IN RE: Aiden G. (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On January 11, 2013, Joette Katz, as she is the commissioner of the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”), filed a petition pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a–112 et seq. to terminate the parental rights of Amber G. and Christopher N. to the minor child, Aiden G. The parents have appeared and are represented by counsel.   Both parents mention possible American Indian affiliation in their history.   DCF contacted the Bureau of Indian Affairs and designated tribal authorities pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C., § 1903.   The Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians' tribal registry finds Amber to be neither registered nor eligible to tribal membership.   Similarly, the Blackfeet Tribe has concluded that Christopher N. is not enrolled and thus this court concludes that this child, Aiden G. is not an “Indian Child” as that term is used in the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978.  (Letter responses are full exhibits # 1.)   The court is aware of no other proceedings pending in any other court regarding the custody of this child.   This court has jurisdiction.

The case was assigned for a contested trial on the termination petition on March 6, 2014, Child Protection Session at Middletown.   The respondent father had previously consented to the termination of his parental rights on May 20, 2013, which was accepted by the court (Epstein, J.) On March 6, 2014, the mother failed to appear for the contested court hearing.   She is presently known to be living within walking distance of the court.   Proper notices of assignment have been sent to her.   She has failed to appear and was defaulted.

A motion for judicial notice was filed on October 24, 2013.   Without objection the motion was granted by this court.   The petition initially alleged that Amber is the parent of a child who has been found by the superior court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.

The file reflects that on November 8, 2011, Wahla, J., accepted the mother's plea of nolo contendere and thereafter adjudicated the child neglected.   The child was returned to mother on an order of protective supervision.   Subsequently the child was removed on an order of temporary custody January 27, 2012, and returned to the care of the Commissioner.

The evidence establishes that DCF has been involved with Amber regarding her three other children, all of whom are presently in the custody of their natural father, Amber's ex-husband.   Earliest involvement with Amber was in 2008, concerning physical neglect, lack of supervision, mental health and substance abuse by Amber.   These same problems brought Aiden into DCF care in 2011.

The child was returned to her under protective supervision.   Amber was directed to attend counseling and substance abuse treatment.  (Specific Steps Ex 5.) She returned to substance abuse.   Aiden was removed from her care.   Amber has been offered available, appropriate and accessible services for substance abuse and mental health counseling.   She has been offered a parent-child in-patient program which Amber rejected.   While she sometimes completes programs, she is unable to remain sober.

Amber was evaluated by Dr. Bruce Freeman, a court appointed psychologist.   The psychologist was guarded in his prognosis for Amber since she tended to congregate with people with similar problems.   Dr. Freedman found that Amber has post-traumatic stress disorder, chronic major depression, poly substance dependence and borderline personality disorder.  (Petitioner's Exhibit 7.)

The court finds that the same problems that brought Aiden into care more than two years ago, still persist.  (Petitioner's Exhibit 3.) In addition to her own personal struggles, Amber has been inconsistent and irregular in visitation, sometimes going for months without a visit.   The department has proven to the court's satisfaction that Amber cannot offer Aiden a responsible, sober, stable and nurturing care-giver.

The petitioner has established this ground of failure to rehabilitate by clear and convincing evidence.

Best Interest Findings

As part of the dispositional phase of this hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights, the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events up to and including the date upon which the evidence in this matter was completed.   During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the children.  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 689 (1999).

The court makes the following seven written findings:  (Pursuant to 17a–112, these findings are not required as to the consenting parent, Christopher.)

(1) As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to Amber and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with respondent, the court finds that the department has offered services to the respondent that were available, appropriate and accessible.   (See Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 3, 4.)

(2) As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, the court finds that DCF made such efforts.

(3) As to the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, the court finds that Amber was issued specific steps for reunification.   She has made some efforts to shed herself of her debilitating addiction.   Regrettably she has failed to demonstrate sobriety over time.   She has mental health problems which also debilitate her.   They will require dedicated, consistent counseling over time.   The prognosis is not bright.

(4) As to the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties, the court finds that the child does not have at present any parental emotional bond with Amber.   The child has adjusted very well in his foster home and to the extended foster family.   This family is providing the day-to-day physical, emotional, moral and educational support the child needs.

(5) As to the age of the child, Aiden was born on July 17, 2011.   He is presently two and a half.   Aiden has been with this foster family since January 26, 2012, a period of two years.   The child's attorney supports permanency for Aiden which can only be achieved here through termination of the parent's rights.   Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).   The Appellate Court has also noted, “[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence ․ “ In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994).

(6) As to the efforts the parents have made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the children to return such children home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child, the court finds that visitation has been sporadic and declining.   Amber's lack of adjustment is self-evident.   She continues to need to address her personal problems before she is in a position to focus on her parental limitations.

(7) As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent, the court finds no unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parents or third parties.

Disposition

With respect to the best interests of the child by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the evidence, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Amber is in the best interest of the child.   In making this finding that termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in the child's best interest, the court has examined multiple relevant factors including the notion that permanency, consistency and stability are crucial for children.   Aiden's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of environment are equally paramount.   The length of stay in foster care;  the nature of the relationship of the child with the biological parents;  the degree of contact maintained with the biological parents;  and the genetic bond to respondents, all have been considered.  In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000);  In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000).

ORDER

It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of Amber G. are hereby terminated as to Aiden.   The parental rights of Christopher N. are terminated by his consent.   The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent.

With regard to the permanency plans for the child, the court hereby approves the plan of termination of parental rights and adoption and finds that such plan is in the best interest of the child.   The court also finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plan.   A case report shall be submitted within thirty days of this judgment, and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.

The Clerk of the Probate Court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of the child shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters 7 Kendrick Avenue, Waterbury, CT. 06702 of the date when said adoption is finalized.

Judgment may enter accordingly.

Foley, J.T.R. # 485

Foley, Francis J., J.T.R.