Steven Horwath v. David Allen Owens et al. (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO STRIKE, # 106

The plaintiff, Steven Horwath, filed this four-count complaint against the defendants, David Allen Owens and McLellan Tree Service, Inc. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant operator, David Owens, was operating a motor vehicle owned by McLellan Tree Service when he collided with the plaintiff's vehicle head-on.   The defendants are seeking to strike counts one and three of the complaint.

Count one, sounding in recklessness, alleges that the defendant, Owens, violated General Statutes § 14–218a by recklessly operating his vehicle at an unreasonable speed, § 14–219 by speeding, and § 14–222 by operating his vehicle with reckless disregard to those around him at a speed endangering the life of another person, and that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's claimed injuries, in violation of General Statutes § 14–295—statutory recklessness.   He is seeking double or treble damages pursuant to § 14–295.

Count three repeats the allegations of count one, and further alleges that Owens was operating a vehicle owned by McLellan Tree Service, and was acting within the scope of his employment within the meaning of General Statutes § 52–193.   Thus, McLellan Tree Service is vicariously liable for the reckless conduct of its employee, Owens, entitling the plaintiff to relief under § 14–295.¹

The defendants move to strike counts one and three of the complaint.   The defendants contend that as to count one, the plaintiff has failed to specifically plead allegations that would give rise to a claim for statutory recklessness, and as to count three, he has failed to state claims upon which relief may be granted under § 14–295, because a non-operator owner of a motor vehicle may not be held vicariously liable for statutory punitive damages.

DISCUSSION

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alvers, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).  “A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court.”   (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Greco v. United Technologies Corp., 277 Conn. 337, 347, 890 A.2d 1269 (2006).  “A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded;  it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).  “It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Asylum Hill Problem Solving Revitalization Ass'n v. King, 277 Conn. 238, 246, 890 A.2d 522 (2006).

Count One

The defendant argues that the plaintiff has not pleaded anything in the recklessness count other than violations of General Statutes §§ 14–218a, 14–219, and 14–222, as the plaintiff has done expressly in the first count, and without any additional factual allegations that the defendant, Owens, operated his vehicle with deliberate and/or reckless disregard in violation of General Statutes § 14–295.

“In determining the legal sufficiency of the recklessness counts, the question is not the similarity of the test to that in the negligence count.   Rather the question is whether the recklessness counts can stand on their own as sounding in recklessness.”   Kelly v. Miller, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. CV 08 5008707 (August 28, 2008).

General Statutes § 14–295 provides:  “In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14–218a, 14–219, 14–222, 14–227a, 14–230, 14–234, 14–237, 14–239 or 14–240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property.”

The appellate courts have not decided what degree of specificity is required in pleading recklessness under § 14–295 and, thus, a division of opinion has occurred amongst the judges of the Superior Court.   This court has previously concluded that a plaintiff need only plead the required language in § 14–295, that is, that the defendant violated one or more of the enumerated statutory provisions named therein, and that violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries.   See, Byrnes v. Zeidler, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 11 6013498 (April 11, 2012).   This conclusion is in line with the majority view, which “is based on both an analysis of the legislative history as well as a review of the statutory language of § 14–295 itself.   These cases conclude that as long as the general requirements of the statute are met, such pleading is enough to survive a motion to strike and to state a cause of action under § 14–295.”   Ferens v. Brown, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 00–509116 (October 11, 2001).²  This court has agreed that the plain meaning of statutory language in § 14–295 requires only that a plaintiff plead a violation of one or more of the enumerated statutes named therein, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries.

The essential allegations of count one of the plaintiff's complaint in this case is that when the defendant, Owens, drove his car, in violation of §§ 14–218a, 14–219, and 14–222, the defendant engaged in reckless conduct under § 14–295, and that those violations were a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries.   As pleaded, this count, sounding in statutory recklessness is legally sufficient as is the accompanying claim for multiple damages.

Count Three

In count three, the plaintiff asserts a § 14–295 claim against the defendant, McLellan Tree Service, alleging that McLellan Tree Service is vicariously liable for the reckless conduct of its employee, Owens.   The defendant moves to strike this count on the grounds that § 14–295 does not impose vicarious liability for punitive damages.   The plaintiff argues that punitive damages provided by § 14–295 have abrogated the common law and therefore, statutory damages can be assessed vicariously against a non-operator owner.

General Statutes § 14–295, as set forth above, was amended to add the following sentence:  “The owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle shall not be responsible for such damages unless the damages arose from such owner's operation of the motor vehicle.”   The plaintiff asserts that this sentence specifically excluded liability for punitive damages against non-operator owners of leased or rented vehicles, and if the legislature had intended to exclude all non-operator owners from these punitive damages, it could have easily done so.   Thus, by declining to take that broader step, the plaintiff contends that the amendment makes clear that most non-operator owners can be held vicariously liable for multiple statutory damages, with the exception of owners of rental or leased vehicles.

Some Superior Court decisions have adopted the position that the legislature intended to hold all non-operator owners vicariously liable.   See, e.g., Goss v. Wright, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 05 5001164 (March 15, 2006) (40 Conn. L. Rptr. 882).   However, since the Supreme Court's decision in Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 836 (2003), where the court in addressing the issue of punitive damages in a case involving § 52–183, the agency statute opined that allowing an award of punitive damages against someone who was only vicariously liability was contrary to the well-established common law, the “trend [in the Superior Court] favors precluding the recovery of punitive damages under § 14–295 against parties who are only vicariously liable for the acts of others.”   Reis v. Hendel, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 10 6016353 (September 7, 2011) [52 Conn. L. Rptr. 526].

“Since Matthiessen, numerous Connecticut Superior Courts have considered whether § 14–295 makes owners or employers vicariously liable for double and treble damages, and the results are mixed ․ Having considered those opinions, this Court is persuaded by those courts that have held that § 14–295 does not abrogate the common law doctrine prohibiting vicarious liability for punitive damages as that imposed by § 14–295 ․ First, there is nothing in the language of § 14–295 that suggests that the legislature intended to abrogate the common-law rule or impose vicarious liability on owner/employers for the conduct of reckless employees.  [B]y its plain language, § 14–295 applies only to an operator of a vehicle, and not to its non-operating owner ․ The last sentence of § 14–295, concerning the owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle, does not change this analysis ․ Indeed, § 14–295 by its own terms applies only to vehicles operated by a defendant.   Second, neither party has directed the Court to any legislative history of § 14–295 that indicates the legislature intended to impose vicarious liability for punitive damages or to abrogate the common-law rule against such liability.”   (Emphasis in original.)  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Hronis v. EBO Logistics, LLC, 641 F.Sup.2d 139, 140–41 (D.Conn.2009).

The court adopts the trend in favor of precluding the recovery of punitive damages under § 14–295 against parties who are only vicariously liable for the acts of others.   One need only look at the plain language of the statute which specifically states that the statutory damages can be assessed against a person who operated a motor vehicle deliberately or with reckless disregard for the safety of others, and the 2003 amendment to the statute does not change that result.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the motion to strike count one is denied.   The motion to strike count three is granted, because double and treble damages cannot be assessed against a nonoperator owner of a vehicle upon a theory of vicarious liability.

Swienton, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Counts two and four allege negligence against Owens and McLellan Tree Service, respectively..  FN1. Counts two and four allege negligence against Owens and McLellan Tree Service, respectively.

FN2. See also, Kelly v. Miller, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain at New Britain, Docket No CV 08–5008707 (August 28, 2008);  Jean–Louis v. Arselli, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No CV 01–0386408 (May 14, 2002);  Woolums v. Deveny, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No CV 01–454434 (November 7, 2001);  Donahue v. Thomas, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No CV 01–161182 (February 28, 2001);  Plimpton v. Amerada Hess Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No CV 99–0169861 (September 27, 1999);  Nelson–Hlebogiannis v. Lee, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No CV 98–0167571 (May 17, 1999);  Carta v. Cohn, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No CV 98–0262531..  FN2. See also, Kelly v. Miller, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain at New Britain, Docket No CV 08–5008707 (August 28, 2008);  Jean–Louis v. Arselli, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No CV 01–0386408 (May 14, 2002);  Woolums v. Deveny, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No CV 01–454434 (November 7, 2001);  Donahue v. Thomas, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No CV 01–161182 (February 28, 2001);  Plimpton v. Amerada Hess Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No CV 99–0169861 (September 27, 1999);  Nelson–Hlebogiannis v. Lee, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford–Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No CV 98–0167571 (May 17, 1999);  Carta v. Cohn, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No CV 98–0262531.

Swienton, Cynthia K., J.