IN RE: Ja–Niyla C.1 (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE TERMINATION OF RESPONDENT MOTHER'S PARENTAL RIGHTS

The court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law by clear and convincing evidence:

Procedural History of the Case

Ja–Niyla C., the biological child of respondent mother, Sharlice C., was born May 2, 2011.   On or about September 27, 2011, respondent mother and a putative father, via a written acknowledgment of paternity, alleged J.B. was Ja–Niyla's biological father.   On September 29, 2011, the court, Burgdorff, J., after a contested hearing issued a written decision sustaining her prior ex-parte order vesting temporary custody of Ja–Niyla and an older sibling with the petitioner, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families (DCF).²

On or about, September 27, 2011, the court, Burgdorff, J., after canvassing and then accepting the acknowledgment of paternity, ordered two expedited interstate compact studies as to J.B. and Mr. B.'s parents.   On or about May 8, 2012, the court, Baldwin, J., after trial, adjudicated the minor child neglected as alleged and committed Ja–Niyla to the care and custody of the petitioner.   Potential placement of Ja–Niyla with the paternal grandparents (Mr. and Mrs. B.) necessitated the commencement of an interstate compact study.   Subsequently, the B.s began questioning their son's paternity;  genetic testing was ordered on or about August 23, 2012 and on or about October 23, 2012, the court, Santos, J. concluded J.B. was not Ja–Niyla's biological father.

On or about March 25, 2013, the petitioner filed a termination of parental rights petition (tpr) as to respondent mother.³  The tpr trial as to respondent mother commenced and concluded on February 4, 2014.   The petitioner alleges mother has failed to rehabilitate pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B) and that it is in the minor child's best interest to terminate respondent mother's parental rights.

Reasonable efforts to locate

Throughout the pendency of these proceedings, respondent mother's whereabouts has been known to the petitioner.   This court therefore finds the petitioner has made reasonable efforts to locate respondent mother.

Reasonable efforts to reunify

Respondent mother chronically exhibits uncontrolled anger and rage which manifests itself in assaultive, threatening and violent behavior.⁴  On at least two occasions prior to the filing of this tpr petition, mother stormed the Middletown DCF office threatening others and, in one instance inflicting physically injury on a DCF supervising social worker.   Mother suffers from post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), severe bipolar disease and alcohol abuse.   Historically, mother is only compliant with mental health treatment and medication when incarcerated.

Ja–Niyla's September 2011 removal from her mother's care stemmed in part from a domestic violence incident between respondent mother and her then boyfriend, Larry B.⁵ Respondent and Larry B. physically assaulted one another and during the assault four-month-old Ja–Niyla was in her mother's arms and Ja–Niyla's two-year-old half-brother, Jadice, stood next to the respondent.⁶  Mother was arrested.

Commencing in June of 2011 DCF contracted with Intensive Family Therapy (IFP) services to work in the home with mother on parenting skills.   Mother was receptive to the IFP service and received positive reports.   However, when Jadice and Ja-niyla were removed from mother's care in September of 2011, IFP closed their case.⁷

Moreover, as a condition of her three different probations in 2012,⁸ mother was required to attend anger management treatment, consequently, mother was enrolled in a dual diagnosis program at Rushford and although mother ultimately completed twenty sessions at Rushford,⁹ only minimal benefit was gained and mother continued to engage in out of control behaviors.¹⁰

From April of 2011 to October of 2012 mother persistently declined to engage in any substantive mental health treatment.   One notable exception occurred in the fall of 2012.   In anticipation of Larry III's birth the petitioner referred mother to a specific form of trauma treatment known as ART (Accelerated Rehabilitation Therapy) in an attempt to address mother's severe PTSD. Mother attended the first five sessions and she appeared visibly more relaxed at the end of each session.   However, after the first five sessions mother failed to appear for subsequently scheduled appointments.¹¹

Mother attended an intake appointment in March of 2013 at Perspective Counseling in Meriden but the program determined she needed a higher level of care.   The petitioner commenced looking for an intensive outpatient treatment program for respondent mother but by April of 2013 mother was re-incarcerated and she has remained incarcerated to date.

The petitioner facilitated supervised visitation between the minor child and respondent mother upon the child's removal in September of 2011.   However in February of 2013, by agreement of the parties, visitation was suspended until such time as mother engaged in individual therapy and submitted to a medication assessment;  upon mother's compliance with the recommendations therapeutic supervised visitation would occur two times a week.   No assessment was done given mother's April 2013 imprisonment.¹²

Given the above, the court finds DCF made reasonable efforts to accurately identify and address mother's multiple issues.   Mother's refusal to engage in substantive mental health treatment resulted in her repetitive antisocial, violent, threatening and criminal behavior which often culminated in her arrests/incarcerations or hospitalizations.   To date, mother has been unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.

Adjudication

Statutory grounds exists to terminate parental rights when:  “the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court ․ to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding and [the parent] has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child ․” C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B).

The barriers that prevent mother from parenting any child are articulately summarized by Dr. Connolly in his November 2012 evaluation:

[Mother] is a seriously mentally ill individual who is highly resistant to receiving necessary services to address her mental illness.   The dangerousness of her uncontrolled and aggressive behavior concerning herself, other adults and children in her care should not be underestimated.  [Mother] is chronically and intermittently subject to states of extremely aggressive behavior but when not in one of these states, she is likely to be cooperative, engaging, and in some instances actually charming.   She solicits the sympathy of many people who note the remarkable incongruity between her apparently reasonable and constructive behavior when she is not in her rage states and her lengthy record of criminal offenses related to interpersonal aggression.   This has unfortunately caused persons involved in the child protection system to sometimes under-react to the danger [mother] presents.   In addition to the mixed hypomanic/depressed states during which [mother] represents a significant danger to herself and others, she is also subject to recurrent acutely depressed states during which time she is unable to move from her bed and attend to her basic personal activities.   By her own acknowledgment and according to her treatment history, [mother] also has a significant problem with alcohol abuse.   Her use of alcohol is likely to increase the seriousness of her rage states and the likelihood that she will do serious harm to herself or others during these states.   Another factor which increases the dangerousness of her rage behavior is her extensive history as a child and adolescent as a victim of abuse.   This abuse involves at least one incident of sexual abuse as well as recurrent severe physical abuse by her biological father.   The combination of [mother's] seriously uncontrolled and aggressive behavior and her remarkably powerful resistance to mental health services render very low the likelihood of her rehabilitation to a point where she could be considered a reliable caregiver for a child at any time in the foreseeable future.

Petitioner's exhibit S, p. 17.

It is noteworthy that mother's disciplinary problems during her present incarceration caused her to be placed in segregation and ultimately while in prison segregation she began engaging in mental health therapy including a medication regime.   Whether mother remains in treatment and compliant with her medications upon her discharge from prison later this year is unknown.   Even assuming mother remains engaged and compliant, (something she has never done except while incarcerated), a significant period of time would need to elapse to determine whether she can refrain from her historical antisocial, self-destructive and criminal behavior and live independently in the community.¹³  Ja–Niyla, at four months of age, was removed from her mother's care;  the child is now approaching three years of age.   For the past twenty-nine months Ja–Niyla has remained in foster care while DCF consistently tried to engage mother in requisite mental health treatment prior to mother's April 2013 incarceration.   Mother's recent compliance with treatment only occurred during her five-month stay in prison segregation and therefore it is not in Ja–Niyla's best interest to wait any further to see what if anything mother does differently upon her release from prison tentatively scheduled for August of 2014.   The court, therefore, finds the petitioner has met her burden of proof as to the statutory ground of failure to rehabilitate.¹⁴

Disposition

The court must next consider what is in the child's best interest.   The court is required to consider the factors outlined in C.G.S. § 17a–112(k):

(1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.

As discussed previously, the presenting and ongoing obstacles regarding reunification are mother's untreated mental health issues, including alcohol abuse, her antisocial/criminal behavior and her protracted incarceration.   Even prior to Ja–Niyla's birth, the petitioner offered mother services to address her emotional and mental health issues and DCF continued to offer services:  IFP services, referrals for mental health counseling and therapy, case management services, supervised visitation and through adult probation, treatment at a dual diagnosis program at Rushford and ART and then a follow up to ART therapy.

(2) As indicated previously in this opinion, DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify respondent mother with Ja–Niyla.

(3) The preliminary specific steps of September 8, 2011 serve as the operative specific steps in this case.   The court relies on its analysis contained earlier in this decision as to the parties' compliance with said steps.

(4) This court notes that at the time of the May 2012 neglect trial, bonding between mother and child had occurred.  (Petitioner's exhibit Q p. 76.)   A year has elapsed since the minor child last visited with respondent mother.   Mother's protracted absence from the child's life, given the child's young age, renders any present parent-child bond nominal at best.

The child has no emotional bond to Maurice Doe. Ja–Niyla was placed in three different foster homes from Sep. 8, 2011 to October of 2011.   She remained in the third nonrelative foster home for approximately one and one-half years, during which time a maternal aunt came forward as a resource.   She is Ja–Niyla's half brother's (Larry B.) foster mother and she vigorously sought to have Ja–Niyla placed together with Larry in her care.   Eventually the petitioner agreed to transition Ja–Niyla to the aunt's care but after three months of caring for both siblings, the aunt requested that both of the children be removed from her care.   Various stakeholders convened a meeting and ultimately Ja–Niyla was placed back with her prior longstanding nonrelative foster family and the aunt agreed to keep Larry.   The foster family is now willing to adopt Ja–Niyla ¹⁵ and on a positive note, the minor child's foster parent and the aunt have met and developed a friendship that ensures Ja–Niyla and Larry will continue to have contact, at least as long as Larry remains with the aunt.

(5) Ja–Niyla was born on May 2, 2011 and is therefore almost three years old.

(6) As outlined in the agreement contained in the file, the mother agreed to cease visiting Ja–Niyla in February of 2013.   Shortly thereafter mother was imprisoned and will remain so until approximately August of 2014.   This court, therefore, is not aware of any effort on mother's part to make it in the minor child's best interest for the child to return to mother's care in the foreseeable future.

(7) This court is not aware of any parent, person, agency or economic circumstance that has prevented respondent mother from maintaining a meaningful relationship with Ja–Niyla.   As stated previously, it is mother's chronic refusal to engage in substantive, sustain mental health treatment and therapy and her chronic criminal and assaultive/threatening behavior that precipitated the 2011 removal, the 2012 adjudication of neglect and commitment to DCF and now the granting of the petition to terminate mother's parental rights.

Accordingly, the court hereby finds that it is in the minor child's best interest to terminate respondent mother's parental rights.¹⁶  The parental rights of Sharlice C. are hereby terminated.

Bernadette Conway, Judge

FOOTNOTES

FN2. The same court signed an ex-parte order of temporary custody on September 8, 2011 along with preliminary specific steps, which is Petitioner's exhibit A. A neglect petition regarding Ja–Niyla was also filed simultaneously with the OTC motion..  FN2. The same court signed an ex-parte order of temporary custody on September 8, 2011 along with preliminary specific steps, which is Petitioner's exhibit A. A neglect petition regarding Ja–Niyla was also filed simultaneously with the OTC motion.

FN3. Sometime in late 2012 or early 2013, respondent mother named a putative father by his first name only:  Maurice.   Respondent mother disclosed Maurice was from New Haven but she did not know his last name.   Consequently the petitioner served ‘Maurice Doe’ with a termination of parental rights petition (tpr) via newspaper publication on or about April 4, 2013.   On or about April 19, 2013, respondent mother finally disclosed Maurice Doe's true last name.   The petitioner, after conducting a diligent search for a Maurice Doe of New Haven, made contact with Mr. Doe in April of 2013.   Mr. Doe admitted to having an intimate relationship with respondent mother and DCF informed Mr. Doe of the next court date and sent Mr. Doe written correspondence to a confirmed address.   Mr. Doe was served abode on or about May 10, 2013 but never appeared in court or had any further contact with DCF until February 4, 2014, the first day of the tpr trial.   In the afternoon session of the Feb. 4th trial, and by agreement of the parties, this court vacated the previous default judgment against Mr. Doe and stayed the tpr trial as to Mr. Doe..  FN3. Sometime in late 2012 or early 2013, respondent mother named a putative father by his first name only:  Maurice.   Respondent mother disclosed Maurice was from New Haven but she did not know his last name.   Consequently the petitioner served ‘Maurice Doe’ with a termination of parental rights petition (tpr) via newspaper publication on or about April 4, 2013.   On or about April 19, 2013, respondent mother finally disclosed Maurice Doe's true last name.   The petitioner, after conducting a diligent search for a Maurice Doe of New Haven, made contact with Mr. Doe in April of 2013.   Mr. Doe admitted to having an intimate relationship with respondent mother and DCF informed Mr. Doe of the next court date and sent Mr. Doe written correspondence to a confirmed address.   Mr. Doe was served abode on or about May 10, 2013 but never appeared in court or had any further contact with DCF until February 4, 2014, the first day of the tpr trial.   In the afternoon session of the Feb. 4th trial, and by agreement of the parties, this court vacated the previous default judgment against Mr. Doe and stayed the tpr trial as to Mr. Doe.

FN4. It is unnecessary to recount in detail the multiple incidents in which mother became so angry and irate that police were summoned and respondent mother was arrested and/or incarcerated and/or hospitalized (see petitioner's exhibits E, H, I, K, J, N, O, P, S).  The extremeness of mother's behaviors cannot be overstated.   For instance, in 2007, mother assaulted a supervisor-coworker at Dunkin Donuts which resulted in the supervisor sustaining injuries including serious burns from hot liquid either being thrown by or spilled by the respondent on the victim during the assault..  FN4. It is unnecessary to recount in detail the multiple incidents in which mother became so angry and irate that police were summoned and respondent mother was arrested and/or incarcerated and/or hospitalized (see petitioner's exhibits E, H, I, K, J, N, O, P, S).  The extremeness of mother's behaviors cannot be overstated.   For instance, in 2007, mother assaulted a supervisor-coworker at Dunkin Donuts which resulted in the supervisor sustaining injuries including serious burns from hot liquid either being thrown by or spilled by the respondent on the victim during the assault.

FN5. Respondent mother and Larry B. are the biological parents of Larry B. III (dob: 11/01/12).   The petitioner removed Larry B. III from mother's care on or about January 14, 2013 and in a Feb. 6, 2014 written decision, this court adjudicated Larry B. III neglected and committed him to the care and custody of the petitioner.   Petitioner's exhibit C are preliminary specific steps ordered by the court regarding Larry B. III at the time of his removal from his mother's care..  FN5. Respondent mother and Larry B. are the biological parents of Larry B. III (dob: 11/01/12).   The petitioner removed Larry B. III from mother's care on or about January 14, 2013 and in a Feb. 6, 2014 written decision, this court adjudicated Larry B. III neglected and committed him to the care and custody of the petitioner.   Petitioner's exhibit C are preliminary specific steps ordered by the court regarding Larry B. III at the time of his removal from his mother's care.

FN6. Mother's guardianship rights as to the Ja–Niyla's older half sibling, Jadice, was reinstated by the court, Burgdorff, J., on August 19, 2011 with a six-month order of protective supervision.The court ordered specific steps of August 19, 2011, among other things, prohibited mother from engaging in any criminal behavior.   On or about September 29, 2011, the court, Burgdorff, J. modified the protective supervision order as to Jadice and committed him to the care and custody of the petitioner.   Guardianship of Jadice was transferred back to his previous guardian on January 17, 2012 at which point any specific steps regarding Jadice terminated..  FN6. Mother's guardianship rights as to the Ja–Niyla's older half sibling, Jadice, was reinstated by the court, Burgdorff, J., on August 19, 2011 with a six-month order of protective supervision.The court ordered specific steps of August 19, 2011, among other things, prohibited mother from engaging in any criminal behavior.   On or about September 29, 2011, the court, Burgdorff, J. modified the protective supervision order as to Jadice and committed him to the care and custody of the petitioner.   Guardianship of Jadice was transferred back to his previous guardian on January 17, 2012 at which point any specific steps regarding Jadice terminated.

FN7. In anticipation of Larry III's birth the hope was to allow him to remain in mother's care with services and to that end, in November of 2012, a second round of IFP services was put in place by the petitioner.   Mother lost interest in working with that program after Larry's removal from her care in January of 2013..  FN7. In anticipation of Larry III's birth the hope was to allow him to remain in mother's care with services and to that end, in November of 2012, a second round of IFP services was put in place by the petitioner.   Mother lost interest in working with that program after Larry's removal from her care in January of 2013.

FN8. Exhibit Q p. 60 reflects that as of May 8, 2012 respondent mother had three different probation files:  one probation was for a threatening conviction;  one file was for a violation of a protective order conviction and one file was for criminal mischief, breach of peace and two counts of threatening in the Second Degree.   In September of 2012 mother incurred a violation of probation charge and had an outstanding assault charge and a breach of peace charge..  FN8. Exhibit Q p. 60 reflects that as of May 8, 2012 respondent mother had three different probation files:  one probation was for a threatening conviction;  one file was for a violation of a protective order conviction and one file was for criminal mischief, breach of peace and two counts of threatening in the Second Degree.   In September of 2012 mother incurred a violation of probation charge and had an outstanding assault charge and a breach of peace charge.

FN9. Treatment at Rushford was temporarily disrupted due to mother's incarceration..  FN9. Treatment at Rushford was temporarily disrupted due to mother's incarceration.

FN10. Mother also received anger management services from Catholic Charities from May to September of 2012.   Although mother completed the program she was deemed not successful as to attendance and as to any substantive progress..  FN10. Mother also received anger management services from Catholic Charities from May to September of 2012.   Although mother completed the program she was deemed not successful as to attendance and as to any substantive progress.

FN11. Payment for therapy sessions after the first five would have been through the state funded Husky program and not necessarily ART programing per se;  the treatment was to be conducted by the same treatment provider and geared toward addressing mother's issues..  FN11. Payment for therapy sessions after the first five would have been through the state funded Husky program and not necessarily ART programing per se;  the treatment was to be conducted by the same treatment provider and geared toward addressing mother's issues.

FN12. Mother's out of control behavior continued while incarcerated.   Mother was segregated for disciplinary reasons from the general prison population from August of 2013 to January of 2014.   Throughout her segregation from the general prison population mother received weekly/biweekly treatment regarding her anger issues and one on one therapy with a correctional social worker on “emotional regulation.”   Mother remains incarcerated and is presently compliant with a medication regime..  FN12. Mother's out of control behavior continued while incarcerated.   Mother was segregated for disciplinary reasons from the general prison population from August of 2013 to January of 2014.   Throughout her segregation from the general prison population mother received weekly/biweekly treatment regarding her anger issues and one on one therapy with a correctional social worker on “emotional regulation.”   Mother remains incarcerated and is presently compliant with a medication regime.

FN13. Respondent mother's prognosis, according to Dr. Connolly is bleak.   Exhibit 5, pp. 20–22.   At the very minimum, if mother were to “seriously organize herself in such a way as to be open to personal rehabilitation,” among other things Dr. Connolly opines would be essential is “individual psychotherapy [which] would almost certainly have to take place more than once a week in sessions of at least 45 minutes for the first year.”  Id..  FN13. Respondent mother's prognosis, according to Dr. Connolly is bleak.   Exhibit 5, pp. 20–22.   At the very minimum, if mother were to “seriously organize herself in such a way as to be open to personal rehabilitation,” among other things Dr. Connolly opines would be essential is “individual psychotherapy [which] would almost certainly have to take place more than once a week in sessions of at least 45 minutes for the first year.”  Id.

FN14. Three different court ordered specific steps were admitted as exhibits in this case.  (Petitioner's exhibits A, B, C.) Exhibit A, dated September 8, 2011, are preliminary specific steps ordered and signed by a judge at the time the ex-parte motion for temporary custody was granted.   Said steps were never made final steps nor did the respondent mother ever sign exhibit A;  exhibit A therefore is the operative specific steps.A review of the May 8, 2012 neglect trial transcript (Petitioner's exhibit Q pp. 37–38) reveals the following:Question by mother's attorney:  “Ms. Verrastro [DCF social worker], with regard to the specific steps, do [sic] you review the specific steps with Ms. C.?”Answer:  “I review [sic] the goals, yes.”Question:  “And would you say that Ms. C. is receptive to those goals?”Answer:  “Yes.”The neglect trial transcript reflects respondent mother was present for the morning session of trial but not for part or all of the afternoon session.  (Exhibit Q, p. 63.)   At the conclusion of the trial later in the day the child was committed to the care and custody of DCF and the trial judge opined that mother's absence may be tied to the court making mother angry.  (Exh. Q, p. 75.)   Moreover, at the tpr trial, social worker Karen Weiss credibly testified she was assigned the case in January of 2012 and that she reviewed petitioner's exhibit A with mother.The absence of final specific steps must be analyzed pursuant to our supreme court's recent decision of In Re Elvin G., 310 Conn. 485 (2013).   In reviewing exhibit A and the neglect trial transcript, this court concludes the preliminary specific steps that were court ordered sufficiently apprised respondent mother of the court's expectations regarding reunification.   The status and needs of the mother and minor child and the unaddressed issues that necessitated the child's removal in September of 2011 continued to be the same issues that precluded reunification in 2012 and 2013 and 2014.   Therefore the September 8, 2011 preliminary specific steps adequately “[p]rovide[d] notice and guidance to [the respondent] parent as to what should be done to facilitate reunification and prevent termination of rights.”  In Re Elvin G. at 507–08.Alternatively, this court concludes that mother's continued incarceration since April 2013, with an August 2014 release date, renders the absence of final specific steps, while not prudent, factually similar to the respondent father's plight in In Re Elvin G. Just as in Elvin, in the present case “the obstacles to the respondent's rehabilitation as a parent [are] formidable.”  Id. Until and unless mother exhibits a protracted period of stability in the community, including but not limited to sustained compliance with mental health treatment and medication, reunification is impossible.   Ja–Niyla has already spent too many years in foster care and should not wait years longer.   Again, this court concludes its reliance on the preliminary specific steps of September 8, 2011 is consistent with C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B) and In Re Elvin G. Alternatively, however, if this court has incorrectly concluded exhibit A satisfies the statutory mandate of C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B), such noncompliance is harmless given that compliance would not have affected the outcome.  Elvin G. at 513..  FN14. Three different court ordered specific steps were admitted as exhibits in this case.  (Petitioner's exhibits A, B, C.) Exhibit A, dated September 8, 2011, are preliminary specific steps ordered and signed by a judge at the time the ex-parte motion for temporary custody was granted.   Said steps were never made final steps nor did the respondent mother ever sign exhibit A;  exhibit A therefore is the operative specific steps.A review of the May 8, 2012 neglect trial transcript (Petitioner's exhibit Q pp. 37–38) reveals the following:Question by mother's attorney:  “Ms. Verrastro [DCF social worker], with regard to the specific steps, do [sic] you review the specific steps with Ms. C.?”Answer:  “I review [sic] the goals, yes.”Question:  “And would you say that Ms. C. is receptive to those goals?”Answer:  “Yes.”The neglect trial transcript reflects respondent mother was present for the morning session of trial but not for part or all of the afternoon session.  (Exhibit Q, p. 63.)   At the conclusion of the trial later in the day the child was committed to the care and custody of DCF and the trial judge opined that mother's absence may be tied to the court making mother angry.  (Exh. Q, p. 75.)   Moreover, at the tpr trial, social worker Karen Weiss credibly testified she was assigned the case in January of 2012 and that she reviewed petitioner's exhibit A with mother.The absence of final specific steps must be analyzed pursuant to our supreme court's recent decision of In Re Elvin G., 310 Conn. 485 (2013).   In reviewing exhibit A and the neglect trial transcript, this court concludes the preliminary specific steps that were court ordered sufficiently apprised respondent mother of the court's expectations regarding reunification.   The status and needs of the mother and minor child and the unaddressed issues that necessitated the child's removal in September of 2011 continued to be the same issues that precluded reunification in 2012 and 2013 and 2014.   Therefore the September 8, 2011 preliminary specific steps adequately “[p]rovide[d] notice and guidance to [the respondent] parent as to what should be done to facilitate reunification and prevent termination of rights.”  In Re Elvin G. at 507–08.Alternatively, this court concludes that mother's continued incarceration since April 2013, with an August 2014 release date, renders the absence of final specific steps, while not prudent, factually similar to the respondent father's plight in In Re Elvin G. Just as in Elvin, in the present case “the obstacles to the respondent's rehabilitation as a parent [are] formidable.”  Id. Until and unless mother exhibits a protracted period of stability in the community, including but not limited to sustained compliance with mental health treatment and medication, reunification is impossible.   Ja–Niyla has already spent too many years in foster care and should not wait years longer.   Again, this court concludes its reliance on the preliminary specific steps of September 8, 2011 is consistent with C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B) and In Re Elvin G. Alternatively, however, if this court has incorrectly concluded exhibit A satisfies the statutory mandate of C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B), such noncompliance is harmless given that compliance would not have affected the outcome.  Elvin G. at 513.

FN15. Ja–Niyla's transition to the aunt's care was challenging but ultimately successful.   Her transition back to her former long-term nonrelative foster family also provoked challenging behavior but ultimately Ja–Niyla settled in.   Of concern now however, is that the child is indiscriminately going to anyone—an issue the petitioner and the foster parent are presently in the process of addressing.   Additionally, Ja–Niyla is identified as a ‘medically complex’ child in that she suffers from asthma and is allergic to peanut butter..  FN15. Ja–Niyla's transition to the aunt's care was challenging but ultimately successful.   Her transition back to her former long-term nonrelative foster family also provoked challenging behavior but ultimately Ja–Niyla settled in.   Of concern now however, is that the child is indiscriminately going to anyone—an issue the petitioner and the foster parent are presently in the process of addressing.   Additionally, Ja–Niyla is identified as a ‘medically complex’ child in that she suffers from asthma and is allergic to peanut butter.

FN16. While it is unclear as to whether Maurice Doe is indeed the biological father and if so what if any future role he will play in the minor child's life, this court nonetheless concludes it is in the minor child's best interest to terminate mother's parental rights..  FN16. While it is unclear as to whether Maurice Doe is indeed the biological father and if so what if any future role he will play in the minor child's life, this court nonetheless concludes it is in the minor child's best interest to terminate mother's parental rights.

Conway, Bernadette, J.