Sylvia Barchue v. Julianne Conte et al. (2014)

FACTS

On September 4, 2013, the plaintiff, Sylvia Barchue, filed this action against the defendants, Julianne and Victor Conte, for negligence and recklessness.   In the plaintiff's two-count complaint, she alleges the following facts.   On July 14, 2012, the plaintiff was involved in a car accident while traveling southbound on Grange Street in Greenwich, Connecticut.   Just prior to the accident, Julianne Conte was operating a motor vehicle owned by Victor Conte, and, while traveling eastbound on Hamilton Avenue, she approached the intersection where Grange Avenue is located.   Julianne Conte then attempted to turn left from Hamilton Avenue onto Grange Street but cut the corner and drove head on into the plaintiff's vehicle.   As a result of the collision, the plaintiff suffered numerous severe and disabling physical injuries, medical and therapy expenses, a loss of income, and diminution of enjoyment in life's activities.

In the first count, sounding in negligence, the plaintiff alleges that Conte made an improper left turn in violation of General Statutes §§ 14–241 and 14–242(a);  traveled unreasonably fast under the circumstances in violation General Statutes § 14–218a;  failed to keep a proper lookout for other vehicles on the road;  failed to take an evasive action reasonable under the circumstances to avoid a collision;  failed to operate her vehicle on the right side of the roadway in violation of General Statutes §§ 14–241 and 14–242;  and drove on the wrong side of the road in violation of General Statutes § 14–230.

In the second count, sounding in recklessness under General Statutes § 14–295, the plaintiff alleges that Conte drove a motor vehicle “deliberately or with reckless disregard of the safety of other[s],” and thereby caused the collision.   Specifically, in violation of General Statutes § 14–222, Conte cut a corner while driving at an excessive rate of speed and drove in the wrong direction in the plaintiff's lane of travel.   These violations of § 14–222 served as a “proximate cause” to the injuries and losses sustained by the plaintiff in the collision.

On September 23, 2013, Conte filed a motion to strike count two of the plaintiff's complaint and her corresponding claim for exemplary damages under pursuant to § 14–295 on the ground that “the plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a statutory claim for recklessness” under § 14–295.   In support of the motion, Conte filed a memorandum of law.   In response, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion to strike on December 5, 2013.   The matter was heard at the short calendar on January 27, 2014.

DISCUSSION

“Whenever any party wishes to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ․ that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof.”  Practice Book § 10–39(a).  “It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted ․ The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112, 116–17, 19 A.3d 640 (2011).  “If facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).

In her memorandum of law in support of her motion to strike, Conte argues that the plaintiff's claim for recklessness under § 14–295 is legally insufficient because it fails to allege any specific facts or conduct in addition to the first count's allegations of negligence.   Relying upon a minority position among the Connecticut Superior Courts, Conte contends that “a plaintiff is required to plead specific allegations that rise above and beyond the facts that need to be pleaded in a negligence case ․ so as to satisfy both the language of § 14–295, as well as the common-law requirements.”   Moreover, Conte maintains that the plaintiff's allegations, in and of themselves, fail to establish that Conte's conduct rose to a level of recklessness wherein she recognized a high risk of harm to others and acted in conscious disregard to that danger.

In response, the plaintiff counters that the second count does, in fact, include additional allegations of a new statutory violation beyond the first count's allegations of negligence which establish Conte's conduct as reckless.   The plaintiff further argues that a cause of action for statutory recklessness under § 14–295 only requires a plaintiff to allege a violation of one of the enumerated statutes and that such a violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries.   It is the plaintiff's position that specific allegations, as Conte argues are required for common-law claims of recklessness, are not necessary to establish the statutory cause of action.   The plaintiff maintains that the allegations in her complaint track the elements of § 14–295 and, therefore, constitute a valid claim for recklessness under the statute.

“The Appellate Courts have yet to clarify the degree of specificity required for pleading recklessness under General Statutes Section 14–295.   There is a split of authority within the Superior Courts regarding whether general allegations of recklessness are sufficient ․ One line of cases, representing the minority view, holds that a plaintiff must plead the specific facts constituting recklessness, above and beyond the facts constituting mere negligence ․ The majority point of view, on the other hand, is that a plaintiff, in addition to pleading facts constituting negligence, need only make the general allegations mentioned in section 14–295:  that the defendant has deliberately or with reckless disregard violated one of the enumerated statutes, and that the violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Lussier v. Zarelli, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk, Docket No. CV–05–5000389–S (August 16, 2006, Jennings, J.).   In accordance with Starr v. Lopez, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk, Docket No. CV–01–0185811–S (November 6, 2001, Adams, J.), this court has consistently adopted the majority view.  “[T]he language of § 14–295 clearly sets forth what is required to sustain a claim for double or treble damages, and if the stated pleading requirements of that statute are met the pleading is sufficient.”   Id.

In the present case, the plaintiff alleges in count two that Conte violated § 14–222 “deliberately or with reckless disregard of the safety of other [s],” and that this violation was “a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries and losses.”   The pleading conforms with the substance of § 14–295, and therefore, the motion to strike count two is denied.

TAGGART D. ADAMS

JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE

Adams, Taggart D., J.T.R.