.   Her maternal grandfather, Geoff B. lives close to Bailey's paternal grandparents.   He has visited with Bailey at their home a few times a year, and he has brought gifts for Bailey's birthday and Christmas.

Bailey has three visits with Stacey B. at York Correctional every two months.   She identifies Stacey B. as “Mommy.”   Bailey has shown more separation anxiety recently during her visits with Stacey B., calling out for her paternal grandmother Kathy J. When Bailey is upset, she turns to her grandmother for comfort, even if Stacey B. is there.   The department has been concerned about Stacey B.'s behavior when Bailey visits her, noting that Stacey B. appears to have difficulty maintaining positive interaction with Bailey at times.   The department's social worker previously had to remind Stacey B. in writing to behave appropriately during visits with Bailey.

Prior to Michael G.'s incarceration on December 12, 2012, Bailey visited with him twice a week at the department's office.   She is now visiting him at the Niantic Annex.

Stacey B.'s compliance with specific steps:  On March 26, 2012, the court (Sommer, J.) ordered final specific steps for Stacey B. to follow in order to facilitate her reunification with Bailey.   As of August 30, 2013, the adjudicatory date,¹¹ Stacey B. had not complied fully with the specific steps ordered by the court.

Keep all appointments set by or with the Department of Children and Families.  Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the child(ren)'s court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem

Stacey B. did not comply fully with this step.   She missed an administrative case review in June 2012.   She did not keep several appointments with the department in May and June 2012 to visit with Bailey.

Let DCF, your attorney and the attorney for the child know where you and the children are at all times

Stacey B. did not comply fully with this step.   The department filed a missing persons report in June 2012, when it was unable to locate Stacey B. Her whereabouts were unknown until she was re-arrested on June 25, 2012 and sent to York Correctional.

Take part in counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals (parenting, individual, and family/couples).

The following treatment goals were expressly identified in Stacey B.'s specific steps:  “Learn developmentally approp. interactions w/ Bailey, gain insight into anxiety disorder and domestic violence pattern.”   Stacey B. did not comply fully with this step.   She did not attend the counseling at Catholic Charities that had been recommended for her anxiety disorder and to address her relationship with Michael G.

Since her incarceration, Stacey B. has participated in various programs at York Correctional, including Target, which is a mental health group with a trauma focus, Healthy Relationships, Parenting from a Distance, and Sisters Standing Strong.   More recently, Stacey B. completed the Tier II program and the Good Intentions, Bad Choices course.

Accept in-home support services referred by DCF and cooperate with them

Although ordered by the court, this step has not been applicable.   Bailey has been in relative foster care since October 29, 2011, when the department executed an administrative ninety-six hour-hold and placed Bailey with her paternal grandparents.

Submit to a substance abuse evaluation and follow the recommendations about treatment, including inpatient treatment if necessary, aftercare and relapse prevention;  submit to hair tests

Stacey B. did not comply fully with this step.   Stacey B. did not cooperate with AIC and participate in all of the recommended services.   She was discharged from the AIC substance abuse group due to urine screens that tested positive for opiates.   Stacey B. also failed to attend the recommended group therapy sessions at CCC. At the time she was discharged, she was not compliant.   Although she attended sessions at MCCA, she missed some sessions and did not maintain her sobriety.   She tested positive for cocaine and opiates on several occasions.   She was referred to the New Prospects program for a higher level of care, but she missed the telephone screening interviews in May 2012.   She failed to complete the recommended treatment at MCCA and was discharged on June 8, 2012 for non-compliance.

Submit to random drug testing;  the time and method of the testing will be up to DCF to decide

Stacey B. complied with this step.   She submitted to random drug testing when requested by the department.

Not use illegal drugs or abuse alcohol or medicine

Stacey B. did not comply with this step.   She continued to use cocaine and opiates until her incarceration in June 2012.

Cooperate with service providers recommended for parenting/individual/family counseling, in-home support services and/or substance abuse assessment/treatment

The service providers specifically identified were CCC, MCCA, AIC, and Catholic Charities.   Stacey B. did not comply fully with this step.   As discussed above, she was not compliant with any of the recommended service providers to address her substance abuse.   She did not attend the recommended counseling at Catholic Charities.   She revoked the releases that she had provided to AIC.

Cooperate with court-ordered evaluations or testing

Stacey B. complied with this step.

Sign releases allowing DCF to communicate with service providers to check on your attendance, cooperation and progress toward identified goals, and for use in future proceedings with this court.  Sign the release within 30 days

Stacey B. complied with this step.

Sign releases allowing your child's attorney ad guardian ad litem to review your child's medical, psychological, psychiatric and/or educational records

No evidence was offered as to whether Bailey's attorney requested any releases.   Bailey does not have a guardian ad litem.

Get and/or maintain adequate housing and a legal income

Stacey B. did not comply fully with this step.   She collected unemployment after she was fired from her job in May 2011.   She was reported to be in the process of being evicted prior to her incarceration.

Immediately let DCF know about any changes in the make-up of the household to make sure that the change does not hurt the health and safety of the child(ren)

Stacey B. did not comply fully with this step.   She did not advise the department of any changes in her household or that she was being evicted prior to her incarceration.

Get and/or cooperate with a restraining/protective order and/or other appropriate safety plan approved by DCF' to avoid more domestic violence incidents

Although ordered by the court, this step has not been applicable.   The department did not require Stacey B. and Michael G. to have a safety plan because they did not have further domestic violence incidents.

Attend and complete an appropriate domestic violence program if recommended by criminal court

Although ordered by the court, this step has not been applicable.   It does not appear that the criminal court recommended that Stacey B. attend a domestic violence program.

Not get further involved with the criminal justice system.  Cooperate with the Office of Adult Probation or parole officer and follow your conditions of probation or parole

Stacey B. did not comply with this step.   She was remanded for a week in January 2012 for violating with the terms of her pretrial release.   On May 18, 2012, she failed to appear in court and was ordered re-arrested.   Stacey B. decided to hide instead of turning herself in to the police.   After a bail bondsman located her in a garage, she was re-arrested on June 25, 2012 and sent to York Correctional.   Stacey B. received two disciplinary tickets for fighting in August and September 2012 at York Correctional.

Visit the children as often as DCF permits

Stacey B. did not comply fully with this step.   In April 2012, the department had to remind Stacey B. in writing to behave appropriately during visits with Bailey.   Stacey missed visits between May 29, 2012 and June 25, 2012, when she was re-arrested.   Since her admission to York Correctional, Stacey B. visits with Bailey three times every two months.   According to the department, Stacey has difficulty in maintaining positive parent/child interaction during the visits.

Within thirty (30) days of this order, and at any time after that, tell DCF in writing the name, address, family relationship and birth date of any person(s) who you would like the department to investigate and consider as a placement resource for the child(ren)

Stacey B. complied with this step.   She and Michael G. both identified Bailey's paternal grandparents as a placement resource.

Michael G.'s compliance with specific steps

On March 26, 2012, the court (Sommer, J.) also ordered final specific steps for Michael G. to follow in order to facilitate his reunification with Bailey.   Michael G. had not complied fully with the specific steps ordered by the court when he consented to the termination of his parental rights on July 10, 2013.   In view of Michael G.'s consent, however, it is not necessary to discuss in detail his compliance or lack of compliance with the specific steps.

Reunification efforts by the department

In addition to case management services and administrative case reviews, the department provided the following to facilitate the reunification of Bailey with Stacey B. and Michael G.:  referrals for substance abuse evaluations and treatment;  random drug screens, including hair analyses;  referrals for counseling services;  psychological evaluations;  transportation for substance abuse evaluations and other services;  relative foster care services;  and supervised parent/child visitation.

III

LEGAL STANDARD

A proceeding for termination of parental rights is governed by General Statutes § 17a–112.  “In order to terminate a parent's parental rights under § 17a–112, the petitioner is required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that:  (1) the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify the family;  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1);  (2) termination is in the best interest of the child;  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(2);  and (3) there exists any one of the seven grounds for termination delineated in § 17a–112(j)(3).”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 148–49, 962 A.2d 81 (2009).

A hearing on a termination of parental rights petition proceeds in two phases—adjudication and disposition.   In the adjudicatory phase, the court must determine whether the department has proven by clear and convincing evidence that one of the statutory grounds for termination existed as of the date the petition was filed or last amended.  Practice Book § 32a–3(b);  Practice Book § 35a–7(a);  In re Keyashia C., 120 Conn.App. 452, 455, 991 A.2d 1113, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 909, 995 A.2d 637 (2010).   When a termination of parental rights is sought under General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B) on the ground of failure to rehabilitate, however, the court may consider events subsequent to the filing date when deciding whether the parent's rehabilitation “is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time.”  In re Jennfer W., 75 Conn.App. 485, 495, 816 A.2d 697, cert. denied, 263 Conn. 917, 821 A.2d 770 (2003).   The court need find that only one statutory ground for termination has been established to grant the petition.  In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466, 473, 816 A.2d 707 (2003).

If the court finds that the department has proven at least one statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence, the court then proceeds to the dispositional phase.  “In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of the child[ren] ․ In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent's parental rights is not in the best interest of the child[ren].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Sarah O., 128 Conn.App. 323, 340, 16 A.3d 1250, cert. denied, 301 Conn. 928, 22 A.3d 1275 (2011).  “In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a–112(k) ] ․” In re Jason B., 137 Conn.App. 408, 422–23, 48 A.3d 676 (2012).   The court is not required to make these specific findings when a termination is based on consent.  General Statutes § 17a–112(k).

Evidence as to adjudication and disposition may be heard in the same proceeding, but disposition may not be considered until the adjudicatory phase has concluded.  In re Alison M., 127 Conn.App. 197, 15 A.3d 194 (2011);  Practice Book § 35a–7(b).

IV

ADJUDICATIONA. Reasonable Efforts Finding

A reasonable efforts finding is a predicate for granting a petition for termination of parental rights.   The court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the department “made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a–111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to section 17a–111b, or determines at trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(1).  “[Section 17a–112] imposes on the department the duty, inter alia, to make reasonable efforts to reunite the child or children with the parents.   The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof.   Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn ․ [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Jason R., 129 Conn.App. 746, 767–68, 23 A.3d 18 (2011), aff'd, 306 Conn. 438, 51 A.3d 334 (2012).  “Thus, the department must prove [by clear and convincing evidence] either that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts.   Section 17a–112(j) clearly provides that the department is not required to prove both circumstances.   Rather, either showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory element.”  (Emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Anvahnay S., 128 Conn.App. 186, 191, 16 A.3d 1244 (2011).

The department alleges that, as of the adjudicatory date, the department had made reasonable efforts to reunite Bailey with Stacey B. by providing case management services;  administrative case reviews;  referrals for substance abuse evaluations and treatment;  random drug screens, including hair analyses;  referrals for counseling services;  psychological evaluations;  transportation for substance abuse evaluations and other services;  relative foster care services;  and supervised parent/child visitation.   The department also provided these services and referrals to reunite Bailey with Michael G. prior to his July 10, 2013 consent to the termination of his parental rights.   The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the department made reasonable efforts to reunite Bailey with Stacey B. and Michael G.

B. Statutory Grounds for Termination of Parental Rights

The department alleges two statutory grounds in the petition, as amended, for termination of the parental rights of Stacey B. with respect to Bailey:  failure to rehabilitate after adjudication, General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i) (Ground B–1), and acts of commission or omission, General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(C) (Ground C).  Following Michael G.'s July 10, 2013 consent to the termination of his parental rights with respect to Bailey, the department amended the petition to provide for termination of Michael G.'s parental rights solely on the ground of consent.

Failure of Stacey B. to rehabilitate after adjudication (Ground B–1)

The first statutory ground alleged for termination of the parental rights of Stacey B. is that set forth in General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i)—failure to rehabilitate after adjudication.  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i) provides:  “The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (3) ․ (B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding ․ and the parent of such child ․ has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(i).

“Personal rehabilitation as used in the statute refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ․ In conducting this inquiry, the trial court must analyze the respondent's rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child ․ The trial court must also determine whether the prospects for rehabilitation can be realized within a reasonable time given the age and needs of the child ․” In re Destiny R., 134 Conn.App. 625, 646, 39 A.3d 727, cert. denied, 304 Conn. 932, 43 A.3d 660 (2012).  “The statute does not require [a parent] to prove precisely when she will be able to assume a responsible position in her child's life.   Nor does it require her to prove that she will be able to assume full responsibility for her child, unaided by available support systems.   It requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation she has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date she can assume a responsible position in her child's life.”  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–3), 1 Conn.App. 463, 477, 473 A.2d 795, cert. denied, 193 Conn. 802, 474 A.2d 1259 (1984).  “Although the standard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must show more than any rehabilitation ․ Successful completion of the petitioner's expressly articulated expectations is not sufficient to defeat the petitioner's claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Destiny R., supra, 134 Conn.App. at 646–47.

As of the March 26, 2012 adjudication of Bailey as a neglected child, the presenting problems were Stacey B.'s pending criminal charges, her substance abuse and mental health issues, and her lack of stable housing and gainful employment.   Stacey B. was unable to provide the stability and consistency required to parent a young child.   Since that date, Stacey B. has failed to demonstrate sufficient rehabilitation to meet Bailey's needs, now or within a reasonable period of time.  “[A] finding of rehabilitation is not based on a mechanistic tabulation of whether a parent has undertaken specific steps ordered.   The ultimate issue the court must evaluate is whether the parent has gained the insight and ability to care for his or her child given the age and needs of the child within a reasonable time.”  (Citation omitted.)  In re Destiny R., supra, 134 Conn.App. at 627.

In the months following the March 26, 2012 neglect adjudication, Stacey B. failed to comply fully with her specific steps.   She continued to use cocaine and opiates, as shown by her positive urine screens and hair tests.   She did not cooperate with services at AIC, and she was discharged from the AIC substance abuse group because she had positive urine tests.   She failed to attend the recommended group therapy at CCC. Although she had been referred for a higher level of care, she missed two telephone screening interviews for the New Prospects program.   She was discharged from MCCA in June 2012 for non-compliance with the recommended treatment.

Her final specific steps provided that she “[n]ot get further involved with the criminal justice system,” but Stacey B. was not compliant.   She was remanded for a week in January 2012 for violating with the terms of her pretrial release.   On May 18, 2012, she failed to appear in court and was ordered re-arrested.   She was re-arrested on June 25, 2012 and sent to York Correctional.   Her behavior was not exemplary during her first months at York Correctional.   She received two disciplinary tickets in August and September 2012 for fighting.

Stacey B. entered an Alford plea in Connecticut on April 5, 2013 to two felony charges and a misdemeanor.   She pled guilty in New York to a drug-related felony on July 27, 2013.   By August 30, 2013, the adjudicatory date, Stacey B. was incarcerated at York Correctional.   She remained incarcerated as of January 30, 2014, the last hearing date.

Since the adjudicatory date, Stacey B. appears to have taken some steps toward rehabilitation during her incarceration.   She completed the Tier Two program and the Good Intentions, Bad Choices course at York Correctional, and she was eligible for transfer to a halfway house as of the January 30, 2014 hearing.   These few positive steps are not enough, however, to demonstrate that Stacey B. has been sufficiently rehabilitated so that she will be able to meet Bailey's needs, now or within a reasonable period of time.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Stacey B. has failed to achieve a level of rehabilitation that would support a belief that she will assume a responsible position in Bailey's life within a reasonable period of time.   The department has met its burden of proving the first statutory ground alleged for termination of Stacey B.'s parental rights with respect to Bailey, that set forth in General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B–1), by clear and convincing evidence.

Stacey B.'s acts of commission or omission (Ground C)

The department also seeks to terminate the parental rights of Stacey B. with respect to Bailey on the grounds set forth in General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(C).  Section 17a–112(j)(3)(C) provides for termination of parental rights when “the child has been denied, by reason of an act or acts of parental commission or omission including, but not limited to, sexual molestation or exploitation, severe physical abuse or a pattern of abuse, the care, guidance or control necessary for the child's physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being, except that nonaccidental or inadequately explained serious physical injury to a child shall constitute prima facie evidence of acts of parental commission or omission sufficient for the termination of parental rights ․” General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(C).  This provision “rests on two distinct and often contradictory interests [of the child].   The first is a basic interest in safety;  the second is the important interest ․ in having a stable family environment.”  (Emphasis in original;  citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 512, 613 A.2d 748 (1992) (holding that General Statutes (Rev. to 1990) § 45a–717(f)(2) did not authorize termination based on mother's prenatal conduct).

On an appeal from a judgment terminating the respondent father's parental rights pursuant to General Statutes § 45a–717(g),¹² the Appellate Court in In re Brian T., 134 Conn.App. 1, 38 A.3d 114 (2012), affirmed the decision below on the basis of the trial court's findings that the respondent had failed to rehabilitate;  General Statutes § 45a–717(g)(2)(D);  and that he had denied his child the care, guidance and control necessary for the child's well-being.  General Statutes § 45a–717(g)(2)(B).  The trial court found that the respondent's criminal acts, his incarceration, his denial of paternity, and his failure to pay to attention to the child when he was an infant were sufficient to prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds for termination under General Statutes § 45a–717(g)(2)(B), that “the child has been denied, by reason of an act or acts of parental commission or omission ․ the care, guidance or control necessary for the child's physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being ․” General Statutes § 45a–717(g)(2)(B).  See In re Amy H., 56 Conn.App. 55, 60, n.2, 742 A.2d 372 (1999) (trial court terminated parental rights under General Statutes § 17a–112 on several grounds, including that respondent, who had been in jail most of child's life, had denied child the care, guidance or control necessary for her physical, educational, moral or emotional wellbeing;  judgment affirmed on appeal without addressing this ground).

Stacey B.'s repeated, voluntary criminal activity has caused her to be unavailable to Bailey for a significant period of time, much like the respondent fathers in Brian T. and Amy H. Stacey B. has already been incarcerated for almost half of Bailey's life.   Before her October 28, 2011 arrest, Stacey B. endangered Bailey by exposing her to heroin, pills, syringes, and other drug paraphernalia strewn throughout their condominium, in clear view and within her reach.   In addition to the drug charges, Stacey B. was charged with risk of injury to a child, General Statutes 53–21(a)(1), due to the dangerous conditions that existed in the home when she was arrested.   Stacey B. pled guilty under the Alford doctrine to the risk of injury charge on April 5, 2013.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Stacey B. has denied Bailey, by reason of an act or acts of parental commission or omission, the care, guidance or control necessary for Bailey's physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being.   The department has met its burden of proving the second statutory ground alleged for termination of Stacey B.'s parental rights with respect to Bailey, that set forth in General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(C), by clear and convincing evidence.

Michael G's consent to termination of his parental rights

Michael G., through his attorney, presented to the court a properly executed “Affidavit/Consent to Termination of Parental Rights,” Form JD–JM–60, signed on July 3, 2013 and sworn to before his counsel, a Commissioner of the Superior Court, in which he consented to the termination of his parental rights with respect to Bailey.   Michael G.'s consent was conditioned upon the execution of an open adoption agreement and the termination of Stacey B.'s parental rights.   The court canvassed Michael G. on his consent and found by clear and convincing evidence that the consent had been knowingly and voluntarily made, with the advice and assistance of competent counsel, and with' a full understanding of the legal consequences of the consent.   The court accepted the consent, to become effective upon satisfaction of the conditions as stated.

At the hearing on September 27, 2013, counsel for Bailey reported to the court that the open adoption agreement had been fully executed.   The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the first condition to Michael G.'s consent has been satisfied.   The second condition—that the court also terminate the parental rights of Stacey B. with respect to Bailey—is addressed below.

V

DISPOSITION

Having found by clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds exist to terminate the parental rights of Stacey B. with respect to Bailey, and that Michael G. consented knowingly and voluntarily to the termination of his parental rights with respect to Bailey (subject to two conditions, the first of which has been met), the court must next determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child.  “The best interests of the child include the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of its environment.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000).

In determining whether the department has established by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parental rights of Stacey B. is in the best interests of Bailey, the court must consider the seven factors set forth in General Statutes § 17a–112(k) and make written findings concerning those factors.  “The seven factors serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered ․ There is no requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   In re Jason B., 137 Conn.App. 408, 422–23, 48 A.3d 676 (2012).   The court is not required to consider these factors with respect to the termination of Michael G.'s parental rights, because Michael G. has consented to the termination.  General Statutes § 17a–112(k).  See In re Bruce R., 234 Conn. 194, 205–06, 662 A.2d 107 (1995) (Regarding a petition brought under General Statutes § 45a–717(f), the court observed that “no statute describes the factors that must be considered in the case of a consensual petition ․ [T]he trial court's paramount objective ․ is to determine what would be in the child's best interest”).

The court makes the following written findings with respect to each of the seven factors:

1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.

Stacey B. has been offered services since Bailey first came to the attention of the department in 2010.   Following the entry of the order of temporary custody on November 2, 2011, the department provided case management services, administrative case reviews, referrals for substance abuse evaluations and treatment, random drug screens, hair tests, referrals for counseling services, transportation, and supervised parent/child visitation to facilitate the reunion of Bailey with Stacey B. Bailey has been provided case management services, relative foster care services, and supervised visitation with Stacey B.

2. Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

The department made reasonable efforts to reunite Bailey with Stacey B. pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, by providing case management services, administrative case reviews, referrals for substance abuse evaluations and treatment, random drug screens, hair tests, referrals for counseling services, transportation, relative foster care services, and supervised parent/child visitation.

3. The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order.

The court ordered final specific steps for Stacey B. on March 26, 2012.   The terms of the specific steps ordered by the court and Stacey B.'s compliance with the specific steps are discussed in detail in part II of this decision.   Stacey B. did not comply with her obligations under the specific steps.   The department fulfilled its obligations under the specific steps and other court orders.

4. The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to such child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.

Bailey has resided in the DCF-licensed foster home of her paternal grandparents Kathy and Terry J. since the department executed an administrative ninety-six-hour hold on October 29, 2011.   Kathy and Terry J. have been Bailey's primary caregivers for two-thirds of her fife.   Bailey loves them, and she is bonded to them.   Although Bailey knows Stacey B. as “Mommy,” Bailey has exhibited separation anxiety and calls out for her grandmother when she visits Stacey B. at York Correctional.

5. The age of the child.

Bailey was born on July 31, 2010.   She is three years and six months old.

6. The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child.

As indicated by her failure to comply fully with her specific steps, Stacey B. did not make the effort required to adjust her circumstances, conduct or conditions so that it would be in the best interest of Bailey to return to her care.

7. The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.

Stacey B. has not been prevented by anyone, including Michael G., from maintaining a meaningful relationship with Bailey.   Her economic circumstances have not prevented Stacey B. from having a meaningful relationship with the child.

The court has considered the best interests of Bailey, including her health, safety and need for permanency.  “It is undisputed that children require secure, stable, long-term, continuous relationships with their parents or foster parents.   There is little that can be as detrimental to a child's sound development as uncertainty ․” Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513, 102 S.Ct. 3231, 73 L.Ed.2d 928 (1982).   Bailey is bonded to her paternal grandparents, with whom she has lived since October 29, 2011.   They are providing her with a stable and nurturing environment, and they are willing to adopt her.   Despite her recent progress, Stacey B. is not in a position to provide Bailey with the care, security, and stability that is essential to her development, now or within the foreseeable future.   Based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parental rights of Stacey B. is in Bailey's best interests.

Having found by clear and convincing evidence that Michael G. voluntarily and knowingly consented to the termination of his parental rights, and with both conditions to Michael G.'s consent now satisfied, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Michael G.'s consent is fully effective.   The court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parental rights of Michael G. is also in Bailey's best interests.¹³  Michael G., like Stacey B., is not in a position to meet Bailey's needs now, or within the foreseeable future.

VI

CONCLUSION

ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Stacey B.'s motion in opposition to the permanency plan is denied;

Stacey B.'s objection to the permanency plan for Bailey is overruled;

Stacey B.'s motion to modify the disposition is denied;  and

The petition for termination of the parental rights of Stacey B. and Michael G. with respect to Bailey is granted, and the commissioner of the department of children and families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for Bailey so that Bailey may be placed for adoption.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(o), the statutory parent shall report to the court within thirty days of this judgment on the case plan for Bailey and shall timely present such further reports to the court as required by law.

The department shall file a petition for the adoption of Bailey with the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Danbury pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–129b, or the clerk of the Probate Court that has jurisdiction over the adoption of Bailey shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Danbury when and if any such adoption is finalized.

Judgment shall enter accordingly.

BY THE COURT

HELLER, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. In accordance with General Statutes § 46b–124 and Practice Book § 32a–7, the names of the parties are not disclosed, and the records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest in the matter and only upon order of the court..  FN1. In accordance with General Statutes § 46b–124 and Practice Book § 32a–7, the names of the parties are not disclosed, and the records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest in the matter and only upon order of the court.

FN2. The court will address Stacey B.'s July 22, 2013 administrative appeal in a separate opinion..  FN2. The court will address Stacey B.'s July 22, 2013 administrative appeal in a separate opinion.

FN3. Stacey B. appeared by videoconference for the oral argument on her motion to reopen the evidence on January 30, 2014..  FN3. Stacey B. appeared by videoconference for the oral argument on her motion to reopen the evidence on January 30, 2014.

FN4. Stacey B. also asked the court to take judicial notice of the preliminary specific steps ordered for her on January 18, 2012.   The steps had already been judicially noticed at the request of the department..  FN4. Stacey B. also asked the court to take judicial notice of the preliminary specific steps ordered for her on January 18, 2012.   The steps had already been judicially noticed at the request of the department.

FN5. Stacey B. testified that the department's initial involvement resulted from a report by her mother, Lynn B., to Michael G.'s probation officer concerning Michael G.'s drug use..  FN5. Stacey B. testified that the department's initial involvement resulted from a report by her mother, Lynn B., to Michael G.'s probation officer concerning Michael G.'s drug use.

FN6. Bailey was not with Stacey B. and Michael G. when they were arrested on October 28, 2011.   She was with her paternal grandmother Kathy J. that day..  FN6. Bailey was not with Stacey B. and Michael G. when they were arrested on October 28, 2011.   She was with her paternal grandmother Kathy J. that day.

FN7. Stacey B. reported to the department that Michael G. choked her until she passed out on November 4, 2011.   Stacey B. and Michael G. were both arrested as a result of this incident..  FN7. Stacey B. reported to the department that Michael G. choked her until she passed out on November 4, 2011.   Stacey B. and Michael G. were both arrested as a result of this incident.

FN8. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970)..  FN8. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).

FN9. Stacey B. told CCC in November 2011 that she first used heroin when she was seventeen years old, and that she first used cocaine when she was eighteen years old.   She said that she had used heroin regularly for five years, and that she had used cocaine regularly for ten years..  FN9. Stacey B. told CCC in November 2011 that she first used heroin when she was seventeen years old, and that she first used cocaine when she was eighteen years old.   She said that she had used heroin regularly for five years, and that she had used cocaine regularly for ten years.

FN10. Stacey B. passed a hair test on September 6, 2011, but Michael G. maintained that she was using heroin with him at that time.   He said that she had altered her hair to pass the test..  FN10. Stacey B. passed a hair test on September 6, 2011, but Michael G. maintained that she was using heroin with him at that time.   He said that she had altered her hair to pass the test.

FN11. The adjudicatory date is the date the petition was filed or the date of the latest amendment.   Practice Book § 35a–7(a).   The petition was amended on August 30, 2013..  FN11. The adjudicatory date is the date the petition was filed or the date of the latest amendment.   Practice Book § 35a–7(a).   The petition was amended on August 30, 2013.

FN12. Section 45a–715(a)(2) allows a child's legal guardians to bring a petition for termination of parental rights, while § 17a–112 applies to petitions for termination of the parental rights of children committed to the custody of the department.   The grounds for termination under § 45a–717(g) are identical to the grounds set forth in § 17a–112(j)(3).   See In re Valerie D., supra, 223 Conn. at 498, n.3..  FN12. Section 45a–715(a)(2) allows a child's legal guardians to bring a petition for termination of parental rights, while § 17a–112 applies to petitions for termination of the parental rights of children committed to the custody of the department.   The grounds for termination under § 45a–717(g) are identical to the grounds set forth in § 17a–112(j)(3).   See In re Valerie D., supra, 223 Conn. at 498, n.3.

FN13. In determining the issue of the best interests of Bailey, the court has considered the adjudicatory and dispositional evidence in its entirety, and the court has concluded by clear and convincing evidence that there is no permanency plan that could have secured the best interests of Bailey that is less restrictive than termination of the parental rights at issue.   See In re Azareon Y., 139 Conn.App. 457, 60 A.3d 742 (2012), aff'd, 309 Conn. 626, 72 A.3d 1074 (2013);  In re Julianna B., 141 Conn.App. 163, 61 A.3d 606 (2013)..  FN13. In determining the issue of the best interests of Bailey, the court has considered the adjudicatory and dispositional evidence in its entirety, and the court has concluded by clear and convincing evidence that there is no permanency plan that could have secured the best interests of Bailey that is less restrictive than termination of the parental rights at issue.   See In re Azareon Y., 139 Conn.App. 457, 60 A.3d 742 (2012), aff'd, 309 Conn. 626, 72 A.3d 1074 (2013);  In re Julianna B., 141 Conn.App. 163, 61 A.3d 606 (2013).

Heller, Donna Nelson, J.