Umar Shahid v. Joseph Roach (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION IN RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (# 108)

Pursuant to Practice Book § 10–30, the defendant moves to dismiss the self-represented plaintiff inmate's complaint, dated May 24, 2013, on the basis that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.   The defendant alleges that the claims against him are barred by Connecticut General Statutes § 4–165 as well as the doctrine of sovereign immunity.   The defendant is an employee of the state Department of Corrections.

The plaintiff filed an objection and memorandum.

Discussion

“A motion to dismiss ․ properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Bacon Construction Co. v. Department of Public Works, 294 Conn. 695, 706, 987 A.2d 348 (2010).  “A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., 294 Conn. 206, 213, 982 A.2d 1053 (2009).  “Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”  George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003).   The purpose of the motion is to attack the “jurisdiction of the court [by asserting] that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.”  Directory Assistants, Inc. v. Big Country Vein, L.P., 134 Conn.App. 415, 219, 39 A.3d 777 (2012).   A motion to dismiss “admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must be decided upon that alone.”  Gold v. Rowland, 296 Conn. 186, 200–01, 994 A.2d 106 (2010).

“[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003).  “[I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ․ clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  May v. Coffey, 291 Conn. 106, 113, 967 A.2d 495 (2009).  “[I]n determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.”  (Intentional quotation marks omitted.)  Connor v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 260 Conn. 435, 443, 797 A.2d 1081 (2002).  “Claims involving the doctrines of common law sovereign immunity and statutory immunity, pursuant to § 4–165, implicate the court's subject matter jurisdiction.”  Manifold v. Ragaglia, 94 Conn.App. 103, 113–14, 891 A.2d 106 (2006).  “The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any state of the proceedings, including on appeal.”  Peters v. Department of Social Services, 273 Conn. 434, 441, 870 A.2d 448 (2005).  “When a ․ court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Kozlowski v. Commissioner of Transportation, 274 Conn. 497, 501 (1997).

“An evidentiary hearing is necessary when a court cannot make a critical factual jurisdiction finding based on memoranda and documents submitted by the parties.”  Ruisi v. O'Sullivan, 132 Conn.App. 1, 5 (2013).   The court has reviewed the pleadings, as well as the memoranda submitted by the plaintiff and defendant, and concludes an evidentiary hearing is not necessary.

I. Connecticut General Statutes § 4–165 Immunity

The defendant argues that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these claims, because as a state employee acting within the course of his employment, he is afforded statutory immunity pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 4–165.

General Statutes 4–165 provides in relevant part:

No state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damages or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his duties or within the scope of his employment.   Any person having a complaint for such damage or injury shall present it as a claim against the state under the provisions of this chapter.

General Statutes 4–165 was intended to grant state officers and employees immunity “where and because the state may be sued.”  McKinley v. Musshorn, 185 Conn. 616, 621, 441 A.2d 600 (1981), quoting Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 571, 362 A.2d 871 (1975).   Because it abrogates the previously existing common-law rights of redress against state officers or employees, the statute must be strictly construed.  McKinley v. Musshorn, supra.

After carefully reviewing the plaintiff's complaint, the court concludes that at the time of the accident, the defendant was acting in his official capacity as a state employee and is subject to the immunity afforded to him under Connecticut General Statutes § 4–165.   The plaintiff has not alleged wanton, reckless, or malicious conduct in the complaint.

II. Sovereign Immunity

“[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011).  “The principle that state cannot be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under our case law ․ [T]he practical and logical basis of the doctrine [of sovereign immunity] is today recognized to rest ․ on the hazard that the subjection of the state and federal governments to private litigation might constitute a serious interference with the performance of their functions and with their control over their respective instrumentalities, funds, and property ․ Exceptions to this doctrine are few and narrowly construed under our jurisprudence.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Markley v. Department of Public Utility Control, 301 Conn. 56, 65, 23 A.3d 668 (2011).

“In the absence of a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, the plaintiff may not bring an action against the state for monetary damages without authorization from the claims commissioner to do so.”  (Citations omitted:  internal quotation marks omitted.)   DiPietro v. Department of Public Safety, 126 Conn.App. 4414, 418, 11 A.3d 1149, cert. granted on other grounds, 300 Conn. 932, 17 A.3d 69 (2011), appeal withdrawn, June 26, 2012.  “When sovereign immunity has not been waived, the claims commissioner is authorized by statute to hear monetary claims against the state and determine whether the claimant has a cognizable claim ․ This legislation expressly bars suits upon claims cognizable by the claims commissioner except as he may authorize, an indication of the legislative determination to preserve sovereign immunity as a defense to monetary claims against the state not sanctioned by the commissioner or other statutory provisions.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Cox v. Aiken, 278 Conn. 204, 212 n.22 897 A.2d 71 (2006).   Even in cases where the claims commissioner denies or dismisses a claim, our statutes provide that the General Assembly may, in certain circumstances, provide the plaintiff such a right.   See General Statutes §§ 4–158, 4–159.

The defense of sovereign immunity may be raised for claims brought directly against state employees acting in their official capacity.  Mercer v. Strange, 96 Conn.App. 123, 128 (2006).   The fact that the state is not named as a defendant does not conclusively establish that the action is not within the principle which prohibits action against the sovereign without its consent.   Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 307 (2003).

In Gordon v. H.N.S. Management Co., 272 Conn. 81 (2004), our Supreme Court set forth the following factors to consider when determining whether an action against an individual is actually against the state and thus barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity:

“(1) a state official has been sued;  (2) the suit concerns some matter in which that official represents the state;  (3) that state is the real party against whom relief is sought;  and (4) the judgment, through nominally against the official, will operate to control the activities of the state or subject it to liability.”  Gordon v. H.N.S. Management Co., supra at 93–94.

Applying these factors, the court concludes that the present action is against the state.   The state would be liable for any judgment against the defendant as he was a state employee in a state operated facility and acting in the course of his duties as a state official at the times alleged in the complaint.   Therefore, he is entitled to sovereign immunity.

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted.

Vitale, J.

Vitale, Elpedio N., J.