Minnesota Mutual Lawyers Insurance Company et al. v. Anne Grunbeck Monaghan (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On September 18, 2012, the plaintiff, Minnesota Mutual Lawyers Insurance Company, filed its complaint against the defendant, Anne Grunbeck Monaghan, seeking a declaratory judgment pursuant to General Statutes § 52–29 ¹ as to whether it is required to defend and indemnify the defendant, an attorney, in an underlying malpractice action, Owens, Schine & Nicola, P.C. v. Monaghan, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV–12–6028770–S (malpractice action), and a grievance committee action, Disciplinary Counsel v. Monaghan, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV–11–6005172–S (grievance committee action).²  The plaintiff claims that because the defendant did not notify it of these actions when it renewed her insurance policy, she is in breach of the policy and is not entitled to a defense or indemnification.   On September 19, 2013, upon learning that the grievance action had resolved and that the defendant and the plaintiffs in the malpractice action had reached a settlement agreement, the court sua sponte raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.

The plaintiff filed a brief in support of subject matter jurisdiction on October 10, 2013.   The defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff's judgment on default and motion to dismiss on October 18, 2013, in which she responded that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.   The court scheduled a hearing for January 30, 2014, and requested that the parties address the status of the grievance action, and, with respect to the malpractice action, the issue of indemnification, and whether the defendant Monaghan had assigned any of her rights under the policy to the intervenor.

DISCUSSION

“Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it ․ [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction ․ The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Keller v. Beckenstein, 305 Conn. 523, 531–32, 46 A.3d 102 (2012).  “Once the question of subject matter jurisdiction has been raised, cognizance of it must be taken and the matter passed upon before [the court] can move one further step in the cause;  as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Harrison, 264 Conn. 829, 839 n.6, 826 A.2d 1102 (2003).

“[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003).  “[I]t is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Keller v. Beckenstein, supra, 305 Conn. 531.  “The determination of whether a claim has become moot is fact sensitive, and may include the representations made by the parties at oral argument.”  Ayala v. Smith, 236 Conn. 89, 94, 671 A.2d 345 (1996);  see also Mackenzie v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 146 Conn.App. 406, 423, 77 A.3d 904 (2013).

“Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be determined as a threshold matter because it implicates [the] court's subject matter jurisdiction ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Valvo v. Freedom of Information Commission, 294 Conn. 534, 540, 985 A.2d 1052 (2010).  “Since mootness implicates subject matter jurisdiction ․ it can be raised at any stage of the proceedings.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Domestic Violence Services of Greater New Haven, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 240 Conn. 1, 6, 688 A.2d 314 (1997).  “[Courts] do not render advisory opinions.   If there is no longer an actual controversy in which [the court] can afford practical relief to the parties, [it] must dismiss the [case] ․ [W]here the question presented is purely academic, [the court] must refuse to entertain the [case] ․ A case becomes moot when due to intervening circumstances a controversy between the parties no longer exists.”  Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 103 Conn.App. 571, 586 n.15, 930 A.2d 739, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 930, 934 A.2d 245 (2007).

In the present case the plaintiff brings this declaratory judgment action pursuant to § 52–29 and Practice Book § 17–55.  “A declaratory judgment action may be maintained if all of the following conditions have been met:  (1) The party seeking the declaratory judgment has an interest, legal or equitable, by reason of danger of loss or of uncertainty as to the party's rights or other jural relations;  (2) There is an actual bona fide and substantial question or issue in dispute or substantial uncertainty of legal relations which requires settlement between the parties;  and (3) In the event that there is another form of proceeding that can provide the party seeking the declaratory judgment immediate redress, the court is of the opinion that such party should be allowed to proceed with the claim for declaratory judgment despite the existence of such alternate procedure.”  Practice Book § 17–55.

“The purpose of a declaratory judgment action, as authorized by General Statutes § 52–29 and Practice Book § [17–55], is to secure an adjudication of rights where there is a substantial question in dispute or a substantial uncertainty of legal relations between the parties.”  (Footnote omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.)  Bysiewicz v. Dinardo, 298 Conn. 748, 756, 6 A.3d 726 (2010).  “Implicit in [§ 52–29 and Practice Book § 17–55] is the notion that a declaratory judgment must rest on some cause of action that would be cognizable in a nondeclaratory suit ․ To hold otherwise would convert our declaratory judgment statute and rules into a convenient route for procuring an advisory opinion on moot or abstract questions ․ and would mean that the declaratory judgment statute and rules created substantive rights that did not otherwise exist.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Milford Power Co., LLC v. Alstom Power, Inc., 263 Conn. 616, 625, 822 A.2d 196 (2003).  “Fully to carry out the purposes intended to be served by [declaratory] judgments, it is sometimes necessary to determine rights which will arise or become complete only in the contingency of some future happening.   Even if the right claimed ․ is a contingent one, its present determination may well serve a very real practical need of the parties for guidance in their future conduct.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   George v. Watertown, 85 Conn.App. 606, 613, 858 A.2d 800, cert. denied, 272 Conn. 911, 863 A.2d 702 (2004).   The Supreme Court dealt with a similar situation to the present case in New London County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Nantes, 303 Conn. 737, 749–50, 36 A.3d 224 (2012), where the plaintiff insurance company sought a declaratory judgment as to its obligation to the defendant insured.   The court determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction where the settlement agreement assigned the defendant's rights under the policy at issue to a third party and the third party had demonstrated an intent to bring an action.  Id.

In contrast to Nantes, the Appellate Court in Shenkman–Tyler v. Central Mutual Ins. Co., 126 Conn.App. 733, 739, 12 A.3d 613 (2011), upheld the dismissal of a declaratory judgment action where the plaintiff's rights under the insurance contract, if any, were assigned to his ex-wife in a marital dissolution action.   The court stated that “[b]ecause no practical relief can be granted to the plaintiff, his claim is nonjusticiable, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's declaratory judgment action.”  Id.

At the hearing held on January 30, the parties stipulated that the malpractice action had settled, and the defendant represented, through counsel, that she paid the settlement.   The defendant further represented that she had not assigned any of her rights to prosecute a claim against the plaintiff.   Finally, the defendant stipulated that she waived any right she might otherwise have to recover costs or attorneys fees incurred from the defense of the actions.   Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the matter is moot, and that it lacks subject jurisdiction to hear the case.

BELLIS, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. General Statutes § 52–29 provides:  “Superior Court may declare rights and legal relations.(a) The Superior Court in any action or proceeding may declare rights and other legal relations on request for such a declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.   The declaration shall have the force of a final judgment.(b) The judges of the Superior Court may make such orders and rules as they may deem necessary or advisable to carry into effect the provisions of this section..  FN1. General Statutes § 52–29 provides:  “Superior Court may declare rights and legal relations.(a) The Superior Court in any action or proceeding may declare rights and other legal relations on request for such a declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.   The declaration shall have the force of a final judgment.(b) The judges of the Superior Court may make such orders and rules as they may deem necessary or advisable to carry into effect the provisions of this section.

FN2. The underlying cases arise from the defendant's alleged failure to diligently represent Owens, Schine & Nicola as its attorney in an employment discrimination case by failing to timely file responsive pleadings, such as a motion to dismiss and an answer, failing to attend scheduled hearings and/or teleconferences, and in general failing to provide competent representation in a variety of ways.   Owens, Schine & Nicola, P.C. v. Monaghan, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV–12–6028770–S (Complaint, July 9, 2012)..  FN2. The underlying cases arise from the defendant's alleged failure to diligently represent Owens, Schine & Nicola as its attorney in an employment discrimination case by failing to timely file responsive pleadings, such as a motion to dismiss and an answer, failing to attend scheduled hearings and/or teleconferences, and in general failing to provide competent representation in a variety of ways.   Owens, Schine & Nicola, P.C. v. Monaghan, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV–12–6028770–S (Complaint, July 9, 2012).

Bellis, Barbara N., J.