Saqueen Carter v. Philadelphia Ins. Co. (2014)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE Motion for Summary Judgment # 114

ISSUE AND SUBMISSION

Whether the court should grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the identity of the unknown driver in the case?

FACTS

On January 26, 2012, the plaintiff, Saqueen Carter, filed a one-count complaint against the defendant, Philadelphia Insurance Company.   In her complaint the plaintiff alleges the following:  Ices, Incorporated (Ices), the plaintiff's employer, purchased an automobile liability insurance policy from the defendant covering the plaintiff's employers' vehicles;  the policy included uninsured motorists coverage and was in full force and effect on May 15, 2010;  on said date the plaintiff was injured when, while occupying an “insured” vehicle, the insured vehicle was struck by another vehicle negligently operated by an unknown driver;  and the unknown driver left the scene after the collision.   The plaintiff claims that the unknown driver is an “uninsured motorist,” as defined by the policy, and asserts that the defendant is contractually liable for the harm plaintiff suffered as a consequence of the uninsured motorist's negligence.

The defendant filed an answer and asserted special defenses ¹ on May 16, 2012.   The plaintiff filed a reply to the special defenses on May 29, 2012.   The defendant filed the present motion for summary judgment along with a memorandum of law and exhibits on October 25, 2013.²  The plaintiff filed an objection to the motion, a supporting memorandum, and exhibits on January 9, 2014.³  The matter was heard by the court at short calendar on January 27, 2014.

DISCUSSION

“Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534, 51 A.3d 367 (2012).  “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Patel v. Flexo Converters U.S.A., Inc., 309 Conn. 52, 56–57, 68 A.3d 1162 (2013).

“In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact.   The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 10–11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).  “As the party moving for summary judgment, the plaintiff is required to support its motion with supporting documentation, including affidavits.”  Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 231 Conn. 756, 796, 653 A.2d 122 (1995).  “When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., supra, 11.

The defendant argues that there is no genuine issue of fact as to the identity of the allegedly unknown driver.   The defendant claims that because the driver has been identified as Stephen Collin, and because Collin did in fact have insurance at the time of the accident, he is not an uninsured motorist.   The plaintiff concedes that Collin was the “unknown driver” who negligently caused the subject collision, but argues in response that Collin's identity was not known to the plaintiff at the time she brought the uninsured motorist claim.   The plaintiff claims that because three years have passed since the accident, the uninsured motorist claim is her only remedy and should therefore be permitted.

Whether or not Collin was an uninsured motorist, as defined by the subject insurance policy, is a material issue in the present case.  “[I]n order to recover under [an uninsured motorist] policy, the plaintiff must prove:  (1) that the other motorist was uninsured;  (2) that the other motorist was legally liable under the prevailing law;  and (3) the amount of liability.”  (Emphasis added.)  Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 229 Conn. 359, 367–68, 641 A.2d 783 (1994).  “[W]hen characterizing uninsured motorist coverage, [the court] must consider the specific circumstances presented in each case, being mindful of the dual purposes of underinsured benefits of providing compensation for the victims of underinsured motorists, while simultaneously adhering to the principle that uninsured motorist coverage is to place the insured in the same position as, but no better position than, the insured would have been had the underinsured tortfeasor been fully insured.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Enviro Express, Inc. v. AIU Ins. Co., 279 Conn. 194, 205, 901 A.2d 666 (2006).

The qualification of a driver as an uninsured motorist must be determined by the terms of the insurance policy in question.  “An insurance policy is to be interpreted by the same general rules that govern the construction of any written contract ․ Under those circumstances, the policy is to be given effect according to its terms ․ When interpreting [an insurance policy], we must look at the contract as a whole, consider all relevant portions together and, if possible, give operative effect to every provision in order to reach a reasonable overall result.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Johnson v. Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Ass'n., 302 Conn. 639, 643, 31 A.3d 1004 (2011).   See also Enviro Express, Inc. v. AIU Ins. Co., supra, 279 Conn. 203 (“the amount of an underinsured motorist payment is determined, within contractual limits, by the measure of tort damages” [emphasis added] ).

In the present matter, neither party has provided the court with the text of the insurance policy which the defendant provided to Ices. Without the details regarding the defendant's policy, the court is unable to resolve the issue of whether or not Collin was an uninsured motorist according to the terms of that policy.   As the moving party, the defendant has the obligation to “support its motion with supporting documentation ․” Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, supra, 231 Conn. 796.   The defendant has not done so.   Accordingly, the defendant has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exist in the present case.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied.

Zemetis, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The defendant's special defenses all relate to reductions of any recovery the plaintiff may be entitled to receive, and are not relevant to the present motion for summary judgment..  FN1. The defendant's special defenses all relate to reductions of any recovery the plaintiff may be entitled to receive, and are not relevant to the present motion for summary judgment.

FN2. The defendant's exhibits include an affidavit of Kathryn Kozak and pages from a deposition of Stephen Collin..  FN2. The defendant's exhibits include an affidavit of Kathryn Kozak and pages from a deposition of Stephen Collin.

FN3. The plaintiff's exhibits include a police report of the accident, a letter from the GEICO Indemnity Company claims department, and additional pages from Collin's deposition..  FN3. The plaintiff's exhibits include a police report of the accident, a letter from the GEICO Indemnity Company claims department, and additional pages from Collin's deposition.

Zemetis, Terence A., J.